FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* **The Editors.**

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 35 APRIL 1957 No. 3

STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION

By Henry A. Kissinger

WHATEVER the problem—whether it concerns our military strategy, our system of alliances or our relations with the Soviet bloc—the nuclear age demands above all a clarification of doctrine. At a moment when technology has put within our grasp a command of nature never before imagined, we are driven to realize that everything depends on our ability to use power with subtlety and discrimination. In the absence of concepts that define the nature of power, its purpose and its relation to policy, the possession of it may serve merely to paralyze the will. All the difficult choices of the nuclear period—the nature of its weapons systems, the risks diplomacy can run, the issues for which to contend—presuppose a doctrinal answer before they can find a technical one.

This is particularly true of military strategy. Because we have won two world wars by outproducing our opponent, we have tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as has superiority in resources. Superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers and at least equal in equipment but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and the use of artillery, a better relationship between fire and movement, furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the mediæval knights. All these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and to pre-

Editor's Note: The present article is adapted from a study, prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, which will be published in June under the title, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy."

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sent the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Strategic doctrine translates power into policy. Whether the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve or prevent a change, its strategic doctrine must be able to define what objectives are worth contending for and to develop the appropriate force for achieving them. By establishing a pattern of response *in advance* of crisis situations, strategic doctrine permits a Power to act purposefully in the face of challenges. In its absence a Power will constantly be surprised by events. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic requirement of American security.

II

It may be argued, of course, that we do possess a strategic doctrine expressed in the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the National Security Council on the basis of which the force levels of our Armed Forces are determined by Congress. But the decisions of the Joint Chiefs and of the National Security Council give a misleading impression of unity of purpose. The officials comprising these bodies are either service chiefs in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or heads of executive departments in the case of the National Security Council. As administrators of complicated organizations, they must give most of their attention to reducing the friction of the administrative machine both within their department and in the relation of their department to other agencies. The heads of departments do not stand above the battle of the bureaucracy; they are spokesmen for it. In fact, the departmental viewpoint is sometimes purposely exaggerated in order to facilitate compromise.

As a result, the conclusions of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council reflect more the attainable consensus among sovereign departments than a sense of direction. Because agreement is frequently unattainable except by framing conclusions in very general language, decisions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council do not end interdepartmental disputes. Instead they shift them to an interpretation of the meaning of directives. And departments or services whose disagreements prevented the development of doctrine in the first place will choose the exegesis closest to their original point of view. The seeming unanimity of our policy-making bodies

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only defers the doctrinal dilemma until some crisis or the budgetary process forces a reconsideration under the pressure of events.

Within the Department of Defense these problems are compounded by the obsolescent division of functions among the services and the predominant rôle played by fiscal considerations in setting force levels. The Key West agreement of 1948 confirmed the traditional division: each service was to continue with its primary mission of defeating its enemy counterpart; the mission of the Air Force is to dominate the sky, of the Navy to control the sea and of the Army to defeat the enemy's ground forces.

Until the end of World War II, this assignment of rôles represented distinguishable strategic options: the Army was in fact powerless on the sea beyond the range of its coastal artillery and the Navy could not project itself far inland. The Air Force was not yet independent and the range of planes was sufficiently short to permit the division of functions among naval and army air forces to follow roughly the division among the senior services.

But with modern weapons, the traditional definition of primary missions amounts to giving each service a claim to develop a capability for total war. For the sky cannot be dominated short of a scale of attack on the opposing retaliatory force which will unleash an all-out conflict; control of the seas implies the destruction of industrial facilities and supply depots deep in enemy territory, as Admiral Burke testified before the Symington Committee; and the Army has declared a 1,500-mile missile essential for the performance of its mission. A division of functions among the services makes sense only if the functions in fact represent distinguishable strategic missions. If each service in the performance of its primary mission must carry out tasks inseparable from the primary mission of a sister service, energies will be increasingly absorbed in jurisdictional disputes. Nor can this problem be avoided by administrative fiat as has repeatedly been attempted. The inter-service rivalries are inherent in the definition of missions; they result inevitably from a division of rôles on the basis of means of locomotion in the face of a technology which makes a mockery of such distinctions.

As a consequence of the lack of doctrinal agreement, none of the services can be certain that a sister service's interpretation of what constitutes an essential target accords with its own. It is therefore convinced that it cannot relinquish control over any weapon which it believes important to the achievement of its

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mission. The only way a service can be certain that its targets will in fact be attacked is to seek to obtain every weapon that can be used against them, even if such a weapon already exists in a sister service. "If I was assured when we wanted to attack Russia on a strategic mission," said General Twining during the Symington Hearings on American Airpower, "that the naval carriers were assigned to General Le May, . . . fine. But that is not the case and I don't know where those carriers are going to be . . . so the Strategic Air Command has to be just as big, just as strong and just as ready, regardless of this Navy contribution."[1] "The primary function of the Air Force," said General Taylor defending the Army's development of a 1,500-mile missile, "is to destroy enemy air power and for the Navy to destroy enemy naval power. . . . If you accept the fact that the Army exists to destroy hostile armies, then any missiles which will destroy hostile ground forces should be available to the Army."[2]

The rigid division of functions therefore exacerbates disputes among the services. Since no service can achieve its primary mission without defeating the enemy completely, each service will always consider its force levels inadequate and will be convinced that one reason for this inadequacy is a transgression by a sister service on its field of jurisdiction. Moreover, while the present assignment of rôles produces a duplication of some categories of weapons, it causes some others to fall between two stools. The disputes between the Army and the Air Force regarding the importance of airlift provide an illustration. The Air Force, charged with defeating the enemy air arm, must look on an investment in planes having no strategic or tactical combat effectiveness as a diversion of resources. The Army, on the other hand, cannot carry out its mission if it is not able to get into position rapidly. The present division of functions, therefore, produces either duplication or an inability to consider requirements in terms of overall strategy.

Another factor which inhibits the development of strategic doctrine is the predominance of fiscal considerations in our defense planning. This is not even always a question of deliberate choice. One of the reasons for the emphasis on fiscal policy and technology has been that the former has been explicit and the

[1] U.S. Senate, *Study of Airpower*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1956), p. 1840.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1285.

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latter impressively demanding. In the process of coördinating diverse policies, which is the primary function of the National Security Council, there always exists a clear fiscal policy, largely because governmental economy is the *raison d'être* of the Bureau of the Budget and because only one agency—the Treasury Department—is responsible for setting objectives in the fiscal field. But there is rarely, if ever, a clear National Security policy to oppose it. On the contrary, the contending services have been tempted to enlist the backing of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget by advocating their particular strategy as contributing to governmental economy. The fiscal viewpoint, therefore, often comes to predominate by default; in a conceptual vacuum the side with the clearest and most consistent position will gain ascendancy.

Whatever the reason, every administration since World War II has at some time held the view that this country could not afford more than a certain sum for military appropriations, overriding the question of whether we could afford to be without an adequate military establishment. Now the imposition of a budgetary ceiling is not inevitably pernicious; a removal of all budgetary restrictions would inhibit doctrine even more, because it would lead each service to hoard weapons for every eventuality—as occurred to some extent during the Korean War. And the proliferation of weapons systems unrelated to doctrine will cause strategic decisions—which always involve choices—to be made in the confusion of battle. The difficulty with our present budgetary process is that by giving priority to cost over requirement it subordinates doctrine to technology. Budgetary requests are not formulated in the light of strategic doctrine; rather doctrine is tailored and if necessary invented to fit budgetary requests.

The predominance of fiscal considerations makes for doctrinal rigidity because it causes each service to be afraid that a change in doctrine will lead to a cut in appropriations. This is illustrated by a violent dispute in 1950 between advocates of strategic air power and a group of scientists at the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who were accused of advocating a cut in our retaliatory force in order to build up air defense. The remarkable thing about this dispute was that the M.I.T. group explicitly denied underrating the importance of strategic air power; they insisted that their recommendations had been solely concerned with building up our air defense. Yet the

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partisans of strategic air power had psychology, if not logic, on their side. With a fixed ceiling on defense expenditures it was clear that any new appropriation was bound to lead to the reduction of existing forces; a new capability could in practice be developed only at the expense of an existing one.

As a result, budgetary pressures compound the inherent conservatism of the military and end in subordinating doctrine to the battle for appropriations. Each service pushes weapons development in every category without sufficient regard for the program of other services, and each service seeks to obtain control over as many different weapons as possible as a form of insurance against drastic budgetary cuts in the future. The predominance of fiscal considerations in our defense planning actually encourages a subtle form of waste: in the absence of an agreed strategic doctrine, it leads to the proliferation of partially overlapping, partially inconsistent weapons systems. Because to relinquish a weapons system may mean to relinquish the appropriations that go with it, every service has a powerful incentive to hold on to every weapon even after it has outlived its usefulness.

The doctrinal handicap imposed by the predominance of fiscal considerations is not compensated for by an increase in civilian control either within the Executive Branch or by Congress. The difficulty of effective control over military programs is due to two factors: the fiction of the yearly review of programs and their technical complexity. The yearly review is increasingly inconsistent with the realities of defense planning. The hiatus between development and procurement is several years in the case of most weapons; the introduction of a new weapon into a unit implies that all units will be so equipped over a period of time. Thus the first order for B-52s logically carried with it the obligation to continue procurement until all heavy bomber wings of the Strategic Air Command were composed of jet planes. Similarly, the beginning of construction of an aircraft carrier makes almost inescapable future appropriations to complete its construction.

In these circumstances, a yearly review does not bring about effective control; it does ensure, however, that no dispute is ever finally resolved. Each year the same arguments about the efficacy of limited war, airlift and the relative merits of carrier and strategic aviation are repeated, and they are not settled until some technical development outstrips the dispute or an administrative decision allocates rôles and missions which the losing service ac-

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cepts only because it has every prospect of reopening the issue in the following year. In the absence of doctrinal agreement, inter-service disputes can be resolved only by compromises which may define merely the least unacceptable strategy or by adding to the number of missions and weapons systems.

The technical complexity of most disputes complicates civilian control and particularly Congressional control even further. Within the Department of Defense the multiplication of civilian officials, often in office for only a year or two, causes the Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to become less agents of control than a device to legitimize inter-service disputes. Their short term in office makes it difficult if not impossible for them to become familiar with the subtleties of the strategic problems. Instead of being able to establish a unified concept, they become spokesmen for the professional staff on whose advice they are dependent.

As for Congressional control, the only forum where the over-all defense program can be considered is in the Appropriations Committee. A meaningful judgment by the Congress on the defense budget would presuppose an assessment of the military strength achieved by a given expenditure and the relationship of this strength to a set of national security objectives. Neither condition is met by current practice. To be sure, the budget is introduced by testimony of the service chiefs and their civilian superiors regarding the gravity of the international situation. But no attempt is made to show the relationship of strategy to events abroad beyond the general implication that the proposed program would ensure the security of the United States. In turn, the Congressional Committees can make their judgments only in terms of a vague assessment of the international situation: they will be hesitant to reduce the budget if they feel the situation too grave and they will be disposed to pare requests drastically when they think the situation is not as serious as represented.

Such Congressional consideration of strategic concepts as does take place is usually produced by the dissatisfaction of some service with its budgetary allocations. Thus the B-36 hearings in 1949 resulted from the cancellation by Secretary Johnson of the Navy's giant carrier and the Symington Committee hearings on air power were the consequence of the budgetary ceiling imposed on the Air Force (and other services too) by Secretary Wilson. This procedure has the disadvantage of emphasizing the problems of one particular service and of obscuring the real difficulties which

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occur in the area of overlapping strategies. Moreover, even the hearings explicitly addressed to the problems of the rôles and missions of the services tend to be conducted in the familiar technical categories. Thus during the Symington hearings on American air power in 1956, relatively little attention was paid to the strategic concepts of the services; on the whole, the Committee was content to take the services at their own valuations. But a great deal of time was spent on the relative numbers of the Soviet and United States heavy bomber forces and the relative thrust of jet engines. These figures are important, to be sure, but their meaning derives from strategic doctrine. Without a concept of war—or at least of air war—comparative numbers mean little and the relative thrust of jet engines means less. The quest for numbers is a symptom of the abdication of doctrine.

In order to create a favorable climate for their budgetary requests, the services tend to emphasize the most ominous aspects of the United States security problem. Because of their awareness that there exists a greater receptiveness for programs which seem to offer total solutions, each service is encouraged to stress the part of its mission which poses the most absolute sanctions. Thus in 1951 the Army produced the "atomic cannon," a cumbersome, hybrid and already obsolescent weapon, in part to obtain access to the nuclear stockpile. Similarly, after the B-36 hearings, the Navy ceased to oppose the identification of deterrence with maximum retaliatory power; in fact, it adopted the theory as its own and in its budgetary presentations, at least, it has emphasized its contribution to the strategic striking force more than its less dramatic task of anti-submarine warfare. And Congressional hearings leave little doubt that even within the Air Force, the Strategic Air Command has the most prestige value.

Thus the budgetary process places a premium on the weapons systems which fit best with the traditional preconceptions of American strategic thought. It is not that the belief in the importance of strategic striking forces is wrong in itself; indeed, the Strategic Air Command must continue to have the first claim on our defense budget. It is simply that the overemphasis on total solutions reinforces the already powerful tendency against supplementing our retaliatory force with subtler military capabilities that address themselves to the likelier dangers and involve a less destructive strategy. A vicious circle is thereby set up: the more terrible we paint Soviet capabilities, the more we confirm our

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predilection for an all-out strategy. But the more fearful the consequences of our strategy, the more reluctant will the political leadership be to invoke it. In every crisis, we are obliged to gear our measures to the availability of forces instead of having in advance geared our forces to the most likely danger. And even with respect to the forces which we have available our hesitations are multiplied because the services do not agree among themselves about strategy either for limited or for total war, but particularly for the former.

III

The temptation in planning strategy is to substitute power for conception, to identify doctrine with the maximum development of strength. But a basic change in the nuclear age is that victory in an all-out war has lost its traditional meaning. With conventional technology, the side which could mount a superior offensive effort would generally retain a sufficient margin to impose its will. In a thermonuclear war, on the other hand, a superior offensive effort may prove strategically insignificant because even the weaker side may be able to inflict a degree of destruction which no society can support. The doctrinal challenge of the nuclear age is therefore the ability to use force with discrimination and to establish political goals in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. Strategic doctrine can no longer confine itself to the problem of providing the weapons for war; it must also relate them to the *purpose* of war.

Against the ominous background of thermonuclear devastation, the goal of war can no longer be military victory as we have known it. Rather it should be the attainment of certain specific political conditions which are fully understood by the opponent. The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be. This does not mean that military operations cannot extend beyond the territory or objective in dispute; indeed, one way of increasing the enemy's willingness to come to terms is to take away from him something which he can regain *only* by making peace. But it does mean that the conduct of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone; it must reflect an ability to harmonize political and military objectives. A "purely" military decision in a limited war is therefore a contradiction in terms.

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A war between major Powers can remain limited only if at some point one of the protagonists prefers a limited defeat to an additional commitment of resources or if both sides are willing to settle for a stalemate in preference to an assumption of continued risk. In either case, however, the protagonists retain the *physical* ability to increase their commitment. To the extent that both sides do increase their commitment the war will gradually expand until one or both Powers reach the limit of their physical resources —until the war has become total. To the extent that only one side is willing to run greater risks it gains an advantage. The ability to conduct a limited war depends therefore on an understanding of the psychology by which the opponent calculates his risks and on the ability to present him at every point with an opportunity for a settlement that appears more favorable than would result if the war were continued.

With a doctrine of limited war, many of the long cherished notions of warfare will have to be modified or abandoned. One of the cardinal principles of air strategy is that wars can be won only by dominating the air space completely. But any attempt to deprive an enemy of his retaliatory force would inevitably bring on all-out war. Confronted by the prospect that it will be completely impotent once its retaliatory force has been destroyed, a Power will almost certainly decide to use it to deprive its opponent of the means to impose his will. Thus the minimum condition for limiting war will be the immunity of the enemy's retaliatory forces.

Even control of the air over a combat zone will be increasingly irreconcilable with a policy of limited war, particularly if control requires deep penetration of enemy territory. For the enemy is likely to interpret any deep penetration as an approaching attack on his retaliatory force. In any war between major nuclear Powers, sanctuary areas immune to attack will be almost essential.

Limited war cannot be conceived as a small all-out war characterized by a series of uninterrupted blows mounting in intensity until the opponent's will is broken. On the contrary, it is important to develop a concept of military operations conducted in phases which permit an assessment of the possibilities for settlement at each stage before recourse is had to the next phase of operations. Paradoxical as it may seem in the jet age, strategic doctrine should address itself to the problem of slowing down, if not the pace of military operations, at least the rapidity with which

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they succeed each other. We must never forget that henceforth the purpose of strategy must be to affect the will of the enemy, not to destroy him, and that war can be limited only by presenting the enemy with an unfavorable calculus of risks. This requires pauses for calculation. Every campaign should be conceived as a series of self-contained phases, each of which implies a particular political objective, and with a sufficient interval between them to permit the application of political and psychological pressures.

Therefore, it will also be necessary to give up the notion that direct diplomatic contact ceases when military operations begin. Rather, direct contact is essential to ensure that both sides possess as much information as possible about the consequences of expanding a war and are able to present political formulas for a settlement. To the degree that diplomacy produces alternatives to expanding a conflict it will inhibit the decision to run greater risks. To the extent that military operations can be conducted in stages, it will give an opportunity for an evaluation of the circumstances which make a settlement advisable. Not the least of the paradoxes of the nuclear age may be that lack of secrecy may actually assist in the conduct of military operations, and that in a period of the most advanced technology battles will approach the stylized contests of the feudal period which were as much a test of will as a trial in strength.

Such a change in traditional notions of warfare will not be simple to bring about. On closer examination it may even prove technically impossible. But the discouraging aspect of so much of our thinking about strategy is its refusal to admit that the new technology requires a new order of tactics. Instead we tend to add nuclear weapons to existing strategy as merely a more efficient explosive. This will not only produce appalling casualities; it also may not be adequate to the challenges we will confront. Any progress in our manner of conducting war must therefore be preceded by a doctrinal revolution. We must recognize the new strategy conceptually before we can explore its technical feasibility. It is, to be sure, a tremendous task, but history will not excuse the inadequacy of the response by the vastness of the challenge.

IV

Among the obstacles to an adequate response is the organization of our military establishment. To develop a strategic doctrine requires an administrative structure which leads officers to reflect

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spontaneously about questions of over-all concern throughout their careers. And this is impossible as long as there exists a division of functions among our services which is growing increasingly arbitrary. A strategy utilizing missiles is not necessarily analogous to air strategy because missiles fly through the air, any more than a 1,500-mile missile is a tactical weapon because it is fired like an artillery projectile.

It may well be that the separation of the Army and the Air Force in 1948 occurred two decades too late and at the precise moment when the distinction between ground and air strategy was becoming obsolete. Instead of making the Army Air Corps independent it would probably have been sounder to mix the two organizations more thoroughly. The separation of the two services was achieved to the detriment of both; different service academies, training schools and war colleges inevitably emphasize a particular aspect of strategy instead of an over-all doctrine in which traditional distinctions should be disappearing, in which the Army should begin to approach the mobility of the Air Force and the Air Force to develop the relative discrimination of ground warfare.

It would still be the wisest course to move in the direction of a single service initially by amalgamating the Army and the Air Force. The strategic problems of the Navy may remain sufficiently distinct not to require integration and in any case resistance to complete unification in the Navy would be so bitter as to obviate its advantages. A unified service with a single system of service schools would force officers at a formative stage of their careers into a framework less narrowly addressed to the concerns of a particular service.

Complete unification among the services is probably out of the question. The persistence of bureaucratic forms and the traditions from which each service derives its strength would insure overwhelming resistance to the concept of a single uniform and a single system of service schools. It may even be that a single service would be too unwieldy and would still require a subdivision according to the strategic tasks which have to be performed. It may therefore be best to begin reorganization by creating two basic commands, each representing a clearly distinguishable strategic mission. The Army, Navy and Air Force would continue as administrative and training units, much as the training commands *within* the various services function today. But for all other pur-

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poses two basic organizations would be created: the Strategic Force and the Tactical Force. The Strategic Force would be the units required for all-out war; it would include the Strategic Air Command; the Air Defense Command; those units of the Army required to protect overseas bases; and the units of the Navy which are to participate in the retaliatory attack. The Tactical Forces would be the Army, Air Force and Navy units required for limited war. The Strategic Forces would probably be under Air Force command, the Tactical Forces under an Army officer. The training and doctrine of each Force should be uniform and its officers should attend the same technical and service schools. The schools would continue to be administered by a parent service but the curriculum and student body should be determined by the Force commander.

Such a division would reflect the realities of the strategic situation. While the Tactical Forces might be required in an all-out war and for such a purpose would come under the command of the Strategic Forces, the Strategic Forces should not be utilized for limited war and should be as self-contained as possible even for all-out war. The strategic striking force is the chief deterrent against all-out war; it must therefore be reserved for this contingency. This is particularly important during a limited war, because to the extent that our retaliatory force was expended in such a conflict, the enemy would lose his incentive for keeping the war limited. An aggressor who could tempt us to utilize our strategic striking force for limited war would gain a strategic advantage, however military operations ended. For to the extent that our retaliatory force suffered attrition in a limited war, our ability to deter the enemy from all-out war would be reduced—and thereby the sanction for keeping the war limited. To consider our strategic striking force as a dual-purpose force will weaken the deterrent to all-out war precisely when it should be strongest.

Moreover, the nature of the weapons, the planning and the concept of operations differ radically between forces useful for all-out war and those which should be ready for limited war. The weapons system for all-out war is designed to inflict maximum destruction in the shortest possible time. The weapons system for a limited war, on the other hand, should be flexible and discriminating. In an all-out war the targets are known in advance, in fact each crew of the Strategic Air Command is training for a specific Soviet target all the time. Everything depends, therefore,

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on the efficiency with which the plan for all-out war can be implemented. In a limited war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can be determined in advance. Everything here depends on the rapidity with which planning can adjust to a developing situation.

The strategic problem in limited war is to apply graduated amounts of destruction for limited objectives and also to permit the necessary breathing-spaces for political contacts. Hence a weapons system for limited war is basically different from a retaliatory force. Limited wars require units of high mobility and considerable firepower which can be quickly moved to trouble spots and which can bring their power to bear with discrimination. The capability for rapid deployment is crucial. For given the power of modern weapons and the speed of movement of military units everything depends on seizing a position as rapidly as possible because it will be very difficult to dislodge an enemy once he has become established. Since aggression is unlikely to occur unless the aggressor doubts either the capability or the willingness of its opponent to intervene, the ability to get into position rapidly even with relatively small forces can serve as a gauge of the determination to resist and contribute to the re-establishment of an equilibrium before either side becomes too heavily committed.

The division of our forces into a Strategic and a Tactical Force would reflect the real nature of the strategic problem we confront: the necessity of being protected against all-out war as the prerequisite of all other measures and the capability to fight limited war as the form of conflict where the cost is commensurate with the issues actually under dispute.

In such an organization, too, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would change their character. They would be composed of a Chairman, the Chief of the Tactical Forces, the Chief of the Strategic Forces, the Chief of Naval Operations (to represent operations such as anti-submarine warfare which do not fit into any of the above categories). Such a group would in its very nature be more oriented towards doctrine than the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of each Force would represent an integrated strategic mission and not a means of locomotion. Since service chiefs would continue to administer the traditional services, the Chief of each Force would be freed of many of the routine problems of administration which, as Admiral Radford pointed out before the

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Symington Committee, make the Chairman the only member of the present group who can give his full attention to problems of over-all strategy.

The advantage of the proposed organization for the conduct of military operations is demonstrated by the fact that joint commands reflecting the same basic concept have been set up in every recent war in which we have been engaged. The new organization would create in peacetime the structure which the requirements of combat would impose on us in any case. To be sure, there would be a possibility of the same contest over appropriations as now between the Chiefs of the Strategic and the Tactical Force. And there would be the same temptation to invent doctrine to support budgetary requests. But with each Force representing a distinguishable strategic mission, self-interest and requirements of strategic doctrine would be in harmony.

In attempting to channel military thought towards doctrine, it would be desirable, however, to relieve some of the pressure inherent in the almost incessant process of either preparing, negotiating or justifying budgets. A great deal would be gained by an extension of the budget cycle for defense appropriations to a period of two years. Thus the military budget would coincide with the term of the House of Representatives. And, as we have seen, many of the essential commitments for major procurement of necessity extend over several years.

To be sure, in its initial stages such a procedure might sharpen inter-service rivalries because commitments would now be more fundamental. But bringing the inter-service disputes to a head would produce healthy consequences in the long run. The failure to resolve current doctrinal disagreements and the pretense of harmony at each budgetary hearing cause the conflict to rage by subterfuge, by planned leaks to newspapers or to Congressmen. A two-year budgetary cycle would free the service chiefs from the constant pressure of short-term considerations; it might encourage planning to turn from the essentially defensive task of justifying force levels to the consideration of the purpose of those forces.

With the emergence of an agreed strategic doctrine within the Department of Defense, the whole process of formulating security objectives within the Executive Branch would gain in balance. An explicit Department of Defense position would then confront the fiscal position. With a better structure for producing strategic

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decisions and a longer interval between budget hearings (the latter, though helpful, is not essential), inter-service disputes would lose a great deal of their intensity. Doctrine could then be built on the only sound basis: a concept of the nature and the possible goals of war.

V

In the absence of a generally understood doctrine, our actions will of necessity prove haphazard; conflicting proposals will compete with each other without an effective basis for their resolution. Each problem, as it arises, will seem novel and energies will be absorbed in analyzing its nature rather than in seeking solutions. Our services will find it impossible to make a meaningful choice among the mass of new weapons with which their research and development programs will soon overwhelm them. We will continue to cede the initiative to others and our course will become increasingly defensive.

Many of our problems in the postwar period have been produced by our failure to accept the doctrinal challenge. We have tended to ascribe our standards of reasonable behavior to the Soviet leaders; we have had difficulty in defining our purposes in relation to the revolutionary forces loose in the world. Above all, we have had a penchant for considering our problems as primarily technical and to confuse strategy with the maximum development of power.

One of the paradoxical lessons of the nuclear age is that at the moment when we are acquiring an unparalleled command over nature, we are forced to realize as never before that the problems of survival will have to be solved above all in the minds of men. In this task the fate of the mammoth and the dinosaur may serve as a warning that brute strength does not always supply the mechanism in the struggle for survival.

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FORCE FOR U.N.

By Lester B. Pearson

PEACE, one might think, is not the sort of human occupation which should normally require supervision. Yet the United Nations, instead of concentrating on more positive and progressive activities, has ever since its inception been engaged in supervising a kind of peace which has been not much more than the absence of fighting—and not always even that. Now policing a peace—or an armistice—can be an essential international function, at times a dramatic one. It cannot be denied that the United Nations has been successful in this function in some important cases. However, action in this field has been largely pragmatic and ad hoc. I believe—and recent events have strengthened my belief—that the time has come when we should seek ways to enable the United Nations to pursue this work in a more organized and permanent way.

The world's alarm last November over events in Egypt—intensified, if that were possible, by the frustrating situation in Hungary—galvanized the General Assembly into establishing a United Nations Emergency Force, an action which until then had not been thought practicable or probable. We must now do everything possible to ensure that this action is successful in achieving the desired results. If we fail in this, a damaging blow —perhaps a fatal one—will be dealt to the whole concept of supervising the peace and avoiding hostilities through the United Nations Assembly. If we succeed, then we must build on that success so that when we are faced in the future with similarly complicated and dangerous situations we can avoid the hasty improvisations of last autumn.

The United Nations was brought into being primarily as a cooperative endeavor on the part of many nations to seek in collective action the security for which mankind hungered and which the facts of life in the modern world denied to each nation individually. To achieve this the founders of the United Nations recognized the necessity of having military forces at its disposal and they wrote into the Charter provisions which they hoped would bring them into being. Over the years, however, these provisions have developed in ways far removed from the intentions of their authors.

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Under the Covenant of the old League of Nations, the Assembly and the Council had concurrent jurisdiction over the peaceful settlement of disputes and recommendations of enforcement action. Under the Charter of the United Nations, however, the Security Council has primary responsibility in this field and, within certain well-defined limits, has the power to direct members to take action. The League Covenant made no provision for the compulsory enforcement of its decisions; any decision which might require the use of force could be taken only with the unanimous approval of all members, including the state against which it was to be directed. Every member of the League had the right of veto over collective action. That, of course, was a guarantee of futility.

The Charter of the United Nations, however, took what was hoped would prove to be a great step forward. The concentration in the Security Council of power to make certain decisions and enforce them gave the new organization immense potential for quick and decisive action—at least in theory. Actually, in the conditions of cold war the veto possessed by each permanent member of the Council was almost as effective in preventing action as if all members had had it.

Despite the dangers inherent in the irresponsible use of the veto, there was hope that the Security Council would prove effective. One reason for hope was that its decisions were to have behind them an overwhelming superiority of armed force deriving primarily from the forces of the Great Powers themselves. In addition, other members of the organization undertook to make armed forces available to the Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements. These forces were to be organized collectively by the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members.

As early as 1947, however, the Military Committee became deadlocked over the issue of the contributions to be made by the Great Powers themselves to the collective force of the United Nations. Their disagreement merely reflected the general breakup of their wartime coöperation and its replacement by the fears and dissensions of the cold war. With no Great Power agreement it is not surprising that the Military Staff Committee also failed to draw up the special agreements between the Council and other members envisaged under Article 43 of the Charter,

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and upon which the whole military structure of the United Nations was originally meant to rest. As a result, the United Nations today entirely lacks that particular type of international force envisaged in the Charter.

In spite of its inability to use force to implement its decisions, the Security Council was nevertheless able to intervene with some success in dangerous situations in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir and Palestine. Then came the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and a temporary but significant change in the pattern of United Nations action to preserve the peace—a change made possible by two accidents of history. First, the U.S.S.R., with its veto, was absent from the Security Council when the decision to intervene was taken. Second, at the moment of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea a United Nations Commission was on the spot, able to report and advise on the facts of the situation. The U.S.S.R., however, is not likely again to vacate its seat in the Council, and there are many dangerous areas in the world where the United Nations maintains no observation agency. The type of Security Council action against aggression in Korea, therefore, is not likely to be repeated. In any event, the United Nations character of that action was as much symbolic as it was real, because the United States supplied most of the forces and exercised most of the control over them. In so far as the possibility of using the United Nations for collective security was concerned, Korea was both an encouragement and a warning.

By the time of the Korean operation, it had become clear that where an important, not to say vital, political interest of a Great Power was at stake, that Power would not readily subordinate its decision to a collective judgment. Because of this, and because of the veto, the earlier idea of collective security through the Security Council became impossible to realize. To escape from the dilemma thus created, many members of the United Nations suggested that questions which the Council was unable to resolve might be referred to the General Assembly; and they advocated that other forms of force than that provided for under Article 43 of the Charter be organized to carry out United Nations decisions.

Even earlier, at the very first session of the General Assembly in October 1946, the Canadian delegation had voiced its concern that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee had failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to imple-

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ment Article 43. It urged that these bodies proceed with all possible speed to equip the Security Council with forces.

In the following Assembly of 1947, Mr. St.-Laurent, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said: "Nations in their search for peace . . . will not and cannot accept indefinitely and unaltered a Council which was set up to ensure their security, and which, so many feel, has become frozen in futility and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security. Such associations, if consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter, can be formed within the United Nations." The provisions of the Charter, he added, "provide a floor under, rather than a ceiling over, the responsibilities of Member States. If some prefer to go even below that floor, others need not be prevented from moving upwards." It was the Canadian hope that such a development would not be necessary. If it were unnecessary it would certainly be undesirable.

As we have seen, however, hopes for ensuring collective security were not fulfilled. The Security Council remained powerless to provide such security and the Assembly was unorganized for this purpose. In view of the undiminished threat from the Soviet Union, which had a preponderance in armed forces and pursued aggressive policies, certain members of the United Nations sought for a regional means of providing for their mutual defense within the framework of the organization. The North Atlantic Treaty, for example, was created and exists only because of the failure to attain a really effective system of collective security on a universal basis.

The search for means to establish a universal system nevertheless continued. Against the sombre background of events in Korea, members of the United Nations reviewed again the collective security machinery available, with the result that in the autumn of 1950 the Assembly adopted a resolution which potentially was of great importance. The Uniting for Peace Resolution, as it came to be called, meant simply that the General Assembly had decided to provide machinery for utilizing certain powers which it already possessed. The resolution did not itself constitute any revolutionary departure in interpreting the Charter; it was conceived simply as a practical measure designed to meet certain situations in which the purposes of the United Nations

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might be frustrated by the negative attitude of a permanent member of the Security Council. The General Assembly was to be used for security purposes only when the Security Council failed to perform, or was prevented from performing, its primary function. If the Council acted, nothing in the resolution would interfere with its action.

But if the Security Council did not act, what then? Were we to admit frankly the failure of our United Nations peace machinery and fall back entirely upon regional collective security arrangements such as NATO? While filling a gap, these obviously were limited in scope or character. Surely, it was thought, some way could be found for the United Nations to provide a force which would at least halt a drift to war by helping to carry out an Assembly recommendation when the Security Council failed to act. True, according to the Charter the Assembly had no legal power of enforcement and could act only by recommendation. Nevertheless, in terms of persuasiveness and moral force, the Assembly's recommendations, if responsibly conceived and generally accepted (two very weighty provisos), would carry as much weight as those of the Security Council—perhaps more. So why not at least make available some machinery which might carry them out?

Such was the background of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It provided, among other things, that an emergency session of the Assembly might be called on 24 hours' notice for the purpose of making recommendations if the Security Council had failed to agree on means of resisting a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. It also called for the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee to study methods which might be used to strengthen the collective security machinery. Moreover—and this was a foundation on which we could have built—the resolution recommended that each member state maintain elements within its armed forces for prompt use as United Nations units, and that a panel of military experts be appointed by the Secretary-General for advisory and organization purposes.

The Collective Measures Committee recommended in the resolution was set up and it developed a set of principles designed to help maintain and strengthen the United Nations collective security system through Assembly action. The Secretary-General asked member governments to survey their resources to determine the nature and scope of the assistance they might render

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and to report on the progress made. The result was discouraging. In all, 37 governments replied to his communication. Simple acknowledgments were received from 15 governments; 8 indicated that they could not participate at all in the projects being studied by the Committee, or gave only limited and conditional acceptance of the measures contemplated; 11 took certain minimum steps (largely in connection with the earmarking of forces for Korea) and gave assurances of active support for the principle of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Canadian Government stated that its special force, raised for service in Korea, would be available for whatever action might be necessary anywhere in order to carry out military obligations under the Charter.

By the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly also provided for a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report on the situation in areas of international tension. So far it has not been used.

As a whole, the efforts of the Collective Measures Committee were sterile. With the General Assembly's adoption of its third report on November 4, 1954, it concluded its work. Another series of studies had been accumulated and now were laid away in files and vaults. The United Nations, nine years after its founding, still had no force at its disposal to implement its decisions—even to "secure and supervise" a cease-fire and armistice.

Nevertheless, the Uniting for Peace Resolution remained on the books; and almost six years later, in November 1956, in circumstances very different from those contemplated by its authors, it enabled the General Assembly to meet and discuss in emergency special session the serious situation in the Middle East. The Assembly still was ill-prepared to take on responsibilities for "peace supervision" through police action. The Uniting for Peace Resolution recommended the earmarking of forces for its use in peace and police action, but nothing had been done. When the need for these forces was upon us we had to embark on an improvised experiment, starting literally from nothing. There was neither precedent nor organization available to the Assembly in carrying out the new responsibility thrust upon it.

In a sense this was due to the unexpected nature of this responsibility. With fighting actually going on and threatening to spread, quick action was required. In the crisis, an Assembly resolution set up a United Nations Emergency Force and authorized the Secretary-General to organize it within 48 hours. Due

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largely to the devotion, energy and intelligence of the Secretary-General and his assistants, the Force was in fact brought into being at once. This amazing example of international improvisation showed what can be done by the United Nations when the collective will to action is strong and united. Moreover, the Force has so far proved effective for the purpose it was meant to achieve, the securing and supervising of a cease-fire.

Nevertheless, these purposes were very different from those originally contemplated in the Charter. What we faced in the Assembly last November was the necessity of organizing quickly a force, not to fight, but to ensure that fighting would not be resumed. We were trying to implement, if not a new concept of United Nations supervisory action, certainly an enlarged one.

Such a concept has already stirred interest and hope and optimism. Some of this optimism is exaggerated, because it does not take sufficiently into consideration the limitations under which the Assembly must act. There can be no certainty that the U.N.E.F. will complete successfully the tasks that have been or may be given to it. It may fail, either because it does not secure the right kind of collective backing in the Assembly or because it becomes the victim of Middle Eastern politics. If so, the failure will extend far beyond the immediate situation. It will destroy confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations in the whole field of security. On the other hand, its success might well lead to further steps in developing means to supervise the peace.

Whatever may be the ultimate result, the intervention of the United Nations through an Emergency Force in November 1956 was certainly an indispensable prerequisite to the acceptance of a cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. Its action also emphasized, however, the need to be better prepared to meet future situations of a similar kind. Even if governments are unable to give the United Nations a "fighting" force ready and organized to serve it on the decision of the Security Council, they should be willing to earmark smaller forces for the more limited duty of securing a cease-fire already agreed upon by the belligerents. We might in this way be able to construct a halfway house at the crossroads of war, and utilize an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting.

The first step would seem to be to create a permanent mechanism by which units of the armed forces of member countries

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could be endowed with the authority of the United Nations and made available at short notice for supervisory police duties. It is not suggested that the present Emergency Force should become a permanent force or, indeed, that its functions should be extended beyond those laid down in the relevant Assembly resolutions. We should, nevertheless, build upon the experience of this enterprise. Otherwise, I repeat, we shall only go back again to the situation in which we found ourselves last November, when everything had to be improvised, when there was no precedent for making units available, no administrative and financial procedure and no organization to which the Secretary-General could turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate situation. We improvised successfully then. We cannot reasonably expect the same degree of success a second time.

We now have at our disposal a body of experience from which can be developed some tentative principles governing the establishment of United Nations machinery and, as required, a Peace Supervision Force. Among these principles—some of which I have already referred to—the following strike me as forming an essential minimum.

Member governments, excluding the permanent members of the Security Council, should be invited to signify a willingness in principle to contribute contingents to the United Nations for purposes that are essentially noncombatant, such as, for example, the supervision of agreed cease-fires and comparable peace supervisory functions.

Since the Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, members who have sought and secured election to the non-permanent seats on it would normally be expected to be among those signifying a willingness to contribute contingents to such a force.

For effective organization, there would have to be some central United Nations machinery. The Secretary-General should have a permanent Military Adviser who, with a small staff, might assume responsibility for the direction of other truce supervision arrangements which have been or might be agreed on.

If at any time a Peace Supervision Force were constituted, the Secretary-General would require an advisory committee similar to that which now assists him in connection with the U.N.E.F. in Egypt.

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While such a force is not primarily a fighting force, it must be capable of defending itself once it is in the field, since the inherent duty of a commander is to preserve the safety of his men. It should also include the necessary administrative and supporting elements to enable it to function effectively as an entity.

A force to deal with a particular situation could be established by a resolution either of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. Presumably it would be associated with efforts made by the United Nations towards assisting in the settlement of the dispute. These efforts in turn could be furthered by a revitalized Peace Observation Commission given real responsibility to investigate disputes. In a sense, a Peace Supervision Force would be an extension in space of the Peace Observation Commission and the subordinate bodies it was expected to produce.

By its very nature such a force would not be expected to fight its way into a country. Indeed, since it would be deployed upon recommendation of the United Nations, it could enter a country only with the consent of the government of that country. This consent would normally take the form of an agreement between the government concerned and the Secretary-General acting on behalf of the United Nations. To facilitate the negotiation of such agreements, and also to expedite the creation of a force when required, the Secretary-General should be requested to draw up model agreements regarding the financial, administrative and legal procedures which would govern the operations of a Peace Supervision Force. The agreement recently negotiated between the United Nations and Egypt on arrangements concerning the status of the U.N.E.F. in that country would provide a very useful example of what can be done in this regard.

It is my firm conviction that the sort of machinery I have outlined, and the kind of United Nations force that would be expected to function through it, are practicable, are within the competence of the General Assembly, and might be of great value in avoiding, ending or limiting hostilities. The early arrival of a United Nations force of this kind at a scene of emergency would give assurance to the fearful and hope to the despairing. It would act as the United Nations policeman and his watchdog.

How these arrangements would function would, of course, depend on the circumstances of the particular emergency to be met. Actually, there is nothing so very new in all this. The United

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Nations has on more than one occasion provided teams of truce observers or supervisors and has now set up an emergency force to enlarge that activity where the danger of renewed fighting, pending the working out of a settlement, required it. A synthesis and systemization of these two concepts would provide a base of departure for the future.

As always, in the last resort, individual governments must determine whether the best laid plans of the United Nations are to succeed or fail. If a plan anything like that which I have outlined is to succeed, governments must, both within and outside the United Nations, follow policies consistent with its objectives and its capabilities. The very least each of our governments can now do, it seems to me, is to draft, in accordance with our respective constitutional processes, whatever measures are required to place us in a better position to support agreed decisions of the United Nations in an emergency. Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?

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PARLIAMENTS, PRIESTS AND PROPHETS

By Ahmed S. Bokhári

"I wish you wouldn't squeeze so," said the Dormouse, who was sitting next to her. "I can hardly breathe."
"I can't help it," said Alice very meekly: "I'm growing."
—"Alice in Wonderland"

IT is by now a commonplace to say that the increase in the membership of the United Nations from sixty to eighty has been a long step towards universality. Speaking quantitatively, this is a geographical fact. But it has brought about qualitative changes—or, rather, by enlarging the mirror has expanded the view of the world and changed our perspective. This has other significances than a mere increase in size.

II

Of the three arms of the United Nations, the judicial is the weakest because the least exercised. In spite of a considerable body of international law available and in operation, major disputes still tend to be regarded as political situations amenable to political remedies rather than legal situations which need to be submitted to judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, the existence of the judicial arm is important, as without it the full concept of international organization based on the ideas of peace, order and justice cannot take shape.

The other two functions, namely, parliamentary—I advisedly do not say legislative—and executive, are respectively exercised by the General Assembly and the Secretariat. The Security Council is in the middle; for it was designed to discharge both functions: to suggest methods for the settlement of disputes as well as take speedy action required for the implementation of its (parliamentary) suggestions or decisions. In the structure of the United Nations, the Security Council was assigned a pivotal position.

But the Security Council failed to live up to its promise. It could hardly have been otherwise, for it was constructed on two assumptions which only naïve optimism could have upheld and which history has, in any case, falsified: namely, that after the war the Big Five would continue to be friendly to each other, and that whatever tensions and upheavals might trouble the world

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they would not be the source. In other words, they assumed a kind of apostolic status whereby they would look after the morals of the world, themselves having achieved perpetual purity.

Very soon, however, the Big Five ceased to act in unison and became merely co-belligerents of the past rather than allies in the great human adventures that lay ahead. Also, it was, alas, found that, whatever the motives for war, no nation was quite free from them. Indeed, it was not long before the gravest danger seemed to come, not from the smaller nations, but from a possible conflict between those that were elevated in the structure of the United Nations to be the custodians and the guarantors of peace. The situation today, therefore, is that the Security Council can assume a monitory rôle when smaller nations are concerned, but a built-in provision protects the bigger nations from their own admonitions. Had this been clearly foreseen by the smaller nations or had the United Nations Organization been constructed in an epoch of calm rather than in a period when enthusiasm ran high and trust was deep, it is doubtful whether the bigger nations of the world would have got away with a privilege which can be used to save themselves from their own castigation.

If the Security Council fails to act in a major crisis, how can the United Nations continue to function? The response to this question was passage of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution: a constitutional device designed to allow the responsibilities of the Security Council to pass as far as possible to the General Assembly in case the Council were paralyzed. Of course, none of the major Powers foresaw that this instrument would be used in hitherto unsuspected situations, although almost everybody else did. And so it is that in recent crises the paralysis of the Security Council has led to the emergency sessions of the General Assembly in a manner which postwar complacency could hardly have foreseen.

Thus the General Assembly has acquired great power. But it is not in a position to use that power to give itself great strength. It can make unprecedented decisions, momentous and even revolutionary in character, yet its strength is no greater than it used to be. It can recommend, request, threaten, but it cannot order, nor has it a standing police force, nor the prestige to commandeer the help of the major Powers to provide it with the machinery for action in the field. At any rate, not yet. Consequently, the more single-minded and determined the General Assembly, the

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more it will have to rely on the executive for the implementation of its decisions and even the finer interpretation of its intentions.

This has enhanced the rôle of the Secretariat in an unprecedented manner. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that it has highlighted the most dynamic function of the executive which had rusted unused. For, to say that the Secretariat has acquired a new rôle would be to imply that its functions were ever meticulously defined or fixed and that it has now burst its bounds. The United Nations is a unique organization in that it came into existence with a future which could only be dimly descried. What form, what function, what shape its various organs were to acquire was left to history and evolution. The Secretariat was perhaps *conceived,* albeit not labelled, primarily as a "servicing" organization—a glorified kind of indentured labor. That conception still persists here and there. Yet the Secretariat is constitutionally equal in independence and in stature to every other principal organ of the United Nations and there is nothing in the Charter to imply that it is to serve as the United Nations' pantry. True, it must perform some tasks of a purely utilitarian nature, but those are its minimum not its maximum functions. Recent events have brought this home to everyone. The office of Secretary-General, when it was created under the Charter, was like a new body thrown into the universe. Whether it would be a planet or a star or a meteor, whether it would have an elliptical or a circular orbit, what its speed would be, whether it would be a satellite or the center of a new solar system—was left to time and space. To time and space and to the person. It is fortunate that the present Secretary-General has the instincts of a diplomat, a detached view of national involvements, a high sense of mission and a sensitive touch when dealing with persons and moments. But it might have been otherwise and somewhere between him and the parliament the initiative might have been lost.

The Secretariat, having been regarded for ten years or so as a conglomeration of round-shouldered, self-denying clerks, no doubt found itself faced with tasks for which its muscles had not been exercised. Having been geared in the past to mere "servicing" operations, the Secretariat was, as it stood, unprepared for its new responsibilities, but given the will and drive, it was found to be capable of quick and efficient improvisations which enabled it to meet all emergencies in a surprisingly efficient manner.

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The present situation, therefore, may be summed up as a vitalization of the parliament for policy-making in close coördination with the Secretary-General, frequently under his leadership, and a vitalization of the Secretariat for action.

It may be expected that during the next phase of the United Nations the Secretariat will continue to maintain and probably enhance its stature as an instrument of the United Nations for combining the three difficult functions—diplomatic, executive and administrative—in descending order of emphasis. It may also now be taken for granted that the concept of the Secretary-General as mainly an administrator who should merely keep the "servicing" operations of the Secretariat in an efficient state has been out-dated.

Side by side with this development, anxious thought will probably also continue to be given to the future of the Security Council and to various methods for giving it soul and muscle. It is doubtful, however, whether there is much prospect of success along conservative lines. To make a certain number of major Powers responsible for the peace of the world, and at the same time place them in a privileged position in which they themselves are protected from their own admonitions, seems to be an outmoded idea. Also, with the increase in the membership of the General Assembly and the shift in centers of world power, the 1945 Security Council, with its big five, the small six and the total eleven, might well begin to look like a museum piece.

More likely is the development that the General Assembly, for each of its decisions requiring major action, will create ad hoc supervisory or advisory bodies working in close coöperation with the Secretary-General. The recent crises have demonstrated the potentialities of this way of international life. Of course, age has not withered nor custom staled the infinite variety of strain and harmony between any parliament and its executive, and the growth of the relationship between these two in the United Nations will not be without its anxieties and excitements. But, although the parliament will continue to be the constitutional source of policy, it will have to lean heavily on the Secretariat for exploration, advice and guidance. In other words, apart from anything else, there will be a greater sharing of policy-making between the parliament and the executive. Indeed, any executive with vitality and initiative is bound to step into this rôle. The Secretariat should not refrain from undertaking the mission which

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history seems, growingly, to assign to it, if only because, by virtue of its position, it is able to deliberate more calmly and at a healthy remove from day-to-day national conflicts. The world should welcome this shift, for great changes are afoot. We are on the threshold of a phase in which old contours are beginning to dissolve and power maps of the first half of this century are becoming out of date. In such a period of flux, it is useful to have some sort of a lighthouse on some sort of a rock which is reasonably above the storm.

III

Thus, if one's logic is not too exacting, there are links to be discerned even between the emergent rôle of the Secretariat and the increase in membership. The larger picture of the world as now reflected in the United Nations has yet to find a frame within which the newly discovered masses and colors should be meaningfully and harmoniously arranged. At the same time, it could, without belittling any statesman's stature, be said that world leadership, which should perform this task, seems for the present to be too widely scattered to be widely acknowledged as resting in any nation or consortium. It should therefore be regarded as the happiest of developments that the executive of the United Nations should take the initiative and should do so not by evolving a new philosophy but by offering that initiative as a natural part of its dutiful service and pledge of office.

A closer look at the new world picture would be useful. The increase in membership is distributed amongst the three older continents as follows: Europe, 10; Asia, 6; Africa, 4; whose previous membership was 16, 15 and 4, respectively. Looking at these figures alone, one would expect that the United Nations, which had hitherto been largely Europe-minded and Europe-centered, would become more so. The actual effect has, however, been in a different direction altogether, for the expansion seems actually to have led to a weakening of the European (or, if you like, Western) fibre in the United Nations and has given almost corresponding strength to the Asian-African strands in it. The reasons for this are various: the loss of empires and of political power that flowed from them; the lack of unity in Europe; and the rise of vigorous nationalism in Asia and Africa. It is true that neither Asia nor the Western countries can be regarded as a single political entity. But, whereas amongst the Asian and African nations

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there is, in spite of the diversity of governments, religions and races, a remarkable degree of unity on certain global issues, political and economic, the Western nations, in spite of their common legacies, are split or are out of step with each other on almost all issues of world importance.

The strong note of nationalism, therefore, heard in the United Nations heralds a new phase. Nationalism, which led to the independence of many Asian and African nations, generated for that purpose a momentum which can hardly be halted on the first day of freedom. Indeed, the tendency is to preserve and develop it further in order to use it as a reservoir of energy needed for raising the standard of life of peoples whose very numbers might fill one with despair. There might have been other ways of creating enthusiasms, and after the experience of Europe the emergent nations of the East might have found a short cut to internationalism. This might still happen if ways could be found to dispel suspicions and if liberalism chose to regard unilateral internationalism as the supreme test of its vitality. But one must record facts as they are.

One must be content to observe, therefore, that the geopolitical centers of the world, which were so strongly associated with Western nations, have begun to shift. Where they will finally rest it is difficult to say, for that would depend on a number of factors—on Soviet-American relations, the final balance in the Middle East, the relations between India, China and Japan, the future of the "white" races in Africa—about which one could only speculate. And, as the United Nations expands further, it will, within its walls, register more and more accurately the political health of the world which to a student of international affairs of an earlier era would not have been visible at all. What it does register at the moment is a great deal of new blood, a restless search for new arteries and—if one may say so—a longing for new hearts.

IV

Liberal political thought has been Europe's greatest gift to the new nations, most of whom have adopted liberal democratic governments, in the Western sense of the term, as their ultimate goal. Nevertheless, the major leaders of public opinion in Asia and Africa can hardly be regarded as unreservedly pro-Western. In fact, the expanded perspective that is now vouchsafed to us

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seems to underline more heavily the differences. Indeed, the gap seems to be increasing. Below every political tussle there seems to be a lurking sense of geography or color or race adding to the temperature of the conflict. Such collisions can mean nothing but loss to the world heritage. In order to forge a new synthesis —something that emergent peoples have been attempting on their own for many decades—the United Nations can and must provide the great alchemy. This requires a still further enlargement of our concept of the world organization; regarding it, to put it in other words, not merely as a step forward in our political thinking but as a step forward in the great human adventure of which politics, even international politics, is but a part. It is by no means rare to find people in the United Nations who carry this concept with them and evaluate their own labors and the achievement of others by this touchstone. It is fortunate that the most responsible international civil servants of the world should also have this vision which, though not written into the Charter as such, alone makes the Charter a coherent and sacred covenant.

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BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL LEGACY

By Barbara Ward Jackson

AT a time when world politics are dogged by the issue of "colonialism," it is well to remember that empires—in other words, colonial systems—must be counted among the most potent forces of civilization in world history. There have been, it is true, purely destructive empires. The Assyrians, the Mongol imperium, the brief and horrible Nazi experiment were deadly to others and finally to themselves. But the expansion of Chinese imperial power coincided with the civilizing of the primitive tribes. India flourished in peace and art and letters under its imperial dynasties. The Western world still draws many of its laws, ideals and master institutions from the memory of Rome. And today, when the British Empire is all but transformed from a formal imperial system into a loose association of independent states, it is possible to look back upon its three hundred years of colonial history and pronounce it one of the creative imperialisms experienced by mankind.

Or is it too soon to pass such a judgment? Naturally no historical assessments are final, but there are special reasons for attempting one in this case. Most empires in history have ended in a welter of war and collapse. Many others are obscured in myth and legend. The British Empire not only stands in the open light of modern mass information and massive documentation. It is ending peacefully in a unique direct transfer of power to successor states which have suffered no external interruption between colonial and independent status. It is thus possible to see with unusual clarity what British colonial policy intended to achieve and what it did and did not in fact accomplish. The passing of few imperial systems have been so well publicized and so little interfered with from outside.

An imperial Power may set out with a deliberate plan of exploitation, in which local inhabitants and territories are totally subordinated to imperial aims of aggression, expansion and enrichment. In Korea, for instance, and then in Manchuria, the Japanese deliberately created an economy from which the local Koreans and Manchurians were virtually excluded save as working "hands." British imperial policy was never formulated in such terms. It was the by-product of exploration, settlement

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and trade. Since there was no conscious plan, the inevitable consequence was to repeat the pattern of the mother country. In North America and Australasia where British imperial power entered into what was, broadly speaking, a vacuum, new communities were created which mirrored much of "the British way of life."

In politics, the concept of government serving, not commanding, its people and submitting to their electoral verdict coupled with the rule of law, an independent judiciary and a non-political civil service created the framework of civil liberty. In social outlook, religious tolerance, the steady securalization of life, rationalism and concern for standards of living combined to direct the community towards material pursuits. An expanding industrial system grew up to satisfy them.

At the same time, the identification of the community with the people's will strengthened the sense of state sovereignty. The right to national independence followed logically from the right of people to govern themselves.

This type of modern industrial democracy, which Britain has endowed with so many of its master institutions, is the dominant imperial pattern projected by the British people. It has its critics, from the Marxists who attack its economic base to the philosophers and artists who doubt its spiritual cohesion and cultural creativeness. Yet it represents a type of society which the Hungarian people at least are ready to die to achieve and it has become, in broad terms, the ideal of all modernizing societies. The Communists themselves pay it lip service in their jargon of "peoples' democracies." Even if there were no more in the record of British imperialism than laying the keel of the great American ship of state and fostering in Canada, Australia and New Zealand young modern expanding communities, the achievement would still be considerable. But in fact this has been only half the task. The far more testing exercise in empire has lain not in creating states where none existed but in modifying crowded communities of totally different race, culture and history.

The British impact on Asia and Africa cannot be understood without noticing two facts about the projection of British influence and institutions. The first is that virtually the whole political framework of free government in Britain was evolved in a uniquely homogeneous community. In any vote, for instance, the majority would tend to consist of the same kind of people,

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with the same tastes, traditions and outlook as the minority. It is significant that the British parliamentary system has only once showed signs of serious deadlock and that was during the presence in Westminster of a cohesive voting block of Irish M. P.s. The Civil Service can recruit by competitive examination and not fear that the success of too many men from Worcestershire would drive Northumbrians to revolt. No one would challenge a judge on the ground that he represented a particular clan.

The second point is that the British community has tended to grow and change as the result of non-governmental initiatives and decisions. Enclosing landlords started the agricultural revolution which scientific innovators like Coke and Townsend carried on. Thousands of small masters worked at the origins of industry; individual inventors created the tools; banks, firms, City companies provided the finance. The coral reef rose through myriad unplanned labors. Government, too, was and still is carried by the initiative of individual citizens in political parties, in local government, in voluntary activities beyond number. Every social service of the Welfare State was preceded by private experiment.

Even the grand design of imperialism itself was the work of unplanned individual effort. The settlers and merchants paved the way. Government followed, often with the utmost reluctance. It is a symbol of this sequence that, until the second half of the nineteenth century, the government of India was—nominally—in the hands of a private trading corporation.

These two factors—the homogeneous community and the predominance of private initiative—were little hindrance to the extension of British institutions to North America or Australasia. In the United States, the original framework proved sufficiently strong and flexible to create a recognizable "way of life" for immigrants of every European stock and in the second half of the twentieth century is meeting the far more formidable challenge of integrating citizens of African descent. In Canada, democratic institutions have made possible the coexistence of French and Anglo-Saxon communities. In New Zealand, the indigenous Maoris have, alone among primitive peoples, found a place beside British settlers. At the same time, the dominance of the British—and European—tradition has meant the transplanting to the new communities of the methods of self-help, responsibility and private initiative by individuals and groups.

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When, however, the imperial scene is no longer the virgin lands beyond the oceans but the ancient civilizations of the East or the primitive communities of Africa, the extension of what one may call, shortly, "the British way of life" has proved a much more complicated and hazardous process. To reproduce British attitudes and institutions in Asia and Africa may not have been the earliest objective of British imperial policy. At first, in both continents commercial interests had primacy. It was only when local administration collapsed and other European traders threatened to encroach on Britain's markets that the British took over local political responsibility. If the Indian Mogul Empire had shown even the vestigial staying power of the Manchus, India, like China, would never have been a full Western colony. Similarly, it is doubtful whether such colonies as the Gold Coast would have come into existence if tribal warfare had not threatened the peace and commercial utility of the coastal areas.

The British, obliged to develop political dominion from a haphazard, largely commercial start, had no pattern to impose except their own. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, men who must be counted among Britain's ablest administrators in India—Munro, Elphinstone—were already stating that Britain's imperial task was "to fit India for self-government" and by self-government they meant representative, legal, domestic government and unqualified nation-state sovereignty. Even where, as in parts of Africa, the policy of indirect rule through tribal chiefs was adopted, there was no suggestion that it represented a final political framework. It was rather an expedient of political education in primitive communities and at the same time a method of administering large areas with a minimum number of British colonial officials. Beyond remained the ultimate aim of elective representative government. Today wherever the British imperium has peaceably ended, the forms of parliamentary rule have in fact taken its place. The Indian Member interjecting "Mr. Speaker, Sir" in a Lok Sabha debate or a distinguished Gold Coast lawyer presiding in wig and gown over the Assembly in Accra symbolizes the attempted projection of modern democracy set largely in a British mold.

But in Asia and Africa, this new form of political and social order faces formidable difficulties because the two presuppositions of British society—a homogeneous community and the spirit of voluntary, self-governing, enterprising, individual ac-

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tivity—are largely absent. Few British colonial territories were homogeneous when they passed under British rule. Even the small island of Cyprus has a large Turkish enclave in a predominantly Greek population. Some colonies which were more or less racially unified—such as Malaya or Fiji—have since been settled by Indians or Chinese. In India, two major language groups, a score of languages and hundreds of dialects divide the country.

The idea of nationalism, the ideal of the fully sovereign, independent, self-governing state, could be learnt from Britain. The British who "never, never would be slaves" could hardly teach any other lesson and it was the very strength of their example that guided Indian nationalism to be directed primarily against them, the foreign rulers. By a paradox, a British member of the Indian Civil Service, Allan Hume, founded in 1885 the Indian National Congress with the precise purpose of arousing Indian nationalism.

But the anti-Western spirit which is the emotional driving force of so much Asian nationalism today is no guarantee that internal differences will be overcome. In the event, Hindu and Moslem, however anti-British, could not settle in the same house. Once parliamentary democracy established the rule of the majority by counting heads, the Moslems saw themselves as a perpetual, out-voted minority. Common allegiance to a united India was not sufficiently felt to outweigh this fear. Since partition, within India itself, the creation of federal states based upon language has led to violence and bloodshed, particularly in Bombay where Gujarati and Marathi dispute for dominance.

Subsequent transfers of power in other territories have further underlined the difficulty. When in the 1930s self-governing institutions were formulated for Ceylon, an ingenious franchise had to be worked out to ensure that the Tamil-speaking areas were not swamped by Sinhalese voters. Today, a decade after independence, the Tamil-Sinhalese division is a perpetual note of discord in the politics of an otherwise singularly prosperous and stable Asian land. In Africa, the primitive peoples of Southern Sudan, within a year of independence, revolted violently in their fear of Sudanese rule from the North. Nigeria is split between the powerful Yoruba and Ibo tribes of the South and the Moslem desert peoples of the Northern Region. In the Gold Coast, the ancient kingdom of Ashanti talks of claiming the right to secede rather than accept government from the Coast.

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Should the British be blamed for the persistence and sometimes the aggravation of these internal divisions after independence? Many Asian and African nationalists have talked of a sinister policy of "divide and rule" whereby the British stirred up local hostilities in order to delay the transfer of power. But since self-government has, in virtually all cases, been granted, the accusation of conspiracy can hardly be sustained. The critics forget two factors—the degree to which the institutions introduced by contact with Britain require a certain measure of communal unity and the time it takes to overcome religious, linguistic and racial diversity by broader loyalties.

The best illustration of these facts is to be found in the contrasted expansion of the Chinese Empire. It took about a thousand years for Chinese civilization to extend from the Yellow River to the frontiers of Annam, and long after the ruling groups were Chinese in culture and allegiance the peasants retained local dialects and customs. But no one offered them a vote. They had no right either to education or advancement. No one suggested that language and nationhood had some organic link.

The British could not avoid inciting, almost from the first days of their empire, a desire for the local self-government and parliamentary franchise which they enjoyed at home. Once the desire existed, nothing could check an accelerated transfer of power except to abandon the principle—and the British could hardly abandon the central fact of their own system of government. They had no time to build new local loyalties in the face of the rising demand for local independence. In Nigeria, for instance, from colonization to independence, the span will not be much more than 50 years.

Could they, in spite of these limitations, have done more to create greater unity and homogeneity? There are a number of ways in which, in theory at least, local differences can be transcended in a relatively short time. Forcible conversion to a new religion established the Moslem communities of northern India. The imposition of Communism as a system of thought may have inhibited the development of local nationalism in Soviet Asia. An industrial revolution, creating new classes which cut across old tribal or caste distinctions, is a potent force for unification. The question, therefore, should be rephrased. Could the British have done more to change in depth, intellectually, socially and economically, the communities into which they were importing

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new ideals and institutions? And here, the answer must surely be that more *could* have been done—provided always one remembers that the judgment is the fruit of hindsight and also of the great extension of historical knowledge and sociological analysis of the last 50 years.

The inhibiting factor in British policy has sprung from the second characteristic of the British political genius—its reliance upon individual and group initiative, its tendency to keep government guidance and intervention to a minimum. In three crucial spheres—religion, education and economic development—the growing points in British imperial policy were largely private. Religion and education are, indeed, inseparable, for most of the Westernizing education in Asia and Africa in the colonial period was provided by missionaries. The first government-established school in West Africa—Achimota—dates only from the 1920s. By that time, four generations of Africans had been educated by devoted missionaries.

In India, government support for education was delayed at first by controversy whether education should be in English or the vernacular. Even after the principle of Western forms of instruction had been officially decided—under the influence of Macaulay—missionary societies and devoted individuals were prime movers in extending the school system. And even with government backing, the new universities and schools developed after 1850 provided in the main for Indian families who could afford the cost.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the official attitude can be drawn from the Indian Civil Service. From 1833, the service was open in principle to Indians and British on a basis of equality—but the Indians, to enter, needed to learn English, study in England, take their examinations there in strict competition with men using English as their mother tongue. As early as the 1860s, three Indians, in the teeth of family opposition and social ostracism, got themselves to England, passed the examinations and were duly admitted. But it was not until 1922 that examinations were held in both London and India. The result tells its own story. In 1919, the Indian Civil Service contained 1,177 Europeans and 78 Indians. By 1939, the figures were nearing equality—759 Europeans and 540 Indians.

The lesson is obvious. If an Indian cared to overcome all the natural obstacles and if his family had sufficient means, he could

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enter fully into a responsible life. But he would receive no special assistance. Equally, an Englishman would have received none in England. But the Indian Government failed to use its power to give the Indian the extra backing without which, competitively, he stood at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, laisser faire applied to education and administration. One has only to compare the attitude with the Japanese Government's systematic determination, after 1870, to train managers, administrators and technicians and to produce the essential cadres of a modern state.

The pattern has been similar in other dependencies. The sons of chiefs and other men of substance could secure education for their children. In the Gold Coast, for instance, there are a few families with a second and third generation of sons sent to English public schools and universities. But local universities in Malaya, West Africa and the West Indies were established only in the last decade. In other words, higher education and self-government are arriving together. The effect of this is particularly apparent in administration. India, at least, had a group of first-class officials—the "steel frame." But Malaya, the Sudan and West Africa, all pressing forward with the nationalization of their own services, find that local trained men are simply not available. Self-government has raced ahead of self-education.

The economic pattern bears the same stamp. The British came to India to trade and to find markets. Local anarchy led to imperial intervention. Responsibility was then accepted for restoring economic as well as political stability. The peasant's land and taxes were surveyed and organized. Famine became a government responsibility and the need to expand food production led the authorities to conduct vast works of irrigation. Law and order required transport. So did famine relief. So, above all, did trade. Roads and railways, ports and harbors were expanded.

If, in the teeth of competition from British manufactures, an Indian could establish a cloth mill, there was no obstacle from the administration, but he was not encouraged. When the visionary Tata family wished to build India's first iron and steel works, no support or capital came from London. Once again it was the laisser-faire approach. It is fair to say that only on one major point could the British be convicted of "selfish exploitation." In deference to Lancashire, they denied the indigenous Indian cotton industry the defense of a tariff between 1879 and 1920. But the indirect effects of opening India to British manufactures

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must also be laid at Britain's door. Cheap imported goods ruined Indian village industries but nothing was put in their place.

Under this régime, the foundations of Indian industry were, however, laid by enterprising Indians. British and foreign firms also began the training of Indian executives and technicians. But the pace was modest and once again the comparison must be made with Japan which in the same decades 1870 to 1920 transformed itself into a modern industrial community.

In Malaya and Burma, the framework of British order permitted economic growth, but it was accomplished almost entirely by foreign settlers. Chinese pioneered the rubber and tin industry, Indians the expansion of rice in lower Burma. In East and Central Africa, the development of resources by British settlers has reached a point at which there are virtually two communities —one modernized, prosperous and European, the other primitive, local and African. This vast gap—in education and resources—not only expresses the weakness of laisser-faire economics and social policy as a sole means of general development. It is also the extreme instance of a lack of homogeneity sufficient to defeat the functioning of British political institutions. The Belgians who extend the franchise to neither European nor African in the Congo face fewer immediate problems than, say, the Central African Federation which gives adult suffrage and confines it largely to the white settlers.

If one can risk a generalization on the basic strength and weakness of British colonial policy, it appears that in aim and in political direction, the intention has been genuine to create self-governing communities and to endow them with liberal institutions evolved in Britain. But this central purpose has not been sufficiently reflected in educational, social and economic policy to enable the new societies to keep pace with their own aspirations.

The method of leaving these spheres to develop at their own speed, without official encouragement, might perhaps have worked if Britain had had at its disposal the millennium China enjoyed in the days before political consciousness. There is certainly impressive evidence to suggest that India, where British power was most pervasive and lasting, may possess the nascent middle class, the growing educational resources, the economic framework and the liberal temper on a scale sufficient to make its vast democratic experiment a success. But in other parts of Asia and in Africa, the slow methods of individual and voluntary

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evolution have not served so well and in territory after territory political forms of state sovereignty and a mass electorate are being adopted without the middle class, the administrators, the education and the evolved economy necessary to sustain them securely. The experiments may succeed, but no one can deny that they are precarious.

It is not, however, too late to counter some of the weaknesses evident in British colonial policy. The task is not—as in Hungary or Soviet Asia—the despairing one of freeing peoples from political despotism. It is the hopeful and constructive possibility of assisting peoples to manage and develop a freedom which they already enjoy. They still lack the education, the trained manpower and the economic momentum needed to sustain modern political liberty. But all are spheres in which the Western Powers can offer effective assistance. A great increase in the availability of scholarships and training schemes for Asian and African students in Europe and America, a systematic training program for local technicians and executives by all Western firms operating in ex-colonial territories, Western economic aid for basic development—all these are immediate policies already practised to some extent which need only to be followed with greater forethought and energy. The crucial problem created by the shortage of competent administrators in some communities could be met in part by providing trained men from a strengthened United Nations and from Britain's proposed overseas service, provided it is developed with sufficient imagination. Western universities could tighten their links with the new academic institutions overseas and possibly go further in exchanging instructors and students.

At present, such policies resemble the rather dilatory methods of social and economic advances practised formerly by the British Raj. Much excellent pioneer work is done, but it lacks a galvanizing direction and is conceived on too small a scale. Something of the energy and concentration which Japan put into its early development—or the Communists devote to theirs—is needed to insure that no discouragement over the complexity of free institutions established without a sufficient economic and social base drives Britain's colonies to abandon the hopeful road opened for them by their imperial past. Since today they make up the overwhelming majority of the uncommitted world, it would be a tragedy for human freedom if the opportunity were left to go by default.

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POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

By Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy

BECAUSE the need for political stability is central to all the major questions faced by my country, I should like to concentrate on an analysis of this problem, suggesting the spirit and attitude with which it must be met rather than articulating a specific policy. In addressing an interpretation of this kind to a foreign audience, a Prime Minister comes under a double temptation—to boast and yet to be apologetic for the state of affairs in his nation. I hope to resist these temptations; it is better for us to be understood by our friends, and by ourselves, as we are, without exaggeration of virtues or indulgence of faults.

We in Pakistan sometimes show a tendency—and I know we have by no means a monopoly of it—to commend ourselves merely for the abstract goodness of our asserted purposes, without regard to whether our purposes have been fulfilled. So simple an action as the decision of a year ago to insert in the official title of our Republic an adjective descriptive of the prevailing faith has been made an occasion for exultation among us as if it were of itself a proof of courage and moral excellence. One often hears and reads assertions of our superiority in ideology, as if that counted in place of performance. On the other hand one sometimes hears it said in extenuation of deficiencies in our real political life that, after all, Pakistan as a state is not yet even ten years old. On hearing this excuse I usually point out that the circumstances of world politics permit no people to claim such exemptions from responsibility as might be appropriate to a child. A nation can earn the respect due to maturity by itself acting maturely. I reject any excuse based upon our youngness as a polity. Discovery and confession are first steps in the correction of faults. By mature and honest self-appraisal in place of self-praise we can best progress in earning the esteem we covet.

To set our problems in perspective, it is well to begin with some of the characteristics of the past from which Pakistan emerged as a state.

For many centuries before partition and independence in 1947 the type of government experienced by the peoples of the sub-

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continent of Asia was imposed by right of conquest; it lacked the ingredient of consent. British rule—let me acknowledge parenthetically our indebtedness to the British for lessons they taught us in administrative integrity, constitutional procedure and proprieties—was only a final phase of a long record of this character. Whether the seat of power was in London or in a local capital was of secondary importance. Either way, the traditions, usages and premises of self-government were lacking.

In such a situation administration and popular aspiration turn on each other as counter forces. Those governing almost inevitably regard their power as something to be exercised despite the will of the governed. The governed regard government as something set against their own interests and purposes. In this situation government has authority only in a narrow sense of being able to compel compliance but not in the deeper moral meaning of having the faculty to elicit consent, to lead and to bind in conscience. In such a situation, law exists in the sense in which we speak of laying down the law—a morally neutral meaning applicable to what administrators ordain and magistrates effect in the manifold daily undertakings of the state; but it does not exist in the sense in which we speak of the rule of law—a phrase invoking a concept of administrators amenable to a set of purposes and restrained by limits established by the consent and will of those subject to their authority.

When law in the technical sense of what is enforced is divorced from law in its moral sense implicit in the rule of law, the operators of the mechanism of government tend inevitably to think of themselves as in possession and to regard scornfully and fearfully as trespassers those who attempt to call up and to marshal popular political aspirations. By the same token, those approaching politics simply in terms of kindling popular aspiration tend to miss a disciplined consciousness of the limits of government. They think of it more as an exercise in rhetoric, theory and ideals than as a stern business of keeping promises.

The inherent weakness of colonial government lies in the alienation between administration and popular aspiration. Administration carried on without a sense of accountability to popular aspirations is deprived of imagination: at best it tends to be sterile; at worst it becomes oppressive. The evocation of general political aspirations without regard for actual operating requirements and limits of government results too often in producing giddiness

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and demagoguery. Political communication is deprived of realism, and the result is likely to be the politics of agitation and utopia. The whole truth and essence of sound government require a continual dialogue between actuality and aspiration, between administrative authority and political leadership—a dialogue that can take place only when each side understands the other and feels kinship rather than distrust.

A people coming into independence from a colonial past faces a task of correcting this alienation between the two. The operative and the evocative aspects of the state must be brought into working relationship. New habits of mind have to be substituted for old. Administration must unlearn its scorn of politics. Politics must overcome its hostility to administration. Only in this way can a government and the people governed communicate confidence to each other and learn that they can count on each other. On such a basis those in authority can draw on popular confidence and public will as sources of power for getting things done. Without it, they feel insecure; their primary concern is anxiety about holding on. In this situation public confidence and will become negative factors, restricting rather than adding to the capability of authority for achieving the general good.

Estrangement between the governing and the governed; anxiety on the part of those in authority over their warrant and their tenure; sterility of government resulting from a lack of confidence among those in authority as to their ability to tap the creative forces of public trust; vanity, opportunism and emotional extravagance characterizing mass leaders who have never tasted responsibility; cold feet and hot heads—such are the conditions of instability in government. These have persisted among us in Pakistan in the degree that we have failed to resolve our wills to throw off habits of a departed past, have permitted moral independence to lag behind legal independence, and have kept political leadership and governmental responsibility as things opposed to each other rather than bringing them into synthesis.

In giving a diagnosis I have indicated a remedy. Fortunately this remedy lies completely within our resources without necessity of any aid from abroad. We Pakistanis have no choice as to how to go about creating an effective basis for our state. No royal or aristocratic pattern of duty and authority based on long and universal acceptance is at hand to serve our needs. The goal can be achieved only through elections. Warning voices sometimes

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tell me that Pakistan is not ready for the democratic process. I can only reply that then Pakistan is not ready at all; for there is no alternative way of bringing about rapport between authority and people, no other avenue to national fulfillment.

I have sometimes heard arguments for an opposite course to national consolidation, a course involving abandonment of the idea of franchise, discarding of principles of accountability and resorting to authority based not upon a warrant to rule but upon the power to rule—in brief, dictatorship. Advocates of this course are in a small and diminishing minority. Nevertheless, the argument for it should be answered if for no other reason than to demonstrate the good sense of the course we have chosen instead.

Whenever I ask an advocate of this expedient to give a bill of particular ills of our political society requiring remedy, I get some such list as this: corruption, shortage of talent in government, insufficiency of bonds of identity between authority and people, deficiency of public education and information, the dominance of emotion rather than reason in political life, and the centrifugal influence of provincialism.

I do not deny the existence of these ills. My answer is simply that the purported remedy represents not a cure but avoidance of a cure. We have only to look to the lands that have dictatorship to gain some insight into how it would work. Dictatorship would not combat corruption; it would erect corruption into a principle. Dictatorship would not widen the access to talent in the public service; it would close sources of talent by preëmpting office for a chosen inner group and alienating the rest. Instead of durable identity between government and people derived from the operation of consent, dictatorship could employ only the brittle bonds of coercion. Its instrument would not be information but deception and concealment, and it would seek not the education but the confusion and the continued tutelage of the people by playing on their emotions rather than permitting the operation of reason. As for the difficult problem of balance of interest and power between our two provinces, dictatorship could succeed not in producing concord but only in subjugating one to dominance by the other. By taking an authoritarian path, we could only confound ourselves and fail our friends.

In any event, whatever our weaknesses of the past, they certainly have not been attributable to overdoses of democracy, for we have yet to try a full dosage. Upon being called to the

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Prime Ministership I made clear my own outlook in these words, which I now reaffirm: "The first essential is to secure political stability, and that can never be attained unless we allow free play to democratic processes. . . . I realize that democracy has its weaknesses, for democracy is human; it has its inevitable failings, but on the whole it is the only sure road to progress and evolution. . . . Politics and politicians too have been maligned unthinkingly by those who fail to realize that politics is essential for the cohesion of the state and that the politicians are its servitors. Politics is the grand avenue of service to humanity. . . ." I pledged that there would be no loss of time in making preparations for a general election, and I added: "I think I can lay claim to at least this much of trust, that the election will be fair and free, so long as I have anything to do with it."

I wish it were possible to hold general elections forthwith. It is not. The technical work necessary in preparation will take some months. With good fortune and unabating effort we can have the basis laid for general elections possibly a year from now.

The thorniest problem in preparing for the processes by which we shall finally achieve a national legislature truly representative in character has been to relate the Moslem and non-Moslem portions of our population in the franchise. Profound questions of the nature of our state ride on the issue.

On the one side are ranged the advocates of segregation of our voters into religious communities. Proponents of this plan argue that Pakistan's destiny is to be an ideological state. They would keep alive within Pakistan the divisive communal emotions by which the subcontinent was riven before the achievement of independence.

On the other side are those who see Pakistan in terms of a nation state. I am unequivocally committed to this side. I see a Pakistan great enough and strong enough to encompass all its citizens, whatever their faith, on a basis of true civic equality and by that fact made greater and stronger. I hear it argued that it is inconsistent for the Moslems to have insisted on a separate electorate in undivided India and to have pressed for the establishment of a nation of their own and yet to admit the religious minorities, especially the Hindus, of Pakistan into full civic fellowship. I do not so regard it. We Moslems in undivided India were a minority. In Pakistan we are the majority. When we became the majority in a new country we fell heir to the moral

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obligation of any majority to protect the rights of minorities. Only a majority has the privilege, and I should call it also the obligation, of being magnanimous. For that privilege and that obligation we struggled in seeking independence. Independence fastened them squarely upon us.

The zeal for separate electoral rolls has arisen mainly in West Pakistan, where the communal minority is slight in number and the question is largely academic. In East Pakistan, where the communal minority is significant in numbers and the question has a central bearing, a joint electorate has prevailing support. In October 1956, our National Assembly passed legislation approving separate electoral rolls for West Pakistan, where the question is really of no moment, and a single roll in East Pakistan, where it is of moment. This is logically a far from perfect formula. The issue will not be settled until it has been settled right. Yet the proportion of evil in the existing formula is small. We can do with what we have for the time being and let the problem of making up our minds to a nationally uniform approach lie over to a less pressing day.

Those who find the prospect of democracy in Pakistan too chancy and fearsome point especially to the factors of political apathy, the meagerness of economic life and the prevalence of illiteracy among large portions of our population. They are apprehensive that the people will vote emotions and unfulfillable wants rather than bringing their politics down—or should I say up?—to the level of rational choice among practical alternatives.

I do not share these apprehensions. I am thoroughly familiar with the political consciousness of the people of East Pakistan. I should be the last to deny their aptitude for seasoning the meat of politics with the spice of enthusiasm. Yet I have seen them many times gather by tens of thousands to give rapt attention to a realistic discussion of policy. A more politically conscious people does not exist anywhere.

The potential for a similar political consciousness exists in the western province. In September of 1956, soon after becoming Prime Minister, I spent ten heartening days in travel through the northern part of West Pakistan. I spoke time after time to audiences of tribesmen in from the sparse hills, to farmers of the rich valleys, to urban throngs of artisans and tradesmen. I heard their questions. These questions preponderantly did not reflect dreams of utopia and did not spring from communal animosity. They

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were mostly about the real substance of politics—prices for crops, allocation of resources, the need for better housing and the like. Repeatedly I called on the police to remove the barriers set up presumably to protect me from my listeners. Each time I called on the throngs to move forward to the very edge of the dais so that I might see their faces and they might see mine, because, as I said, the people and the Government must henceforth stand face to face. Then I undertook to explain the identity between people and government and the obligation now imposed on them, as well as upon magistrates and administrators, to learn that the government is not master but servant. I explained to them also —and with emphasis—the need for government to have authority so as to be able to bring expertness to bear in its decisions and to weigh the general interest without being subjected to the pressures, passions and prejudices rife in the marketplace. In the faces before me I saw comprehension and concurrence. I was refortified in my assurance that popular confidence and rational consent are not beyond expectation but are indeed the great unexploited resource still available to strengthen the nation.

II

So far I have emphasized our shortcomings. Let me cite now a few milestones established along the upward road.

First, there is the solid fact of having achieved a constitution. Perhaps it took too long. The course carried the nation into a troubled period when, in October 1954, the executive power broke up the first Constituent Assembly without knowing how to get a successor. The constitution that was finally produced remains, and will remain, incomplete until a Parliament has been established and the Government rendered accountable to it. Yet the fact of having been able to produce a constitution gives comfort and assurance; it has brought the people significantly nearer to nationhood with institutions of their own making.

Second, the judiciary has been vested with power to issue prerogative writs—an authority enabling the courts to act on their own initiative to ensure the rule of law. I have no space to tell the full story of this achievement. I can only recount that the first Constituent Assembly originated this provision in 1954. Under it was brought the suit, early in 1955, challenging the validity of the executive's action in breaking up the first Constituent Assembly. The Government countered by challenging, on the ground that it

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lacked executive assent, the validity of the law granting writ jurisdiction to the courts. The highest court of the land sustained this contention, invalidating the law in question and along with it, by inference, the whole body of laws created by the first Constituent Assembly. In the face of strong Government opposition, the second Constituent Assembly stood firm and imposed its will that the High Courts have power to issue prerogative writs. It was, I believe, the first occasion in our history that a legislature succeeded in sustaining its will against the executive—an instance indisputably on the side of the rule of law.

A third item coming to mind is one of close personal and political concern to me. Faint heart in facing and rendering account to legislatures has been a recurring ailment among the ministries within our provinces. For me to cite all the instances of this failing might be misleading, for in 1955 the six provinces in the western part of the country were consolidated into one; thus any figure given might seem to attribute to the two existing provinces the shortcomings recorded by the former seven. In any event, East Pakistan suffered a specially long siege of this ailment. As late as the summer of 1956 a legislature elected in the spring of 1954 had not yet been permitted to perform its normal rôle. The ministry was subsisting on a series of budgets authenticated by the central executive under authority designed to bridge emergency situations in the provinces, though in this instance the crisis involved was nothing more than a heavy attack of cold feet in a provincial cabinet that feared its days would be numbered if it ever had to test its strength in the legislature. When the provincial authority sought to prolong the emergency once again, by proroguing the legislature on the eve of what was to be its first budget session, the central Government refused to be a party to a constitutional subterfuge. The Opposition, with which I was identified, was permitted to form a ministry. My predecessor as Prime Minister, the distinguished Mr. Mohamad Ali, proved true to a pledge he had given against permitting the invocation of emergencies for partisan gain. Constitutional rectitude prevailed over political interest, and parliamentary forces were at last permitted to operate. I know of no better instance to prove the efficacy of having a constitution, and the valuable results flowing from insistence on constitutional proprieties.

It is no disparagement to any previous Prime Minister for me to say that thus for the first time a government at the Center was

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formed in direct response to parliamentary forces, a government representative in a sense that no one of its predecessors had been, and thus marking another step forward to political maturity. I was therefore amused to read a headline in an American newspaper: "Stability Again Eludes Pakistanis."

I should have concluded the opposite. The word "government," let us remember, derives from a Greek verb for piloting a ship. It is an apt meaning. A ship can be piloted only when going somewhere. Stability in a ship is not the quality of being able to stand upright while moored; it is the faculty of keeping balance in motion, of accommodating change without capsizing. Thus it is also with government. The political events of the late summer in Pakistan demonstrated that faculty; they marked a significant beginning along the way to true stability in politics. I know nothing more destructive to good order in the state than that those in power should be spared from having to think of the possibility of ever being in opposition, and that those in opposition should be foreclosed from that sense of responsibility that goes with regarding themselves as a potential alternative government. I know no surer way to dampen imagination in a government or to promote capriciousness among its critics. We have taken a long step away from that unhappy development in our politics.

In our eastern province the turn to democracy and accountable government has continued. The new provincial cabinet did not flinch from the obligation of facing the legislature, regarding this not as an ordeal but as an opportunity. This self-confidence and democratic rectitude were rewarded by a strong measure of support in the assembly. Moreover, the new cabinet in East Pakistan proved true to pledges to face without delay the risks of by-elections. Here again trust in the democratic process resulted not in a loss but in a distinct gain of strength. In December the people sustained the new provincial government in six of the seven constituencies where seats were at stake. It may not be a unique thing in contemporary Asian politics, but I am sure that it is a rare thing, for a government to find its hand strengthened rather than weakened by undertaking to face a free electorate. I suppose that with their vast preoccupations with other things the newspapers of the West had scant space for reporting this fact in our political life, but in my view it was important news that bore real assurance to friends of Pakistan and of democracy. Certain circumstances enhance its significance. These by-elections occurred

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at the same time that I, as Prime Minister, restated in definitive terms Pakistan's foreign policy, which avoids the equivocations of neutralism and aligns us squarely on the side of the free democracies and the upholding of principles of responsibility in world affairs. It was a difficult time for such a test. Spurred by the autumn's complex developments in the Suez area, passions seemed to be running high. Yet the people listened and by their votes sustained the rational course rather than passions and shibboleths.

My closing words are to our allies in the West, for whose indispensable material aid to us in our struggle to survive and flourish we are deeply grateful. We can best be useful to them and to the cause of freedom everywhere by firming up our domestic situation so as to be a strong friend in every sense.

In the past our foreign undertakings have been, in too great degree, the business of a few ministers sheltered by secrecy. The result has been a set of commitments in a legal sense, yet not sufficiently felt as commitments in the consciousness of the people themselves. In the unfolding of democracy there must be an appraisal of our international situation; I specifically avoid calling it a reappraisal, for no such process of appraisal has been carried out in the past. The very secrecy with which our engagements have been entered into, the lack of thorough public airing in debate, has left them vulnerable to suspicion that they have somehow rendered us subservient and have drained away our autonomy. The best— and indeed the inevitable—corrective is to bring into the open what has been done altogether too much on the quiet. I know the nature of our undertakings. I am sure that they will bear scrutiny and that suspicion will vanish with the disclosure of facts. Fickleness abroad is no way to promote stability at home. The converse is also true, for as our domestic institutions are strengthened, as we approach true political stability, our allies, as well as we, will be the gainers.

It is for these reasons that I have resolved to open the whole foreign policy of Pakistan to debate in the National Assembly and to test the issue in a vote of confidence. As I write, the Assembly session concerned lies just ahead. I do not doubt the outcome. In the end, I am confident, our mutual undertakings will be anchored not alone in the word and will of ministers, who come and go, but in the conviction and consensus of a people, which will persist.

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GERMAN PARADOXES

By Claus Jacobi

MARSHAL Bulganin's only half-concealed threat to let rockets fall on London and Paris reached Chancellor Adenauer on his special train one night in November when the Egyptian crisis was at its height. The Chancellor was on his way to make his first state visit in Paris and had already retired to his compartment when his Foreign Minister, Dr. von Brentano, highly alarmed, sent in the first—and particularly hair-raising—version of the bad news. Dr. Adenauer glanced at the ominous text, asked if the diplomats in his entourage were still up, and went to bed with the remark that those gentlemen might worry their heads about it during the night.

Not all the citizens of the German Federal Republic were so unperturbed. A Gallup test disclosed that, for the first time since Korea, more than 50 percent of those questioned were afraid that a new world war might soon break out. At Bonn the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously inquired of the Ministry of Defense who would win such a war under the existing circumstances. Nothing since the capitulation of the Third Reich had so stirred German hearts as did the events in Hungary and Egypt, culminating in this threat of war.

The immediate German reaction to the military acts of the Great Powers in Eastern Europe and the Near East was diverse but clear. The futile uprising of the Hungarian people and the brutal suppression of it by the Soviet tanks roused a wave of disgust and hatred and even of shame for being unable to help. For the first time in ten years the Germans admired and pitied somebody besides themselves. They suffered and felt with the Hungarians, nor did their sympathy spend itself just in spontaneous demonstrations all over the country. The very people of West Germany whose selfish materialism today is the strongest force sustaining the Bonn Republic showed a spirit of sacrifice not unlike that of the war winter of 1941–42 when frost-bound German troops in Russia had to be provided with warm clothing.

Not less human though perhaps less encouraging to moralists was the immediate German reaction to the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. Eleven years after the Hitler régime's collapse it gave the majority of Germans effective proof of a fact they had

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known hitherto in the back of their minds only: that "the others" who had come to be their judges were actually no "better" than they themselves. They felt that it had not been a new code of justice, after all, but just a victor's judgment that had been proclaimed in Nuremberg in 1946. True, the difference between planning a war of aggression against half the world or one against Egypt is not negligible. In principle, however, was not aggression aggression? This moral levelling, plus the unimpressive Anglo-French military operation and the threat it carried to the peace of Europe, roused genuine anti-French and anti-British feeling. The West Germans felt that they had acquired the right to a self-satisfied and condescending attitude; and after ten years in the doghouse they were under great temptation to show it toward their two great European allies.

Chancellor Adenauer's state visit to Paris, planned months before, happened to fall in those critical days. He embarked on it against the wishes of influential forces in parliament, in his own party and in his government. But like a racer who steps on the gas when his car reaches a dangerous curve, Dr. Adenauer now put his whole emphasis on the effort to forward West European unity, a project which had seemed almost dead. Thus once again he succeeded in saving a situation which might have been a threat not only for him but for everybody. When the smoke of Budapest and Suez had cleared, the Germans were in a somewhat supercilious mood but at least still side by side with the British and French.

In addition to these rather superficial effects, the bloody autumn of 1956 has had another and considerably deeper influence on German politics. It has suddenly rekindled the great fear which seven fat years had repressed into the subconsciousness of the West Germans. The spectre of death and hunger, war and slavery, which had dominated their thoughts in the first postwar years, again appeared before their eyes. Overnight they were brought face to face with a fact which they had tried hard to forget: that the glorious German "economic miracle" of recent years had been performed on very thin ice.

Fear and an overwhelming desire for security had fostered the creation of the Federal Republic and later helped the West Germans to bear the sufferings of their brothers in the East with greater ease. Now that the fear is alive again the search for security will influence German policy indefinitely and more than any

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other single factor—security of all kinds, political, military and social, security alike for the country and for the individual. At present this is the supreme goal of a nation which twice in one generation has lost its ideals, its sons and its property. Its citizens had thought that—like their sovereignty and like their "economic miracle"—security had fallen into their laps as the result of hard work and the cold war. The shots in Budapest and Suez shattered the illusion. In those November days big industrialists laid plans to flee the country and frantic buying set in among the lower middle class—symbolic of how far Germany had lost any sense of real security.

The first indications of the political changes introduced by events in Hungary and Egypt came from the poll takers. Dr. Adenauer's reputation, which had been declining ever since his return from Moscow, suddenly began to improve, helped, no doubt, by the German tendency to turn to a strong leader in times of crisis. Although membership in his Christian Democratic Union decreased and the opposition Social Democratic Party clearly moved into the lead (in December the polls showed 39 percent C.D.U., 45 percent S.P.D.), the Chancellor's personal reputation gained. In August 1956 only 37 percent had been found to agree with his policy; in December the figure was 45 percent. This schizophrenic discrepancy in judging the government party and the head of the government was typical of the desire for security on two different levels: on the one hand, the S.P.D. opposition with its promise of social security and the welfare state seemed best equipped to distribute the fruits of the "economic miracle" reaped in a free-market economy; on the other, the events in Hungary seemed to justify Dr. Adenauer's much disputed basic principle that rearmament offers the best promise of military security. According to a poll in October 1956, only 38 percent were in favor of a Federal army; two months later the figure was more than 50 percent.[1]

No sooner had this trend appeared than the political leaders began a series of surprising somersaults. In order to satisfy the dominant desire for military security, Chancellor Adenauer and the leader of the opposition began swapping passages from each other's programs, which until then had been under bitter dispute. For the first time since the outbreak of the political conflict in 1951 the S.P.D. Chairman, Erich Ollenhauer, acknowledged the

[1] Results of a poll conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee.

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existence of the Federal army which his party had been fighting at knife's point. In a speech to party officials late in January he announced that in the event of victory in the fall elections, an S.P.D. government would try to meet military obligations to NATO for the time being, if not by conscription then with the help of a volunteer army. "The S.P.D. does not wish to open a gulf between itself and the soldiers."

The Chancellor in the same month took a parallel loan of ideas which he had hitherto condemned. His move apparently aimed at decreasing the military risk that, in case of riots on the Polish and Hungarian model in the Soviet Zone, the American and Soviet troops in West and East Germany might collide and bring about the third world war. "It is quite possible," the Chancellor said in a press conference, "it is even probable, that this question [of a demilitarized zone in Europe] will again be raised by us with other Powers within the next months." Like Ollenhauer's pledge regarding the Federal army, this was a completely new variation in the Chancellor's policy. At the Geneva summit conference in 1955, the German Federal Government had been proud of having a part in thwarting British Prime Minister Eden's plan "to create an area (on both sides of the zonal border) where a system of mutual international inspection of armed forces would be applied." Now it went a good deal further: not just troop inspection but withdrawal of troops.

These two examples show how much developments in Hungary and Egypt have changed the way of looking at things in German political life. The question arises whether they have not changed West German policy also. During the Bundestag's last foreign policy debate, Foreign Minister von Brentano stressed—in the opinion of some observers even suspiciously overstressed—that no change had occurred. And indeed there has been no actual change so far. Something else has happened, though: the Federal Republic is surrounded by a world which has changed. In the West, two of its neighbors, Britain and France, have lost rank. In the East, two of its neighbors, Poland and Hungary, have attempted to break away from Soviet strangulation. The United Nations, meanwhile, has been trying to reverse its rôle and become an institution of power politics instead of an oratorical forum. This situation does not seem to open promising possibilities for Germany so much as to carry new threats.

The most depressing item on the German balance sheet made

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up after Hungary and Suez is the fact that the chances of achieving German reunification on acceptable terms are smaller than ever. The Communist puppet régime in East Germany had been losing importance in the eyes of the Kremlin in recent years; but the new situation in Poland and Hungary made a revaluation necessary. Just as the Bonn Government is Washington's most loyal ally, so the government of the Soviet Zone—whose very existence depends on the presence of the Soviet Army—is Moscow's most devoted satellite. In East Germany a nationalist Communist revolt from the top, as happened in Belgrade, Warsaw and Budapest, is unthinkable. The value of this safety zone between the West and the smouldering satellites was proved dramatically in the Polish uprisings, which might easily have taken the same form as in Hungary if Poland had had a common border with the free world. The West prefers the result at Warsaw to the massacre which took place in Budapest; but so does Moscow. The Soviet defeats in Poland and Hungary have made a withdrawal from Germany almost impossible for reasons of prestige; but quite apart from that, the new importance of the German Soviet Zone makes such a withdrawal out of the question.

Moscow's price for German reunification in peace and freedom has steadily increased. After the Federal Republic entered NATO the Kremlin announced that reunification had now become as good as impossible for an indefinite period of time. But even if Germany were to withdraw from NATO and become neutral—as the Socialist opposition has always been prepared to offer officially and as the Federal Government has lately been willing to offer unofficially—Moscow no longer would be tempted. Liberalization of the satellite system and German reunification are too much to digest at the same time. If, as seems the case, the two procedures are mutually exclusive, there is no price which can be paid at present for a peaceful Russian withdrawal from the heart of Europe.

Starting from this basic fact, the Federal Government concentrates upon three issues connected with reunification: how to decrease the risk of a military conflict in Germany; how to get international recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union is responsible for the country's continued division; how to bring the satellites into the picture, with the idea that new possibilities for reunification may then be discovered.

The first point corresponded with the revived German concern

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for security. Chancellor Adenauer had that in mind when, early in February, he spoke of a relaxation of tension with regard to atomic weapons as "the main goal" of German policy. On another occasion he once again referred to the idea of a neutral zone in Central Europe. All this reveals the limitations of German policy. The Allied—chiefly American—troops in West Germany might easily collide with Soviet troops stationed in the Eastern Zone in the event that new riots broke out there or in Czechoslovakia or Poland. Thus the U.S. divisions represent a military risk as well as the most effective military security—a paradoxical situation in which a decrease of risk in one respect would mean simultaneously a decrease of security in another.

In this dilemma the West German Government has decided to try to minimize the risk at the source; it is trying in every way to prevent new unrest in the Eastern bloc from spilling over into the German Soviet Zone. According to broadcasts from Bonn, Dr. Adenauer urgently warned the heads of his party early in February "to be extremely cautious in their statements and suggestions regarding the situation in the states of the Eastern bloc." Even more significant are the current discussions as to whether or not the Federal Republic should give economic aid to the Soviet Zone. Such a plan could not even have been discussed a year ago, since any material support given there would naturally strengthen the Communist régime. Today, however, this consideration is outweighed by fear that a state of economic depression in "the other Germany" might lead to riots among the population, with unforeseeable consequences.

As regards the second item on the program, the German Chancellor announced officially shortly before Christmas that he was planning to bring the German question before the United Nations. He does not look for any immediate practical result. He does see a chance, however, to obtain an international verdict that today the Soviet Union alone is responsible for the continued division of Germany. The Western Powers have not hitherto been in possession of a clear alibi. An alibi is desired for the sake of history and would also be valuable for tactical purposes in an electoral campaign. Influential forces in the Foreign Office strongly oppose the move, fearing that even if the Government proceeds with all caution the former occupation Powers might take it as releasing them from their responsibility to create a united Germany, a responsibility so far undisputed.

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On the other hand, the Foreign Office puts great stress on the remaining project: to draw closer to the satellite states. Foreign Minister von Brentano told this writer as long ago as last November that he was definitely in favor of establishing West German embassies in Warsaw and Budapest. Being a loyal minister he has never made this proposal formally, since Chancellor Adenauer does not wish to go beyond an exchange of trade missions. Even that is not officially a part of German foreign policy as yet, but the Chancellor has given orders that the project be prepared. The reason he does not wish to go so far as his equally Western-minded foreign minister is due less to a difference of opinion on the objective situation than to his personal experience. He still remembers his shock when he found on his visit to Moscow in 1955 that he had run into an enemy trap; and he has not forgotten the resentment of his allies when he agreed to an exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet Union just after he had given them assurances that he would not do precisely that. Ironically, it was Dr. von Brentano who put up the greatest opposition against that deal.

Hitherto Bonn's principal object in not opening diplomatic relations with states of the Eastern bloc was to guarantee that the East German Government would not be recognized by the neutral and Western world. It declared officially that it would regard any recognition of that government as an unfriendly act. Behind this declaration lay the threat to cancel trade and economic agreements. In the case of the Soviet Union, the Bonn Government was able to point to its special position as one of the four occupying Powers. But if it should begin sending ambassadors to the satellite states, which in turn maintain representatives to the East German Government, it would hardly be able to maintain its point; and the result might be that East Germany might be recognized by countries like Jugoslavia, Egypt and India, followed by a whole swarm of others. That would strengthen the separate existence of two Germanys and make reunification still harder to attain.

In Bonn this situation is considered to have been changed greatly by the events in Poland and Hungary. On the one hand, hardly anything can make reunification harder than it already is. On the other, it is felt that even though they might be entitled to do so juridically, countries like India would shy away from recognizing such a shaky régime as that in East Berlin. Finally,

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Dr. von Brentano figures that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the restless satellites might open a possibility that has more advantages than dangers; it might win support for German reunification in a hitherto hostile camp. For instance, if it were possible to convince the Poles that they would have less to fear from a reunited Germany than from the Soviet Union, and that they could expect to receive more advantageous treatment there than from Moscow, then Poland—and perhaps other national-Communist states—might give decisive support to the German effort for reunification. This would be the more likely in that the Poles might at the same time secure the withdrawal of the Soviet troops now stationed at their back in the German Eastern Zone.

However, this tempting plan is heavily mortgaged by the Oder-Neisse line, which places more than 25 percent of prewar Germany under Polish and Russian rule (Federal Republic, 96,000 square miles; Soviet Zone, 42,000 square miles; Eastern territories, 47,000 square miles). This makes all German assurances of friendship sound suspicious to Polish ears. The Poles are themselves so extremely nationalist that they find it hard to imagine that a reunited Germany would not immediately threaten border revisions—and indeed that *is* somewhat hard to imagine.

At present no German government would dare renounce these territories officially. Foreign Minister von Brentano has solemnly announced in the German parliament, however, that the Federal Government would never try to revise the Eastern borders by force, since their final demarcation must in any case be left to a peace treaty. Here again the policy studies being made at Bonn far outrun the official government program. Both the Government and the Socialist opposition realize, at least subconsciously, that the lands beyond the Oder and Neisse very likely constitute the price for Hitler's lost war. If in addition it were to turn out that by relinquishing those territories, freedom could be bought for 18,000,000 Germans in the Soviet Zone, the price might not be considered too high. Presumably the Federal Government would at the least insist on the right of individual refugees to return to their former homes with various guarantees of the right to work and to move about freely, for whatever they might be worth. Any such proposal would so exceed the responsibilities of a government and parliament that a final decision would certainly have to be left to a plebiscite.

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An appeal to the United Nations, the opening of diplomatic relations with Warsaw and Budapest, and a withdrawal from NATO as the price for reunification—these are not as yet official lines of German policy but, like the so-called Radford Plan in America, are subjects of study and planning. The fact that a survey of the situation is being made in Bonn is only natural and should not cause misunderstandings. Yet such is the inability of Dr. Adenauer and Secretary of State Dulles to admit to each other the mere possibility that the interests of their two countries might one day cease to coincide that even the hint of a new plan comes close to being regarded as a breach of confidence. Only last year the Radford Plan proved to what unfortunate results the present unnatural relationship may lead. The German Chancellor felt betrayed when he heard of the studies which bore Admiral Radford's name even though they seem to have been made by a group of majors and colonels of the American Chiefs of Staff without the personal knowledge of either Admiral Radford or Secretary Dulles, let alone their approval. Now something similar threatens to come up on the German side. For fear of alarming Washington, Bonn tries to hush up its legitimate desire to explore all the possibilities of a new situation. The trouble is that an ally always finds out such things, perhaps from a third party, and the later this happens the more painful the repercussions.

It would be well if Bonn and Washington could change their neurotic friendship into a relationship based on real confidence. This relationship should allow discussion of divergencies which so far have been taboo. If the United States Government should have a chance to buy world peace and a genuine relaxation of tension with Moscow at the price of the continued division of Germany, it would fail in its obligations and responsibility toward its own citizens if it refused the offer for the sake of the Germans. If, on the other hand, the Germans should be able to buy their reunification in peace and freedom at the price of severing all ties with the West, even a German government that might prefer to remain loyal to its Atlantic and West European friends would have to accept the offer. To say this does not mean that either of the two extreme possibilities exists at the present time. But they mark the field. Any discussion of German-American relations should be conducted with the two extremes in mind instead of having the two partners bashfully pledge their chaste love to each other after ten years of married life.

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FROM "DOCTRINE" TO POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By John C. Campbell

THE United States, in the words used by Dr. Charles Malik in these pages, is now "entering the history of the Near East." After years of evasion and delay this country has taken up a new and more active rôle of leadership. President Eisenhower's message of January 5 to the Congress is a firm declaration of intent to preserve the Near and Middle East for the free world. Despite the difficulties the President's specific proposals encountered in the Senate, the Congress clearly supports his basic purposes.

Most of our earlier attempts to build a "position of strength" in the Middle East have foundered on the rocks of extreme nationalism, neutralism, political instability and reckless leadership. The new American policy, like those that have gone before, will have to navigate among these same rocks and reefs, in a new and more dangerous situation marked by alarming Soviet gains, by the virtual disappearance of British power and prestige, and by a pattern of unrest and conflict within a large part of the area itself in which the tolerant and the moderate are apparently being swept aside by the intolerant and the fanatical. We shall have what advantage there may be in building on prior efforts where they have succeeded and also the considerable handicap of having to clear away the wreckage of those that have failed.

The Truman Doctrine program of aid to Greece and Turkey, initiated in 1947, succeeded because the Greeks and Turks shared our aims and welcomed our help. The success of the new "doctrine" will also depend in the last analysis upon the support and the coöperation of the peoples of the "general area of the Middle East." For the Soviet challenge in the Middle East is above all a political challenge. Military commitments and economic aid can be an adequate response only if grounded in a sound political strategy.

Whatever its shortcomings of method or scope, the Eisenhower Doctrine is designed to accomplish certain things it was necessary to do, above all to make the Congress and the American people aware of the seriousness of the Soviet threat in the Middle East and to put their weight behind the President in his future efforts

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to keep that area free of Soviet domination. It constitutes a clear warning to the Soviets. And it is a useful, even necessary, statement of American purpose to be pondered by the peoples of the Middle East.

But having posed the counterthreat to the Soviet Union, we are now faced with a dilemma. The United States can concentrate on establishing and maintaining a military position that will provide maximum deterrence, trying to build an effective regional alliance system and holding strategic positions still in Western hands even in the face of nationalist pressure. Or it can accept a militarily inadequate situation until political conditions change. The first course would be the logical one were we at war or on the brink. Otherwise it almost certainly would use up our political credit and jeopardize gains already made, embroiling us with the very nations we desire to protect. Experiments over the past few years have already shown the futility of trying to define and apply a general plan for the defense of the Middle East in the face of widely variant local conditions, reluctance to grant use of necessary bases, and unsettled political conflicts. The second alternative means accepting for the indefinite future an unsatisfactory military posture, leaving the Middle Eastern nations to decide for themselves when they want the American assurances to become really effective. Until then there is an obvious risk, but it is one which can perhaps be reduced to tolerable proportions by concentration on those elements of military power which can be maintained in and near the area without stirring up antagonism.

The risk of a less than perfect defense posture in the area is worth taking for the very reason that Soviet advances by nonmilitary means are a greater real danger than that of armed attack, and attempts to achieve that posture at all costs can only increase vulnerability to more pressing dangers. The new doctrine, for understandable reasons, is cast primarily in military terms. Its real contribution in the Middle East itself, however, must be first of all as a backdrop for political action.

Similar considerations apply to the other part of the doctrine, the provision of military and economic aid to the nations of the Middle East. Where it is requested and welcomed, it may contribute greatly to the ability to cope with the Soviet danger. But the contemplated expenditures for arms deliveries and economic assistance cannot be expected by themselves to bring strength and stability to the Middle East or to buy its allegiance. More

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than that has already been spent without stabilizing the area or buying the allegiance of anybody. The aim must be more modest.

Military aid is primarily important for internal security, for morale, for prestige, for keeping a balance. No amount of it will make these nations a real military barrier against Russia. Serious risks, moreover, are attached to the spreading of arms about the explosive Arab-Israel area unless accompanied by policies which control its effects. Yet the sending of arms to some countries—to stiffen the "northern tier," to increase Lebanon's feeling of security, to consolidate Saudi Arabia's ties with the United States, even to counterbalance new Soviet deliveries to Egypt—may well be necessary.

The general justification for economic aid has been that it would contribute to stability, higher living standards and conditions less favorable to the growth of Communism, while creating good will toward the United States. So far as the Middle East is concerned, the record justifies only the conclusion that no general approach applies throughout the area and no specific amount will guarantee specific results. In Iran, American aid has been of tremendous significance; in Egypt or in Jordan it seems to have accomplished little enough.

A long-range regional program, divorced from immediately political purposes, may be essential. To deal with the pressing problems that bear down upon us now, however, the great need is for unorthodox means, for flexibility, for the authority to attach "strings" or to leave them off as the occasion demands. Whether the problem be the Arab refugees, the Jordan valley scheme, or the continuance or orderly demise of the Kingdom of Jordan, economic aid can be one of the most effective instruments of American policy. Of itself it is not a policy and will not solve the intractable problems. Used in support of definite political objectives it may be indispensable.

II

The real problem is to find common interests with the nations of the Middle East, for in the last analysis they cannot be kept within the free world against their will. The overriding common interest is their continued independence. They must have the conviction that their independence is not threatened from the west, and one may hope they will come to realize that it is threatened only from the north. Soviet propaganda and conduct have

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had a real measure of success in convincing some of them of precisely the reverse. "National liberation of the peoples of the East" has been Moscow's most effective slogan in the Arab world ever since 1917. Middle Eastern countries that have had their independence for some time, however, are far less susceptible to this kind of blandishment. Turkey and Iran are not taken in by the talk of liberation from Western "domination."

The example of Turkey is worth studying. Perhaps in recent years it has been somewhat oversold to the American public. Turkey's recent reversion to authoritarian practices and its errors of economic policy have added a note of realism to earlier estimates. Yet the country remains strong and stable, impervious to Soviet pressure and subversion, anxious to coöperate with the West, unworried over the presence of American missions, willing to provide bases. Its main concern is to be strong for self-defense and to help deter Soviet aggression. Fortunately for us it holds a key geographical position and is the strongest state in the Middle East. In some ways Turkey is unique. It has had centuries of experience with Russian imperialism. In recent years it has "faced West," in its internal reforms as in its foreign policies, to the point of being more a Western than a Middle Eastern nation.

Iranians and Arabs, we have had ample opportunity to learn, are not Turks either in traditions or in temperament. The Arabs do not look to the Turks, their former rulers, as an example or for leadership, nor have the Turks thought it worth while to make a real effort to lead them. But certain facts in the Turkish experience may be significant. The Turks went through their nationalist revolution a generation ago. It was directed largely against the West, and Soviet help was welcomed as a means of winning the fight. Turkey then went through a period of neutrality while it consolidated its independence, and finally turned to the West when it perceived the full implications of the Soviet threat. It is now willing to collaborate freely with self-confidence and no psychopathic touchiness about "sovereignty."

Can others go through this same process toward maturity, and can we afford to wait while they do? What has happened in the northern tier is in fact quite encouraging, although it often tends to be overlooked amid all the turmoil caused by the nations farther south. Iran, having passed through its period of fanatic anti-Western nationalism, may now be settling down to greater political stability. It has come to the point of abandoning its

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historic neutrality, a courageous decision that has received too little recognition in the West. The Shah, having taken upon himself the responsibility for defying the Kremlin and making his policy stick, is in a difficult position. He has to show his people some results, especially in economic progress. Military aid is a political necessity even though every last bit of it may not be justified on purely military calculations. Eager for American help, Iran has welcomed the new American doctrine as providing an assurance sought in vain before.

The remaining Middle Eastern member of the Baghdad Pact is in a different situation. Iraq does not border on the U.S.S.R. and is in and of the Arab world. Its present isolation from its brother Arab states is unnatural and unlikely to be permanent. No other Arab state has been drawn into the Pact, and the pull of the Arab world is inherently stronger than that of the West. In the long run Western relations with Iraq must be considered in the context of relations with the Arab nations rather than exclusively with the northern tier. This does not mean a reversal of policy now or indifference to Abdel Nasser's campaign to oust Nuri es-Said and add Iraq to his Arab bloc. America should help Iraq to hold firm, recognizing that it will remain with the West only if the West can find a sounder relationship with the rest of the Arab world. Otherwise the association becomes too great a burden for Iraq to carry. It also suffers some internal handicaps in realizing its potential for leadership of at least a large part of the Arab world. The fact that this potential exists makes it all the more important that Iraq achieve a peaceful transition from its present paternal and feudal rule to a system more securely based on the people, and to escape a position that finds it isolated in the Arab community and charged with infidelity to the sacred cause of Arab nationalism.

To the extent that common interests have been found with the states directly bordering on the Soviet Union the northern tier concept had merit. Unfortunately the Baghdad Pact was by no means the best way to bring the concept to concrete realization. Leaving aside the question whether its formation provoked the Soviet jump into the "southern tier," the failure of the West to find a basis of common interest with the Arab states other than Iraq is what brought on the grave crisis that began with the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and has deepened ever since. It is legitimate to ask, after recent events, where one can find such

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a basis of common interest. The winds of Arab nationalism are blowing strong; Arab nationalism seems to have been captured by Gamal Abdel Nasser; its tone is violently anti-Western; it welcomes the friendly support of the Soviet Union against the hated "colonialists" and "Zionists."

To command these winds to calm down is futile. To make a frontal assault on nationalism, as the British and French did, is fatal. To appease "Nasserism," as the United States has had cause to discover, gains nothing. The Soviets can bid higher than any Western nation. The only hopeful course is one which frankly accepts Arab aspirations to self-determination, equality and independence, but sets limits to support of extreme claims which deny these rights to others. It is the determination of those limits that is so difficult, for Arab claims and grievances range far and wide. An essential preliminary in any case is the establishment of a certain amount of confidence on the part of the Arabs in American motives, building on the prestige gained by our stand against the recent invasions of Egypt, but maintaining necessary bargaining power in working out specific agreements with them.

It is utopian to expect calm reason and statesmanship from the Arabs. Their political leaders, for the most part, retain the spirit and the methods of revolutionaries. The American hope that somehow the achievement of independence would bring normal and coöperative relations has been borne out neither in the Middle East nor anywhere else. Nothing is so unstable in the world balance as a group of newly independent states, weak, uncertain of their frontiers and their future, jealous and suspicious of each other, resentful of the "interference" of great Powers. The Middle East today recalls the Balkans of 50 years ago. Outside Powers who fish in such waters have to gauge the force of nationalism and to accommodate their policies to it if they wish to succeed at all. But woe to those who, in pursuit of supposed advantage or of a benevolent theory or principle, abdicate powers of decision vital to their own future. The important thing is that the Arabs know where the United States stands: that it is not an enemy of their cause; but neither, as a responsible world Power, can it give a premium to irresponsibility. On a number of matters (oil production, pipelines, economic development, regional planning) the possibility of arrangements of real benefit to them should provide some incentive. Saudi Arabia, for example, has an obvious interest in such practical relationships, rather than

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in beating the anti-Western drums for the greater glory of Abdel Nasser.

Only in that way can the West successfully support and encourage those Arab leaders who are moderate nationalists, who do not repudiate the West and all its works, or who have a substantial political or economic interest in coöperation. Such leaders may seem hard to find at the moment. The tide has been running so strong in the other direction that they have tended to ride along with it or to keep silent. They cannot make headway if the West persists in making Abdel Nasser the sole champion of Arab nationalism who can win victories.

It may be objected that to try to walk this fine line (if it exists at all) between encouragement of "good" nationalists and appeasement of "bad" nationalists is well beyond the capacities of our diplomacy. How can the West "accept" Arab nationalism without playing into the hands of the extremists and the pro-Soviet elements at the expense of Western interests? Our only hope of doing so is by consistent official and public attitudes which give Arabs the sense that they are regarded as equals and are being treated fairly and impartially; by recognizing the futility of trying to hold Western positions based on former "imperial" relationships that are an offense to Arab feeling and serve to unite all Arabs against the West; by encouraging greater unity among Arab states desirous of maintaining freedom, and even taking a more tolerant attitude toward the Arab League if the League will itself develop a measure of tolerance; by respecting the neutrality of those Arab states that prefer it, provided it is genuine; and by a courageous attempt to tackle the question of Israel in a way that does some justice to outraged Arab feeling without feeding the fires of Arab megalomania.

This last point illustrates the basic dilemma in which the existence of unsolved and seemingly insoluble conflicts in the Middle East has placed the Western Powers. The United States, on Palestine and other thorny disputes, has not been eager to make proposals sure to be rejected and to earn the abuse of both sides. Yet it is the persistence of unsettled conflicts that has brought us to the present pass. The Soviet Union is entrenching itself not through aggression or the threat of it, not through its skill in undermining and subverting non-Communist governments, but because certain non-Communist Arab governments have *invited* Soviet power and influence into the area to serve their own ends.

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As long as there is not even an approach to a settlement, the danger will continue. The situation has elements of blackmail, but the plain fact is that the West cannot have any standing in the Arab world unless it takes positions which moderate the conflicts and which well-disposed Arab leaders can defend before their own peoples.

This is not the place to make concrete proposals on the involved controversies over the Suez Canal, Palestine, Buraimi, or the Yemen-Aden border. It is, perhaps, the place to suggest that the United States should take the lead in getting these matters into U.N. channels for solution and make the diplomatic efforts necessary for pursuing them there, and that it should not be afraid to put itself on record both as to principles and as to the major points of settlement. If there was any momentum for a new approach to the question of Palestine at the time of the cease-fire and the first appearance of the U.N. Emergency Force, it was soon lost. Attention inevitably was riveted on the pressing problems of troop withdrawal, the impasse over Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba, and reëstablishment of the armistice (which may not work any better than it did before). Yet the urgency remains to face the real issues of boundaries, refugees, and the use and development of water resources. However unfavorable the atmosphere, we cannot delay indefinitely pushing on beyond the general points made by Secretary Dulles in his speech of August 26, 1955. Israel wants, above all, national security, which has just been proved unattainable by her own efforts. Outside guarantees are the only answer. The Arabs want, above all, a more just settlement in Palestine. This they can get only with outside support. Here is at least the opportunity to devise proposals that might satisfy the basic drives on both sides, even if immediate claims cannot be satisfied.

Whether or not the United States is morally bound to support a territorial settlement more favorable to the Arabs than the current armistice lines or to do something more for the Arab refugees may be a subject for debate, but it would certainly be politically wise to do so. Such proposals, even if in a package containing guarantees of new frontiers, will bring loud cries from Israel. They may be unacceptable to the Arab States. The Soviets would almost certainly hold out promises of much more, feeding Arab hopes of destroying Israel altogether. There is no answer to this except firmness.

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Here is where the chief value of the new doctrine lies. It puts up a fence on the northern border of the Middle East, ruling out the use of force (including, if the doctrine's logical corollary is followed in practice, the sending of "volunteers"). It thus limits the degree of Soviet intervention and the degree of Arab expectation of the benefits to be derived from it. The President's message to Congress, moreover, pointed out that subversion often depends for success on the threat of direct aggression, and that to eliminate the latter is to go far toward eliminating the former. Similarly, once the Arabs can be convinced that Soviet military power will not be introduced into the area, either for them or against them, chances will improve for progress on the tough problems that have resisted all attempts at solution hitherto.

In addition to the outer fence there must also be an inner fence along new borders between the Arab states and Israel—a fence guaranteed by the United States and, to the extent feasible, by the United Nations. The Arabs and the Soviet leaders might just as well know that the United States will not permit the destruction of Israel. If the United States takes a firm position, letting the Arabs know they will not get anything more even if they try to play the Soviet card, and letting Israel know that only thus can it get a dependable guarantee of security, then forces may begin to work toward acceptance of settlements worked out through the United Nations. We cannot expect any "peace treaty" at this stage. Neither side can be expected to negotiate with and make concessions to the other. Both might reluctantly accept something unpalatable that was nevertheless less distasteful and less dangerous than the status quo, especially if they saw the futility of standing on maximum claims that they could never fulfill. Many in the Middle East say that they have long been waiting for the United States to act with the firmness and assurance of a great Power that knows its own interests and deals justly with the interests of the others. The opportunity is there.

III

One striking feature of the new doctrine is that it seems to have no place for other interested Powers as active partners. With a nod to the United Nations, the United States appears as the self-appointed policeman and patron of the Middle East. Secretary Dulles in his testimony was frank to state that any association with Britain or France in this area could only be a handicap.

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While the United States still holds to the provisions of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 it is now a unilateral policy and not a tripartite one. The Declaration itself was killed by the Anglo-French action in Egypt. The rejection and failure of anything presented to the Arabs as a "Western" or "Anglo-American" policy in the aftermath of those events could not be a moment in doubt. Nor is it merely a matter of waiting a decent interval while passions have time to cool. Anti-British feeling among the Arabs is rooted in many years of history. France, now no longer a Middle Eastern Power at all, has earned bitter Arab hatred because of Algeria. These are facts which have to be taken into account. They are, however, no cause for smugness or satisfaction on the part of the United States. For, aside from the strain on Western ties generally, new relationships have to be worked out in the Middle East itself where Britain still has vital interests, still controls territory and can still bring power to bear in time of crisis.

What is needed, as many on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested, is a new understanding between Britain and America on how the vital interests of both countries are to be preserved. Britain's overriding interests, and those of the rest of Western Europe, are security—to prevent the outflanking of Western Europe by Soviet advances in the Middle East—and oil. These are also interests of the United States. It would be tragic if the inability to agree on methods, which contributed so greatly to the recent crisis, continued to divide the two Powers in the future. The "combination of British experience and American resources," a phrase one often hears in London, is surely not the right formula. Years of experience did not keep Britain from making the wrong decisions. On the other hand, the idea of the replacement of "imperialist" British leadership by "disinterested" or "enlightened" American leadership—which oversimplifies to the point of distorting the truth—does not meet the real problems. The American record on Palestine, after all, is hardly remarkable for political wisdom and remains a nearly insuperable obstacle to good relations with the Arabs.

According to Soviet propaganda the United States is trying to "replace" the British, both in their political position and in the ownership of oil interests. This is precisely what the United States is not doing and should in no circumstances attempt to do. There should be, obviously, a common understanding on policy. But it

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should not be a joint policy presenting a solid front to the Middle East on all issues; rather an understanding on how, in a period of American leadership, vital common interests can be safeguarded. In taking on the rôle of leader, however, the United States also takes on certain obligations such as to get a Suez settlement that really protects the rights and interests of Britain and Europe. In doing that it cannot rely entirely on Egypt's good will; it has to build up an effective bargaining position including practical alternatives to the canal route.

In the non-Arab northern tier states the transition to American leadership has already been made without damage to Anglo-American relations. Britain has given up its position as the leading Western Power but its security and its interests are being protected under new arrangements. The same trend is now discernible in Iraq, where Nuri es-Said finds his former close association with the British a political handicap. On the Persian Gulf, however, the British are still physically present as the protecting Power for a series of Arab sheikhdoms backward in political and social life but, in most cases, rich in oil. They are not ready for independence, nor do the neighboring Arab states have a God-given right to annex them. But they are already the target of Arab nationalist agitation and internal disorders bound to generate future crises with the West. Britain and the United States must work out some solutions in advance. That does not mean that Britain should immediately give in to every Arab claim; it probably does mean that the future of these territories should be discussed and worked out with Saudi Arabia and other neighboring states. The Western world cannot afford to have its whole position in the Middle East jeopardized by a series of Buraimi disputes.

The new doctrine says nothing about alliances or collective defense organizations. It states only that the United States will give aid to states or groups of states that want it. Significantly, the Baghdad Pact is not mentioned, although the President's message cited a recent official statement that a threat to the integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United States "with the utmost gravity." The Baghdad Pact was for all practical purposes invented and nursed through infancy by the United States, though the actual negotiations were left to the local states. In April 1956 the United States "half joined" it, participating in several

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committees but avoiding formal adherence for a number of reasons: the desire not to antagonize Egypt, to sidestep further objections from Israel, and to avoid going to the Senate for ratification in an election year. In our absence the Pact was widely regarded through the Middle East as an instrument of its one Western member, Great Britain, which had indeed joined primarily as a means of keeping its position in Iraq (including access to two bases there) and of continuing, despite setbacks, to play a more modest but still significant rôle of leadership in the Middle East. Then after the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, the four Moslem members of the Pact met ostentatiously without the British and denounced the aggression of their treaty partner. Whatever the Pact may be henceforth, it will not be subject to British leadership.

The choice for the United States, then, has been whether to strengthen these states through the Baghdad Pact, joining it for that purpose, or outside the Pact. The formulation of the new doctrine leaves the question open, but one has the impression that the Pact will be allowed to drift into obscurity like its prewar antecedent, the Saadabad Pact of 1937. When it was the only sign of Western determination to hold the Middle East in the free world, the Baghdad Pact could not have been abandoned without presenting the Soviet Union with a great political victory. Now that the United States is making an even stronger commitment than the rather vague obligations of the Pact would have imposed, the Pact itself no longer holds great meaning for its Middle Eastern members.

As long as there are so many divisions among Middle Eastern nations themselves, a Western-sponsored alliance tends to accentuate the divisions and magnify the problems. The Baghdad Pact, laboriously constructed as a barrier against the Russians, had as its most direct result the explosion of Egyptian resentment that led to the arms deal of September 1955 and a gigantic forward stride in Russia's march into the Middle East. By splitting the Arab front it brought the United States into the middle of an inter-Arab dispute in which all but one of the Arab states were ranged on the other side. As ground was gained in the Pact countries it was lost in others. The danger was that, for lack of flexibility of policy, the losses might be multiplied beyond all hope of recovery. The threat of a Soviet breakthrough in Egypt or Syria was there for all to see. A virtue of the new doctrine is

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that it offers the possibility of checking the losses among "neutrals" without alienating those nations that have chosen alignment with the West.

Lebanon has welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, where it never spoke up for the Baghdad Pact. Saudi Arabia appears to be well disposed, although it would be unwise to count heavily on King Saud's influence as a counterweight to "Nasserism." At least the United States is not coming into the Middle East with a policy that is automatically rejected by the Arabs. Wisely it does not seek to make them stand up and be counted or to promote a new regional pact.

From whatever angle one looks, conditions in the Middle East itself proclaim the importance of the political. Declarations of warning and military dispositions can help fence off the area from Communist armed adventurism. Military and economic aid can bolster friendly governments and help grease the wheels of diplomacy. The real challenge, however, is to diplomacy itself, to the ability to make political decisions and carry them out in complex situations fraught with dangers and difficulties. To stand on sound principles, to lay down the right general lines of action over the long term, will be essential. But the United States is no longer above the battle, preaching to others. It has "entered into the history of the Near East." It should use to the full such moral and political force as the United Nations represents, but it cannot hide behind the Secretary-General or leave all initiative to the United Nations. It is already apparent that we cannot avoid making specific proposals of our own, or engaging in hard bargaining with Arabs, with Israelis and even with Russians. American representatives will have to dirty their hands with some of the problems with which the British have long been wrestling. Determination to hold the Middle East in the free world, the essence of the Eisenhower Doctrine, will be unavailing unless matched by a determination boldly to attack its vexing political problems with a resourceful and resilient diplomacy. One may hope that diplomacy will have full freedom of action, unhampered by the partisan demands of domestic politics or undue restrictions of legislation.

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ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL OIL POLICY

By Walter J. Levy

OVER the past decade, the economic growth of the industrialized West has been based in large measure upon a prodigious expansion in sources of energy. Oil has made the largest single contribution to that expansion; and the stepped-up consumption of oil has been especially marked among basic industries engaged in production and transport. In consequence, Western industry has become increasingly dependent upon an uninterrupted flow of oil. Since the end of World War II, Europe has been drawing more and more heavily upon Middle East oil to meet its requirements. But mounting tensions in the Middle East, arising from aggressive nationalism, the deterioration of British political authority and Soviet expansionist tendencies, put Europe's access to these critical supplies in jeopardy. The Suez crisis has driven these points home as no argument or previous circumstance could.

I. THE SUEZ CRISIS AND EUROPE'S OIL

Just a few figures will highlight the proportions of the current crisis for Western Europe. Europe's oil requirements last year were running at about 3,000,000 barrels daily. Imports from the Middle East amounted to 2,100,000 barrels per day, or 70 percent of European requirements. In contrast, crude oil production in Western Europe itself came to a bare 200,000 barrels. The balance of its needs was largely met by crude and product imports from the Western Hemisphere.

These oil supplies accounted for almost 20 percent of the total energy utilized by Europe. The relative importance of oil as a source of energy varies, of course, from country to country. The United Kingdom, for example, with relatively high coal production, relies on oil for only 13 percent of its energy needs. Sweden, on the other hand, depends on oil for about 45 percent of its energy needs. For Europe as a whole, each 5 percent shortfall in its oil supplies is the equivalent of a 1 percent decline in total energy availability.

When the Suez Canal was blocked following the British-French military operations against Egypt, the normal flow for 1,350,000 barrels daily of Middle East oil was cut off. When Syria blew up

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the pumping stations of the Iraq Petroleum Company, delivery of 550,000 barrels of Iraq oil came to a halt. Thus, 1,900,000 barrels, out of total shipments of 2,100,000 barrels per day, were lost. All that remained of Europe's normal receipts from the Middle East were 200,000 barrels per day moving from Saudi Arabia via Tapline.

Tanker tonnage, which was already fully engaged in mid-1956, was obviously inadequate to long-haul the same volume of Middle East oil to Europe around the Cape. Europe was obliged, therefore, to turn to the Western Hemisphere for a maximum contribution of both crude and essential black oils. Tanker priorities were given to the movement of supplies from Gulf and Caribbean ports; remaining tonnage could be assigned for liftings from the Persian Gulf around the Cape.

As a result of the U.S. supply effort and its own stock withdrawals, Western Europe was able to maintain over-all oil consumption at about 80 percent of normal. In terms of total energy, the 20 percent oil deficiency amounted to an over-all energy shortage of about 4 percent. All countries, of course, made every effort to meet their more urgent industrial requirements. In general, the minimum needs of railways and basic industries were maintained. Distillate and fuel oil supplies for other industries ranged from about 80 to 90 percent of normal. Gas and diesel oils for heating were more severely restricted; and gasoline consumption was reduced by rationing devices.

The economic impact of the Suez crisis extended, of course, beyond the direct effects of these oil shortages. In two broad areas, that of dollar exchange and of investment potential, the economic consequences of recent months set Western Europe back considerably. European balances of trade—especially those of the United Kingdom and France—were seriously disturbed. Britain's currency position deteriorated badly, and France's was equally precarious.

II. THE PROBLEMS AHEAD

When Europe emerges from the present crisis, it will still have to face up squarely to two stern realities. First and foremost, there is its continuing and even increasing dependence upon Middle East oil. And set against this dependency is the seriously compromised position of the Western Powers—and of the international oil companies—throughout the Middle East.

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Since 1948, oil's contribution to the energy requirements of Western Europe has increased from 10 percent to almost 20 percent. Europe's continued economic growth is predicated upon a vast expansion in energy; and oil is counted on to provide for more than half of that expansion. By 1965, oil is expected to account for over 25 percent of the total energy supply. The only known reserves capable of supplying Europe's rapidly mounting oil needs are in the Middle East, where 70 percent of the "free world's" oil resources is concentrated. Looking ahead to 1965, the probable oil balance shapes up, therefore, about as follows:

Europe's requirements are projected at 4,700,000 barrels daily. European production is not expected to yield more than 400,000 barrels, leaving import requirements of 4,300,000 barrels which would have to come from the Middle East. U.S. requirements are projected at 13,000,000 barrels daily. With expected production of, say, 10,000,000 barrels, U.S. imports would run to 3,000,000 barrels daily. Export surpluses in the Western Hemisphere will probably be able to meet 2,200,000 barrels of U.S. import needs; the remaining 800,000 barrels would also have to come from the Middle East. The Middle East, therefore, would be required to provide more than 5,000,000 barrels daily toward the West's probable oil deficiency—as well as to provide the bulk of oil supplies for the rest of the Eastern Hemisphere. This is the measure of Western dependency upon Middle East oil over the years ahead.[1] Moreover, despite enormous efforts to increase the output of alternative sources of energy, it is doubtful that in the foreseeable future increased coal production or nuclear energy can do more than just keep up with the rise in demand for energy. An intensive effort to push nuclear power development in Britain and in the Euratom countries might result in electrical generating capacity which by the mid-1960s would save the equivalent of 500–600,000 barrels of oil daily. We cannot expect, however, any significant reduction in Europe's dependence upon Middle Eastern oil.

That dependency is, of course, only one of many and often

[1] The U.S. might itself be able to achieve substantial independence from Middle East supplies, but this would require vastly accelerated exploration and capital outlays. In the United States the capital cost of finding and developing crude oil has more than doubled since the war, according to the Chase Manhattan Bank, from $0.78 per barrel in 1946 to $1.65 in 1955. (These figures exclude expenditures for geological and geophysical work and for lease rentals.) And while the picture may look better in Canada and Latin America, there is no doubt that any attempt to speed up the development of Western Hemisphere reserves would require very special incentives, and would have to be covered by sharply rising prices.

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diverse interests involved in the international oil trade. This has always been the case. Consider these competing objectives:

1. An importing country wants assured access to oil reserves. It would like its oil deliveries at the lowest possible prices, with minimum payments in hard currencies. It would prefer crude oil that it could refine, to finished products.

2. Each producing country would like the maximum production and sale of its oil, and the most rapid development of its resources. It wants high prices for its products. Above all, it wants the largest possible revenues that accelerated development, maximum production and high prices might assure.

3. A transit country looks for the highest possible income payments in return for passage. It also expects its own oil requirements to be met on the most favorable terms.

4. An international oil company must cope with competing demands among producing countries, and with the conflicting demands of producing and consuming countries. Withal, it must accurately forecast probable demand around the world; it must plan its long-run investment commitments and short-run production schedules. From these precarious operations, it must expect the earnings that are at once a return on past investment and an incentive to continued exploration, development and market expansion.

In the past, these opposing considerations have, on the whole, been successfully accommodated. Three important factors contributed to the stability of arrangements under which international oil trade was carried on. Each of these has been progressively weakened in recent years.

In the first place, the interdependence of the various parties helped to reconcile their diverse interests. If consuming nations were dependent upon the oil reserves of producing nations, the latter were equally dependent on the former for markets. If international oil companies depended upon access to potentially prolific areas in order to meet growing oil requirements throughout the world, the undeveloped areas depended on the companies for the capital and technological facilities to develop their resources. In the Middle East, however, that interdependence is now of decidedly unequal urgency.

Before the war, Europe drew less than a fourth of its oil imports from the Middle East. Both Latin America and the United States shipped larger quantities to Europe. After the war, Europe

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began to expand its refining facilities at a rapid rate, and its crude requirements increased accordingly. By 1949, the Middle East contributed 60 percent of Europe's oil imports. Today, the Middle East provides nearly 80 percent of Europe's oil imports—and no other area is in a position to replace Middle East crude.

This increasing dependency provides Middle East nationalism with its most effective weapon. The dynamics of that nationalism make existing oil arrangements an inevitable target for attack. Nor can the West rely on the importance of uninterrupted oil operations and oil revenues to Middle East governments as a deterrent to hostile actions. Economic considerations, important as they are to the relatively impoverished countries of the area, become insignificant when confronted with political necessities or political pretensions. Syria provides a striking example. Last October, the Iraq Petroleum Company dropped its plan to construct a new pipeline through Lebanon to Tripoli (which would have meant a considerable gain in revenues) because of its dispute with the Lebanese Government over taxes. The new line was instead scheduled for Syria. Yet Syria, the impending beneficiary from the dispute between Lebanon and I.P.C. over transit revenues, wantonly destroyed I.P.C. pumping facilities. Under the circumstances, there is little chance that Syria will be regarded as a better risk than Lebanon.

Meanwhile, British political authority, which had contributed so much to the stability of institutional arrangements in the Middle East, has been on the decline and has now practically disappeared except perhaps in the Persian Gulf sheikdoms. In 1951, Mossadegh nationalized the properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Europe weathered the crisis by virtue of expanded crude production in other areas of the Persian Gulf and product exports from the United States. But American and other non-British participation in the operating consortium represented an obvious derogation of British status in Persia. In 1954, Britain acceded to the evacuation of the Suez territory, with only pro forma recognition of its vital interests in the Canal itself. More recently, Jordan evicted British military advisers and then voided the long-standing treaty with Britain. Cyprus is in revolt. Yemen now stirs up trouble over Aden. Even in Kuwait and Bahrein, Britain has been faced by local disturbances.

Under the pressure of increasingly aggressive Middle East nationalism, local forces have frequently concentrated their at-

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tacks to disrupt existing oil arrangements. At the same time, the Soviet Union is in a position to exploit every tension in the area. It can conspire with rulers, or conspire to subvert them. It can make political capital out of the explosive Israeli situation. It can support one power bloc against the regional grouping that the West relies on for support in the cold war. In this situation, no institutional arrangement into which Western governments or oil companies enter may long be secure.

Finally, the commercial dominion of the international oil companies has been increasingly impaired. Development of the area's oil resources had been initiated under the umbrella of British political authority. The countries themselves were underdeveloped, often with no prior contact with the Western world; their political and social institutions had scarcely been exposed to modern Western influence at the time when international oil companies started their operations. Concessions were secured by large international oil companies—three of them European and five American—mostly in the inter-war period. These concessions were usually framed on a broad basis, giving the companies development and export rights.

In the ten years following World War II, international oil companies invested $2.5 billion in Middle East development. These investments were undertaken under concessions and contractual arrangements that seemed to offer a substantial measure of security, and the oil companies could pursue commercial operations relatively freely. Production, pricing and sales all fell within the province of company operations and could be worked out in the context of world resources and requirements.

In recent years, however, oil companies operating in the Middle East have found themselves increasingly circumscribed by political considerations. The threat of expropriation is ever present; and the precedents of Iran and Suez can hardly be reassuring. Under that threat, terms of concessions are constantly revised in favor of the Arab governments; and one revision is scarcely completed before new demands are presented. What appear to be minor impositions gradually add up to pretty basic changes in the circumstances under which companies operate. Local government representatives gain participation in management of company affairs; headquarters have been transferred to the producing countries; 50-50 profit-sharing arrangements are used by the local government to obtain a voice in commercial

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decisions. Control is exercised over destination of exports and attempts are made to control tanker shipping. In the end, the international company is being required to behave as though it were solely a national organization.

The companies are also confronted by attacks from quite the opposite direction. While Middle East governments may argue that prices should be higher, the Secretariat of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe suggests that those prices might well be lower. In the United States, oil companies are under indictment for violation of anti-trust laws by virtue of their foreign operations; they are, on the one hand, asked by our Government to limit imports, and, at the same time, charged with manipulating prices by not importing more.

In sum, the commercial operations of companies are exposed to conflicting political pressures. The companies are no longer able in all circumstances to assure supplies from the producing countries to various consuming nations. Frequently they cannot balance and reconcile their interests in various producing and consuming countries effectively. Also, they may no longer always be able to implement effectively the policy decisions of their home governments.

In view of the deterioration of the arrangements under which a large part of the international oil trade is carried on, we must define the broad goals of our oil policy and find effective ways to implement it.

First, our international oil policy must assure access to foreign oil resources for ourselves, our Allies and other non-hostile nations, no less during troubled times than during peacetime.

Second, it must provide for access to foreign oil on an equitable basis.

Third, it should so far as possible provide that the flow of oil from the various producing countries where our corporations and those of our Allies operate will be in accordance with our basic policy aims and strategic necessities.

Fourth, our international oil policy should offer encouragement to the foreign oil operations of American companies. It should protect the concessionary arrangements and operations of our companies against undue and illegal interference by the governments of foreign producing countries; and it should assure non-discriminatory treatment of our corporations engaged in refining and marketing operations in consuming countries.

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Fifth, it should include friendly collaboration with other Western nations whose companies are also engaged in foreign oil producing operations.

III. LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

We are now facing a challenge to every single aim and aspect of our international oil policy. The range of alternatives through which we might seek effectively to implement our major goals is broad. They narrow down considerably, however, when we measure them against the unpleasant realities that we have just reviewed. For example, to secure uninterrupted Western access to Middle East oil, several proposals have been made involving new international agreements, providing either guarantees of access or guarantees for private foreign investments, or both. While such agreements may well represent a step forward in the evolution of international law, it is nevertheless important to recognize their inherent implications and limitations.

To be effective, the principle of assured international access would have to involve also agreement on the terms under which oil would be made available. But the interests of consuming countries in access to supplies on "equitable" terms would be countered by the interests of producing countries for guaranteed access to markets at "reasonable" prices. This would seem to suggest the need for an international oil authority. But such a development would probably put our companies and those of our Allies into the position of being subject to regulation as international public utilities, and it is unlikely that it would either provide effective protection for the terms under which our companies presently operate or assure their management control. In the Suez Canal case, Egypt has actually taken over the management and control of the Canal, and it is noteworthy that during all of the negotiations no effective consideration was given to the reëstablishment of the old Suez Canal Company.

Nor is it clear what effective sanctions could be invoked if free access to oil resources or markets was refused by a producing or consuming or transit country. The most prominent and perhaps the only example of an international treaty assuring free access to an international facility is the Constantinople Convention of 1888. This Convention worked reasonably well so long as it was not subjected to intense conflict of national interests. However, it broke down during the two world wars. It also was ineffective

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when Egypt believed that overwhelming political or strategic considerations warranted closing the Canal to Israeli shipping.

If effective sanctions cannot be established, it follows that an agreement on free access will break down whenever any participating country becomes engaged in overt dispute with another signatory country. In the midst of cold war, and while the world is disturbed by Soviet machinations and subversive activities, the effectiveness of such an agreement must remain in doubt.

It has also been suggested that an international agreement be concluded which would assure respect for private foreign investment. Such an investment treaty might imply that an international body would also have the right to adjudicate disputes arising out of various agreements under which foreign investment is undertaken. It might also imply that there would be machinery for adjustment of contractual terms, particularly where contracts had been concluded for periods of 60 to 90 years.

While such a charter might cover the case of expropriation and provide arbitration machinery for disputes over compensation, it should be noted that the way international law has been interpreted during the last 20 years, expropriation with adequate, prompt and effective compensation has not been successfully contested. No effective test has ever been made of the case where expropriation actually involved unilateral cancellation of foreign concessions and breaches of contractual commitments by a sovereign. The sovereign, by refusing to permit an international tribunal to pass upon his conduct, closes the door against any international legal recourse.

Equally unresolved is the question of how such a charter could deal with a progressive erosion of concession rights. Changes in concessionary terms undermining the position of the foreign investor may be as harmful as expropriation. Without in fact openly nationalizing the property, governments may infringe on management rights, establish local political control over operations, impose increased taxation, and enact troublesome labor laws. Similarly, the establishment of production and export controls under what countries may claim are their sovereign rights, the submission of the operations to their own foreign policy considerations, and a host of other devices would effectively limit and might even destroy the value of foreign investments.

In the final analysis, neither an international agreement providing for free access to oil nor an international charter guaran-

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teeing the security of foreign investments can by itself meet the basic needs of an international oil policy. Both would probably lead to the establishment of new and complicated international machinery which would interfere with the functions and flexibility of private operations. They would fail to provide ultimate security against interferences with oil supplies or violations of investment rights precisely because the West would still have no practicable recourse against such moves when they are spawned by nationalistic determination or Soviet machinations.

There is also some reason to doubt whether the West could at this time rely on the United Nations for the establishment of a policy that would effectively protect its interests in Middle East oil. The United Nations is not an impartial judiciary body; its power often depends on the support of voting blocs with sectional interests; it would have no practical means of enforcement when either the United States or the Soviet Union opposes its decisions. We could expect the U.S.S.R. to support any move against the West which would interfere with Western political, economic and strategic interests. The Soviets would naturally frame all oil and Middle East political issues in terms of "Western imperialism and oil monopolies," and try to unite the voting strength of their own satellites with that of members of the Bandung group and of other underdeveloped countries.

Considerable thought has been given to the possibilities of a European Oil Community, designed to improve Europe's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Middle East oil producing countries, on a commercial as well as political level. The Community could, in the view of its advocates, more easily integrate Europe's oil supply within the framework of Europe's over-all energy economy. In case Middle East oil were unavailable or obtainable only on the basis of unreasonable terms, the Community could take joint steps either to regain access to the oil or to make alternative provisions and divide the burden of any shortfall equitably among its members.

In evaluating the potential effectiveness of an oil community, however, it is essential to keep in mind that in contrast to the resources of the Coal and Steel Community oil reserves are located outside Europe, in an area of political unrest and subject to constant Soviet interference. A combination of European consuming countries that tried to enter into negotiation with any oil producing country would most likely provoke the creation of a

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bloc of Middle East producing countries. There are, of course, distinct trends toward a unified oil policy by the Middle East producing countries. But political problems and economic rivalries have up to now prevented its effective establishment. Nothing would give it greater impetus than a combination of European consuming countries. It is to Europe's interest, however, to avoid as long as possible the establishment of such a Middle East bloc; and certainly to do nothing that would provoke its early creation. Once consuming bloc and producing bloc confront each other, each separate grievance of individual countries is likely to be embraced by all. Each oil problem would then tend to become an intergovernmental and political problem and the great flexibility inherent in private oil operations would be lost. Accordingly, under present conditions the oil problem is more apt to be aggravated than eased by an open combination of European consuming countries. This of course does not imply that the countervailing power of consuming countries does not provide an essential contribution to the implementation of international oil policy.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL OIL POLICY

While international agreements may fall short of guaranteeing Europe secure oil supplies, they may in certain instances help toward the evolution of principles of international behavior and procedures for the international settlement of disputes. And in spite of its limitations, the U.N. within certain areas may determine at least a minimum basis of common interest and exercise a moderating influence.

However, it would be dangerous to rest our national security on the expectation that international agreements will insure international performance. To be successful in protecting our essential interests and those of our Allies in the Middle East, an oil policy for the United States must proceed simultaneously along three lines:

(1) Emphasize the community of interest between Middle East states and the West, and minimize thereby the opportunities for Soviet intrigue.

(2) Minimize Western vulnerability to the interruption of the flow of Middle East oil, and increase thereby the bargaining position of the West.

(3) Support effectively the rights of private companies which are prerequisites to continued investment and development.

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No one of these goals by itself will result in absolute Western oil security; together they hold out the promise of restoring stability to the international oil trade.

As to the first, we must try to establish with as many of the major producing and transit countries as possible a continued relationship that would tie them more firmly and more securely to the Western side so that they will be immune to Soviet interference and Soviet temptations which are likely to persist as long as the East-West struggle lasts. This will require an effort to accommodate at least the major political and economic aims of the Arab countries.

Such a policy would inevitably involve some identification of the Western world with at least the most essential aims of Arab national aspirations—the development of their economies and improvement of standard of living. The major emphasis of such a policy must be on the enlightened self-interest of all the parties concerned and on awareness that a breakdown of their relations with the West would be catastrophic, perhaps even more so to them than to the West. The prerequisite for Western coöperation must be some basic commitment by Middle Eastern countries of their own national resources and efforts to their national purposes.

Arrangements with the governments of Middle East countries would not necessarily be all that is required to assure the security of our oil operations. A great deal would depend on the popular support which these governments command. To achieve a measure of popular support is the more important as Soviet attacks on our position in the Middle East are clearly designed to appeal to popular prejudices against our oil companies. Their propaganda repeats monotonously that the companies are out to "plunder" the Middle East's natural resources and export their oil without adequate compensation to them, and that "oil monopolies" in the United States dictate U.S. foreign policy to assure the most "colossal superprofit" to these monopolies.

We cannot, therefore, ignore this issue, and must try to see to it that the benefits from our oil operations and our economic aid as well are spread reasonably fairly throughout the economy. This is easier said than done; but it would be helped along if Western governments were to provide greater encouragement to those countries whose governments act responsibly.

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We should also try to encourage a spirit of competition among the various producing countries for attracting investments and securing outlets. The development of their oil industry should, to the extent possible, be a measure of their own coöperation. We should further do our utmost to dissuade producing countries from the notion that because the international oil companies control production in other areas and have refining and marketing affiliates all over the world they can always be assured of a market outlet by applying pressure against the companies.

The problem of the degree to which the United States and the West can accommodate themselves to Arab policies and national aspirations is of course a most serious one. We cannot give up vital principles, policies or economic interests. We must not be blackmailed into taking a position contrary to basic equities because Arab countries threaten to cut off our access to the oil, or take over our companies, or join the Soviet bloc. Such policies would be self-defeating in the long run.

There are plainly certain political issues on which we simply cannot satisfy the Arabs. In the first place, the Middle East is so lacking in intra-regional unity that certain of our decisions might be acceptable to some countries and completely unacceptable to others. In particular we cannot afford to refuse support to the friendly nations of the Baghdad Pact and yield to pressures or threats of other Middle East countries hostile to us.

Secondly, we cannot ignore certain vital interests of Britain and France which have run counter to Arab national ambitions and have led to friction between our Allies and the Middle East. The maintenance of the NATO alliance imposes upon us the obligation to protect their vital interest as well as ours. Moreover, in our oil operations throughout this area our companies are nearly everywhere closely associated with European companies. We cannot (and in general must not even try to) escape the concomitant responsibilities of our Western alliances. Popularity in the Middle East may be quickly acquired and even faster lost; it provides no reliable basis for Western policy.

Finally, we cannot agree to the continued corrosion of essential rights of our own and allied corporations, not only because unilateral and arbitrary breaches of commitments are contrary to basic Western principles, but also because they would increasingly jeopardize Western access to the oil. Behind our willingness to accommodate ourselves to Arab national aspirations there must

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also be the willingness and ability to resist unjustified requests and threats. Our Middle East policy must thus be based on friendship backed by strength. For on the realities of power at any given moment rests the effectiveness of diplomacy.

Let us now turn to the question of how we might minimize the West's vulnerability to interruptions in the flow of oil from the Middle East. Since our strength to resist undue pressures in that area will rest in large measure upon our success in minimizing our dependency upon its oil, we must put ourselves in a position in which we are at least able to cope with a temporary interruption of supplies. If that can be done, it will be apparent to the Middle East that Europe could survive a temporary cut in its oil supplies without too much danger. At present, continued availability of Middle Eastern oil is so urgent that no interruption can be borne. In contrast, the dependence of some Middle East countries on the income they obtain from the sale of oil is of a different order of urgency. Many of them could absorb a reduction of their royalty and tax income for some period of time by drawing on accumulated funds or by reducing less essential expenditures. By redressing this balance it might be possible to drive home to the Middle East its dependence on income from sales of oil.

Wherever allied companies are in a position to do so, it would seem essential to encourage the development of excess productive capacity. This would include the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, for it is possible that in an emergency our access to production in some of them might be maintained. Excess productive capacity in the Western Hemisphere and in the Eastern Hemisphere outside the Middle East would, of course, be particularly desirable. In addition, the development of other sources of energy should be pursued as rapidly as economic considerations permit.

There should also be a greater flexibility in the provision of transport and refining facilities. We need a maximum build-up of tanker capacity and should avoid wherever possible the construction of pipelines from oil supply sources through third countries, especially if tankers can be made to do the job. Further, we should encourage the building of refining facilities in consuming rather than in producing countries or other areas which are likely to be subject to political disturbances.

Finally, provisions must be made to accumulate substantial strategic reserves in the United States as well as in Europe. Dur-

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ing periods of ample availability, arrangements might perhaps be made to produce and ship crude oil from the Middle East to suitable consuming countries for storage for an emergency. The target for such a program might well be on the order of nine to twelve months of European crude oil requirements.

If such a broad program were carried out, our Allies could do without Middle East oil for a limited time, particularly if we were prepared not only to make excess production and stocks available to them, but also to share in the shortage, if necessary. Our bargaining leverage with the Arab world on all vital issues would be enhanced and the security of Europe's oil supplies greatly increased. It would provide us with alternatives either to yielding to completely unreasonable requests of the Middle East countries or to using more drastic and probably less effective means such as economic sanctions or even force to impose our will. Even a temporary ability of Europe to support its economy with alternative oil supplies might be of decisive value in the play of forces with which we are confronted. With wholehearted coöperation between the United States and Europe, this program can be realized at a total cost of less than our present peacetime military expenditures for a few weeks.

We have already dealt at length with the increasing disabilities to which our oil companies have been subjected. It is becoming imperative that we insist more energetically that the rights of our corporations be respected and that disputes be arbitrated rather than unilaterally resolved in favor of Middle East governments under the threat of expropriation. In particular, we should not leave our corporations without advice and protection against arbitrary decisions of Middle East governments. Our corporations, with their world-wide interests and responsibilities, must not be coerced into becoming in fact instruments of the foreign or strategic policy of Middle East producing or transit countries. The framework of international oil operations and international investment would be torn apart if we are not able to put a halt to such local pressures.

In lending support to the companies in their foreign operations, Western governments must be prepared to recognize (as must the companies themselves) the legitimate interests of producing and transit countries. But Middle East governments must in turn recognize that their oil as a resource has been developed through international participation; and its value hinges on international

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trade which brings producing and consuming countries together; and that oil's rôle in future economic expansion depends on continued capital investment on a massive scale in production, transport, refining and marketing facilities. International oil companies have undertaken the costs and responsibilities in each of these areas—but the flow of private capital and the effectiveness of commercial operations can continue only if the security of investment against political depredations is assured.

Our policy requires, of course, the closest coöperation between the oil companies and their own national governments. This involves special responsibilities on either side. It also creates new problems of communication and of chain of command between government and the companies. The demands and responsibilities which have devolved on our international oil companies go far beyond the normal concerns of commercial operations. Public and private responsibilities become increasingly intertwined. Our existing arrangements for government-industry relationships in this new unchartered area appear to be inadequate to cope with the broad range of new problems. At present neither party knows quite how to proceed, who should act and who must take responsibility for decisions; serious misunderstandings have thus been inevitable. The problem deserves the most urgent and careful study if our governments as well as our companies are to play their proper rôles.

Within the framework of our international oil policy we must unequivocally state our intention to assure Western access to Middle East oil and our readiness to protect the equitable rights and basic position of our companies. If our interests can in due course be fortified by treaties so much the better; if not, we must nevertheless undertake to support them with all the power at our command. They involve basic issues of international comity and behavior and our prosperity and security depend on the respect they command.

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UNBINDING THE POLISH ECONOMY

By John Michael Montias

WLADYSLAW GOMULKA'S immediate predecessors, after mismanaging the Polish economy for a number of years, have left him a legacy of debts and unfulfilled promises of increased living standards, but scant means with which to patch up the Government's credit. Foreign currency holdings are low and dwindling, and government stockpiles of goods and raw materials are depleted. The peasants cannot be induced to market a larger share of their produce, while the townspeople, who have been paying the price of industrialization by their sacrifices, can be made to pay no more.

To stave off bankruptcy and to check inflation, Gomulka and his economic experts are bending their efforts in two directions. First, they are endeavoring to bring fairly prompt relief to consumers by obtaining external aid, a redirection of foreign trade and a cut in investments and armaments. Second, they expect to uncover "reserves" in the Polish economy itself so that greater well-being for the whole population may be achieved with the same effort and the same resources. This they propose to do by reforming the inefficient institutions that in the course of the last ten years have turned Poland into a miniature of the Soviet economy.

It would be wrong to lay all the blame at one door and to count on a rapid and lasting improvement as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to control Poland's economic policy. A search for the sources of the present economic ills would take us back before the First World War to the boom years when the mines and industrial plants of the future state were developed for the capacious national markets of the partitioning Powers—Germany, Austria and Russia—and then were cut off from these markets after Poland became independent; to the runaway inflation of the early 1920s; to the depression of the 1930s, when prices and money wages were driven down with resulting unemployment and dislocation; to the gradual cartelization and *étatisation* of the economy throughout the whole inter-war period; and finally to the disastrous German occupation during World War II, when entire cities, including Warsaw, were razed and over six million Poles were killed.

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In spite of this unpropitious background, Poland recovered from the war with excellent prospects for economic development. The loss of certain poor, densely-populated provinces to the U.S.S.R. was more than offset by the gain of the mines, steel mills and chemical plants in the former German territories in the west, which were placed under Polish administration at the Potsdam Conference. This forced exchange of lands, together with the effects of the postwar migration to the towns, brought the non-agricultural population from 40 percent of the total population in 1931 to 53 percent in 1950. The former German lands were better cultivated than the lost provinces and their yields were higher. With moderate investments in agriculture, postwar Poland could have produced more food than prewar Poland even with 15 percent less arable land, and there are at present 7,000,000 fewer inhabitants to feed. In fact, the Three-Year Plan of Reconstruction (1947–1949) brought rapid gains in output at a relatively small cost in investments; industrial production exceeded prewar levels both in the old and in the new borders, while agricultural production came fairly close to prewar levels. These gains permitted a prompt rise in living standards after the extreme hardships of 1944 and 1945.[1]

The new ills arose from policies initiated soon after the rout of the German army and the institution of the Lublin Government. First came the notorious agreement of August 16, 1945, on coal deliveries to the Soviet Union, which was to mulct the economy until November 1953. Then in 1946 the Government set the stage for later reforms by subjugating private industry through nationalization and through discriminatory rationing of raw materials; and in 1947 and 1948 private trade was crushed by controls and prohibitive levies. From 1948 on, the Polish economy was clamped into a system of Soviet-type centralized planning despite the fact that psychological and natural differences between Russia and Poland made the institutions of the one ill-fitted to serve in the other. For example, the narrow range of natural resources in Poland called for an economic system that would promote economy in raw materials. What the Poles got, as we shall see, was a system of incentives that in effect rewarded material waste. It is also questionable whether extreme central-

[1] The old Central Planning Office (C.U.P.) was directed during most of this period by economists steeped in Western traditions. The policy was to limit investments to quick-yielding projects entailing a minimum of risk, in order to raise living standards as quickly as possible.

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ization along Soviet lines was suitable for the Poles, whose experience in business management qualified them for a greater degree of initiative, especially since the old industrial and business class in Poland was relatively more important than had been the case in Russia at the time of the Revolution and it was more smoothly integrated into the new bureaucracy of socialism.

"Schematism," as this indiscriminate alignment with Soviet patterns came to be called, was carried to extremes. Not only was the structure of the budget recast to conform to the Soviet model, but even the percentage of revenues collected from indirect taxes on consumer goods and the percentage of expenditures invested in the national economy soon approximated these proportions in the Soviet budget. Translations or imitations of Soviet books on management and finance were used to teach Polish students the techniques for managing their economy.

The great exception to all this imitation was of course the failure to collectivize agriculture. As late as 1955, collective farms, which more often than not were formed under economic pressure and even threats of violence, accounted for only 9 percent of the agricultural area of Poland and less than 8 percent of the total product of agriculture.[2] Furthermore, such collectives as came into existence were much smaller in acreage and in membership than the Russian *kolkhozy,* and more loosely organized.

In 1949 the old Central Planning Office was reorganized as the State Commission for Economic Planning. New personnel committed to Soviet methods were appointed to all key positions. The Commission prepared and enforced the Six-Year Plan (1950 to 1955) which was to lay the groundwork for an ambitious industrialization program. At the cost of enormous investments, officially estimated at around 25 percent of national income, but more probably over 30 percent, the Plan was successful in its main goal: the output of producer goods, according to the official index, nearly tripled between 1950 and 1955. During this period non-agricultural employment increased by more than 60 percent. Forty-five percent of all investments went to industry (and most of those to metallurgy, machine-building and armaments), only 9 percent to agriculture (mainly to the collectives and State farms) and 10 percent to housing (primarily in the large industrial centers). The table on the next page shows the growth of

[2] The State farms, which cultivate many of the old landed estates with little labor and much mechanical equipment, accounted for another 14 percent of the agricultural area in 1955.

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Poland's industrial base that resulted from this policy of accelerated industrialization and from the postwar acquisition of Western Silesia.

POLAND'S OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
1937 AND 1955

	Output in millions of tons		*Percentage of Soviet bloc output*(a)
	1937(b)	1955	1955
Bituminous coal	36.2	94.5	19
Coke	2.3	10.0	17(c)
Crude steel	1.5	4.4	7
Cement	1.3	3.8	9
Sulfuric acid(d)	0.2	0.5	9(e)
Electric energy (in billions of kwh.)	3.6	17.8	7

a) Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. b) Prewar territory. c) Total excludes Communist China. d) Converted to 100 percent acid. e) Estimated. No Soviet figures published.

The adverse consequences of rapid industrialization are being felt now: a failure to maintain the stock of rural buildings; a deplorable housing crisis in the cities, where population rose by one-third in six years; and the retrogression of light industry, at least in efficiency and in the quality of its output. The lack of housing in Warsaw and in Silesia is now hampering further industrialization, since some 700,000 persons partially or totally unemployed in the central and eastern provinces of Poland cannot be resettled in the industrial districts of the west, where there is a labor shortage of more than half a million men.

The inadequacy of investments in agriculture, especially in the private sector, together with the shift of lands and manpower into such industrial crops as sugar beets, tobacco and flax, contributed to the decline in cereal and potato harvests from 1949 to 1955, necessitating imports of wheat and rye from the U.S.S.R., France and Argentina. The increase in the stock of animals (particularly of hogs and sheep) has been quite appreciable. But the failure to meet planned goals for over-all agricultural production or to offset this shortage by increasing the share of food marketed caused considerable difficulty in feeding the swollen population of the industrial cities, as well as an army of half a million men and the Soviet troops stationed in Poland. It also caused a steady inflation, with average money wages more than doubling from 1949 to 1955. The wage fund was always being planned on the basis of optimistic estimates of food output, and, when the plans failed, workers' incomes had to be raised to attract new man-

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power from the land and to redress the terms of trade between town and country, which threatened to become too advantageous to the farmers.

This inflation, incidentally, has in part been concealed by the policy of artificially keeping consumer prices down. Coal, for example, is in effect rationed and its black market price is about twice the official price. Many food items (including butter and some grades of meat), cinema tickets, motorcycles, private cars, better quality shoes and many other consumer goods produced by the State are priced too low, so that their distribution must be affected by privilege, queues, bribery or the black market. The figures of the Central Statistical Office notwithstanding, urban wages never fully recovered from the sharp setbacks of 1951 and 1952.[3] The real wages of families fell less, because women and older persons sought employment—though rather from bitter need than from choice. The fall in real wages was particularly severe for workers in light industry and for white collar employees.

During this period foreign commerce was increasingly directed toward trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, which took over 70 percent of total Polish trade in the peak year of 1954. Emphasis was on machinery, imports of which rose from 25 percent of the total value of all Polish imports in 1949 to a maximum of 41 percent in 1953. Poland at first tended toward autarky, replacing imports from all countries by domestic production; but in recent years some effort has been made to take advantage of the division of labor within the Communist bloc, especially in the production of machinery and metal goods. The structure of retail prices and the reports of travelers indicate that there still is ample scope for increased trade of consumer goods between Poland on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on the other. Nevertheless, exchanges concentrated within a bloc of countries pursuing similar policies of accelerated industrialization, of countries where differences in relative costs are much smaller than in the compass of the entire world, have deprived Poland of a large measure of the benefits of international trade.

[3] By dividing an index of nominal wages by an index of retail prices heavily weighted with industrial commodities that hardly enter into workers' budgets and with prices that fail to ration off the demand, the Central Statistical Office succeeded in demonstrating an increase of 27.6 percent in real wages from 1949 to 1955. These official statistics of real wages have been sharply criticized lately in the Polish press and in economic periodicals.

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An obvious consequence of autarky is that exports will decline as more resources are tied up, and at greater real cost, to replace imports with domestic production. Thus, despite a 30 percent increase in the output of coal in the last seven years and a nearly stable private consumption, coal exports have dropped from 26 million tons in 1949 to 19.5 million in 1956, and there is little hope of exporting more than 13 or 14 million tons in 1957; conversely, deliveries of coal to industry have nearly doubled since 1948, reaching 51 million tons in 1956. Coal at least is relatively plentiful as a raw material for industrialization, whereas there is an absolute shortage of most of the other vital raw materials. The development of the steel industry since 1949, which is dependent on imported iron ore, has necessitated a tripling of iron ore imports. Similarly, increasing imports of non-ferrous metals and of rubber and petroleum products must be fed into the industrial machine, thereby tying up most of the available foreign currency reserves earned with coal and forcing Poland to export high-cost items in order to pay for other "less essential" imports. Instead of coal, which brings in a dollar at an average cost of 8 zlotys, Poland must export steel costing 15 to 20 zlotys for each dollar and metal products such as railroad cars, locomotives and machine tools at 30 to 50 zlotys to the dollar.[4] Since coal exported through Gdansk sells for $20 a ton, the expected decrease of 10 million tons in coal exports from 1955 to 1957 implies a yearly loss of 200 million dollars, which would buy consumer goods worth 15 to 20 billion zlotys on the domestic market,[5] or roughly one-third of the entire retail sales of non-agricultural goods by the State shops.

The planners made the raw material shortages worse during the Six-Year Plan by consistently overestimating available supplies from local resources and underestimating requirements for their ambitious production plans. Material balances, which relate available supplies to Plan requirements, were often "closed" on

[4] Until February 11, 1957, the Polish zloty was equal to one Soviet ruble or 25 U.S. cents at the official rate of exchange. The zloty was then devalued to 4.17 U.S. cents in tourist transactions, without altering the nominal parity between the zloty and the ruble. Poland's foreign trade is carried on by a government monopoly, which makes little or no use of official exchange rates either in selecting commodities to be traded or in determining terms of exchange. Selection is made by comparing foreign prices and domestic costs, and terms of exchange are set by inter-governmental bargaining on the basis of world prices.

[5] Consumer goods imported from the United States sell for 80 to 110 zlotys to the dollar on the free market and in the luxury State stores (Gallux). However, heavy imports of goods from the West would have the effect of driving down this rate and reducing the sum cited in the text.

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paper only: during the course of the year shortages arose which were made good by the running down of inventories, already at excessively low levels, or by shifting allotments from less essential (mainly consumer goods) industries to plants producing heavy chemicals, to metallurgy and to machine-building. Sometimes, as in the cruel winter of 1955–1956, coal supplies were so short that many light industries had to shut down for weeks or reduce working hours.

The bonuses paid by the State to plant managers increase rapidly according to output, particularly if output surpasses the Plan; they serve to encourage production gains at all costs while neglecting cost reduction. Controls on material expenditures and blandishments by the higher authorities to save materials run against the self-interest of managers and hence meet with little success. The bonuses, averaging over 70 percent of the base pay of the managerial staff, make it profitable to hoard materials or use them to turn out little-wanted items "above Plan." Meanwhile other firms may have to cease or curtail operations for lack of even small consignments of these same materials.

The complexity of industrial processes also frustrates the controls that are used to combat waste by means of norms relating planned outputs to inputs. The type and age of machines, their frequency of repairs, the quality of materials and of products, and the amount of labor used in production are variable and affect the consumption of materials to an unpredictable extent. Producers can easily find more or less acceptable excuses for ignoring or surpassing the norms when some overriding incentive, such as the bonus for output, makes it profitable for them to do so. In Poland, physical controls have failed, in part because of the live-and-let-live attitude that seems to rule relations between the bureaucracy and plant managers. It takes Draconian measures, such as only the Soviets are willing to apply, to punish the virtuous along with the wicked and instill enough fear in the lower echelons to make physical controls effective.

During the Plan years, not only materials were wasted but also transportation services, equipment and labor. In order to favor the backward regions of the east, the prices used in transactions among socialized enterprises have been equalized all over Polish territory since 1948 and made to include the costs of railroad delivery; as a result, since no one has an incentive to cut down on transportation costs, bulky materials such as coal are

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consumed in excessive quantities even where local substitutes like peat are available. As all important equipment is supplied by the State without charge (and is "paid for" only through amortization quotas based on a generous estimate of the durability of the equipment),[6] there is no incentive for socialized firms to refrain from ordering labor-saving machinery which could easily be dispensed with in a country where labor is cheap. Instead, more scarce steel is used, involving further sacrifice on the part of consumers.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s labor was exhorted with some success to work harder, but exhortation is ineffective today. The institution of piecework frequently fails as an incentive to production because workers fear that quotas will be raised if they are surpassed too easily; on the other hand, workers are completely without interest in their jobs if they are paid on straight time. As early as July 1956 Oskar Lange, a noted Polish economist and former Professor at the University of Chicago, referred to the "nihilism" of workers, which he ascribed partly to their low living standards, but also to their lack of confidence in the planners' goals. Moral apathy also assumes the form of petty cheating in stores, of graft and of semi-legal "deals" on the part of workers and minor officials.[7] Many staff cars of ministries operate as taxis on government time, occasionally with the collusion of policemen. In 1955 only 15 percent of the sales taxes on gasoline were actually collected, because most gasoline was purchased with tax-free coupons acquired by hook or by crook from socialized firms.

The system has also tended to stifle technical innovation. Invention is poorly rewarded and attention has focussed on Soviet techniques to the neglect of Western developments. Money has on occasion been wasted on research that had already been done abroad. In the early 1950s a license was purchased from the Soviet Union to manufacture electric locomotive motors produced in the United States and in Italy 30 to 40 years earlier and subsequently discontinued in all countries not excepting the Soviet Union. At least until recently, bureaucratic duplication

[6] A modest allowance for obsolescence was charged to costs in the Ministry of Metallurgy during the Six-Year Plan, although this practice was condemned by the theoreticians. Many officials in the ministries tend to be more aware of economic problems than the economists who were cut off from industrial problems.

[7] Even high officials in the ministries earn very low salaries. The range of pay between the director of a department in the State Planning Commission and an unskilled worker is about four to one.

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and inefficiency in industry and in the administration of the economy were flagrant.

The strait jacket of the economy was loosened a little in 1953 and 1954, when some decentralization took place. For example, the number of commodities subject to central planning was reduced and the lack of balance between bonuses for cost reduction and bonuses for output slightly redressed. These measures were, however, weak and largely ineffective. The increases in prices of producer goods in January 1956 wiped out the deficits of industries producing basic raw materials and semi-fabricated goods, besides helping to strengthen cost accounting; yet because of the lack of interest of management in reducing cost and maximizing profits, much of the potential advantage of the price reform was lost.

The first decisive step taken after the political upheaval of October 1956 was the transformation of the State Planning Commission into an organization for guiding the economy rather than for planning and supervising its most minute activities. To implement this reform, two important decrees were passed, one increasing the responsibility of factory directors and the other setting the legal framework for "experimental plants." These plants are now trying out new management techniques for interesting the staff and workers in efficiency by allowing them to share both in profits and in the responsibility for results. In most of these experiments, efficiency is measured by money profits (no longer by Plan fulfilment) and is rewarded accordingly. In some experimental firms, profits are worked out according to a special set of prices and according to strict cost-accounting rules, which include charging interest on all working and fixed capital. The workers' council, borrowed in its general features from Jugoslavia, has wide powers of revision over the policy of the firm, especially in matters of management personnel, but it cannot interfere in the day-to-day decisions of the director and his staff. Sales prices and production targets are still handed down by the Central Board of Industry. Even if these reforms are generalized throughout the whole economy, this will not mean the end of central planning; yet they would more nearly realize the type of independent production units Oskar Lange envisaged in his famous essay "On the Economic Theory of Socialism" than had been thought possible only a year ago.

The Five-Year Plan for 1956 to 1960 was tentatively approved

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by Parliament at the end of its first year of operation, some days after Gomulka and his team took power.

The materials published show that this Plan treats the hard-pressed consumer only slightly better than the last one: it still concentrates on high investments in heavy industry while neglecting agriculture and housing. Without formally scrapping the Five-Year Plan, the new leaders have tended to bypass it and to solve economic problems as they arose. Long-term projects are being given up in favor of investments yielding quick benefit to consumers, and construction of factories is being curtailed if they require heavier allotments of deficit raw materials than their output is worth.[8] In planning investments from now on, detailed calculations of profitability and efforts to minimize costs will assume far greater importance than they did during the Six-Year Plan, when political considerations overrode all others in the selection of investment targets.

Cutbacks in the armaments industry may also help to solve shortages on the domestic market. According to present plans, the defense plants will produce civilian manufactures valued at 4.5 billion zlotys for 1957 and at a total of 25 billion zlotys for the next three years. The yearly sales of these manufactures, consisting largely of agricultural machinery and of durable consumer items (such as sewing machines, motorcycles and refrigerators), will be worth about 10 percent of the total retail sales of industrial goods produced by the State. All these changes seem fairly far-reaching, and there is some question as to how the over-all Plan targets may be kept internally consistent in the face of uncoördinated cutbacks in producer goods and increases in consumer goods.

So many projects are close to completion that it is not easy to trim investments. Six billion zlotys have already been sunk in the great Nowa Huta steel works and the more modest sums required to complete them around 1960 are expected to yield a far better return than the isolated units already in production. Prospects are also good for many projects near completion in the chemical industry, such as the Oświęcim works.

Efforts to shift foreign trade toward the West and to lighten

[8] However, the planners are paring down investments too evenly among the various branches of mining and industry instead of giving full priority to projects that will yield foreign exchange in one or two years (particularly coal mining) and instead of slashing plans of expansion in the already overgrown machine-building industry. They still aim at self-sufficiency in almost all types of machines and tools.

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the burden of Soviet claims on the Polish economy, which began soon after the death of Stalin, have been greatly accelerated in the last six months. From 1945 to 1953 about six million tons of coal a year, or a total of around 50 million tons, had been delivered to the U.S.S.R. at a price of $1.25 a ton—barely enough to cover freight costs to the border. Another two million tons a year were sold at nearly world market prices. After November 1953, "political exports" were abolished; the price of lump coals was then raised to $15.50, and again to $19 in 1956. As a result of negotiations by Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz in Moscow in November 1956, two billion rubles of Polish debts to the Soviet Union for previous credits were cancelled in compensation for losses suffered on coal exports between 1948 and 1953. At the old rate of four rubles or four zlotys to one dollar this sum comes close to the estimated losses for these years.[9] The new agreement of last November also provides for a loan of 1.4 million tons of wheat in 1957 and of 700 million rubles between 1958 and 1960, all to be repaid before 1965. Polish losses on Soviet railroad transit between 1945 and July 1954, when the privileged rates were abolished, will also be settled shortly.

If there is to be any Soviet economic exploitation in the future it might now take the subtler form of deflecting Polish trade away from channels most advantageous to Poland, rather than of the direct imposition of terms of trade that would drain the Polish economy.

It is interesting to speculate whether Poland may expect to gain by shifting trade to countries outside the Communist bloc. In 1955, the Soviet Union accounted for one-third of Poland's imports and 30 percent of her exports. A large share of this trade follows the lines of natural advantage: Poland imports annually over 400,000 tons of raw oil, 240,000 tons of petroleum products and 13 million cubic meters of gas from the Soviet Union, most of which comes from the Drohobycz, Boryslaw and Daszawa fields formerly in Polish territory. Ship plate, copper and nickel imports from the West were limited by strategic controls in recent years and could be bought by Poland only from uncontrolled sources and at higher prices than in the Soviet Union. Since met-

[9] The rate of the four zlotys to the dollar may be justified in this instance. The available ruble prices of raw materials traded by the Soviet Union and Poland substantiate the claim that, with the exception of "political" coal exports, the terms of exchanges have been pegged to dollar prices current in world trade in 1950 and that ruble accounts have merely registered dollar values multiplied by four. However, prices paid by Poland for Soviet machinery and equipment are not known.

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als may be exchanged in raw or in processed form, it is doubtful whether restrictions on strategic materials could be relaxed for Poland alone; they would rapidly filter through to the other countries of the Soviet bloc. Imports of machinery and spare parts from the U.S.S.R. may also be fixed for years to come by previous imports of plant and equipment and by Soviet blueprints. Finally, the Soviet Union exports over 200,000 tons of manganese ore, which the Poles use in their ferro-alloy industry; there is no other supplier for this natural Soviet export.

The relative benefit of the iron ore imports from the Krivoi Rog fields in the Soviet Ukraine, which came to three million tons in 1955, cannot be assessed so easily; the prices charged are low in terms of coal, but deliveries are irregular in quality and in quantity. The chemical and physical properties of Scandinavian ore are superior, but Sweden, Norway and Finland are not in a position to meet all of Poland's requirements, which already must be partly supplied by France, Brazil and India at high prices. Poland is not likely to buy much grain in the West if it can be bought on credit from the U.S.S.R. The main Polish imports that might be redirected from Russia to the free markets of the world consist of vegetable fats, cotton, rubber products and agricultural machinery. At least part of the demand for watches, of which Poland bought 330,000 in Russia in 1956, can easily be met by Western European producers.

Poland will perhaps be able to exercise more flexibility in her exchanges with East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Communist China, which together account for nearly 30 percent of the value of her foreign trade. East Germany alone buys about one-half of Poland's coke exports, most of her lignite and some four million tons a year (or 15 percent) of her bituminous coal exports. These imports from Silesia are essential to East Germany's steel industry, since good metallurgical coke cannot be made exclusively from lignite, which is relatively abundant in East Germany. Czechoslovakia also depends on imports of Polish coal (3.7 million tons in 1955). This coal is in part coked for reëxport to Hungary, which buys an additional 330,000 tons for her metallurgical industry directly from the Polish ovens. There is no other available source of coal and coke for Central Europe except the Soviet Union, which has little to spare from its own domestic requirements. If Poland can bargain freely, she should be able to command highly advantageous terms in trading with

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East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, since they have nothing to sell that is as vital to Poland as coal is to them. If Poland cannot receive enough in exchange for her exports of coal and coke, she can divert them and increase exports to the Scandinavian countries, to West Germany, France, Austria, Italy or Argentina. For Poland to import cotton, tobacco, vegetable fats, iron ore and even pig iron all the way from Communist China or corn and handicraft products all the way from North Viet Nam cannot be very advantageous; yet she spent over one billion zlotys in 1956 to manufacture machinery and equipment for export to China alone in payment for such imports. "Prestige exports" of entire plants to the Middle East or of outmoded automobiles to South America have no more sound economic basis than politically motivated exports to Communist Asia, and Poland would stand to gain by curbing both.

Hopes of raising trade with the West hinge on credits as well as on the redirection of trade away from the Soviet bloc. The Poles need dollars for buying coal-sorting and mining machinery and modern power-generating equipment to replace the outworn equipment now producing electricity in thermal plants at the cost of enormous waste in coal. The sulfur mines, which are said to be rich and profitable, could be exploited if foreign capital were available. These investments would eventually increase exports and yield the dollars necessary to repay foreign credits.

Consumption loans would also be of great benefit to the economy, if only in raising labor productivity, which is now kept low by an inadequate diet; however, the dollar return on these "investments" would have to be stretched over a longer period. Last December Gomulka claimed that imports bought with foreign credits would be necessary to absorb the difference between the total wage bill and the anticipated volume of retail sales to wage earners. In 1957 this inflationary gap will rise to 13 or 14 billion zlotys, roughly equivalent to the market value of 150 to 250 million dollars in imports. The exact values of the external loans that Poland requires to bridge this gap will depend on the proportion of food to other consumer goods that she purchases in the West on credit. Imports of raw wool, cowhides, rubber products and finished manufactures would make a greater contribution to monetary stability (and to living standards) than imports of wheat and lard, the prices of which are relatively low on the Polish market.

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A Western loan might most benefit the Polish economy by enabling the Government to cut back exports of foodstuffs, wood and furniture, paper and leather, which are now needed critically for her consumer market but must be sold abroad in order to cover the cost of imports.

In November of last year planners in Warsaw were discussing a project for exporting additional quantities of flame coals to Western Europe in exchange for quality coking coals from the United States. Imports of coking coals would enable the Poles to honor their commitments to Hungary for gas coals, which are now fed into Polish coking ovens to produce rather inferior cokes, and to improve their own coke production for the blast furnaces of Silesia. The westward reorientation of coal exports from Silesia would also help to solve the fuel crisis in Europe and to reduce continental dependence upon American coal exports.

These multilateral exchanges and foreign loans may be profitable not only to Poland but also to the Soviet bloc. In the long run any measure that improves the economy of Poland may help to turn her into a more efficient member of this bloc. Credits for imports of consumer goods may enable the Polish planners to shift factors of production now engaged in agriculture or in light industry to the manufacture of machine tools or armaments. While they can easily find ways of exploiting increased trade or loans to frustrate the policies of their potential Western creditors, the Poles have sound political and economic reasons to use foreign aid without fraud or deceit. The risks that the West might take in granting economic assistance to Poland seem outweighed by the tangible prospects of good will that this assistance will engender among the Polish people.

Even if it is too early to evaluate the economic policy of Gomulka and his aides, one thing is clear: they have moved more promptly toward reforms and toward liberating the country from Soviet influence than most people in Warsaw expected last October. Unfortunately, they have loosened the bonds of compulsion that kept the old economic system together before they have been able to revive individual initiative and enterprise. As a result, labor discipline has slackened, but the stimulating effects of profit-sharing schemes and other new labor incentives have not yet been felt. At least until recently, the peasants were not turning their compulsory deliveries of grain to the State on time because official prices were too low; in January, the Government

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found it necessary to double these prices, which will now come up to about 50 percent of the prices the peasants can get for their grain on the free market. While it is fairly clear that this price increase will feed the current inflation, it is not clear at all whether the peasants will be tempted to deliver any more grain than before. Private trade and industry are at last getting licenses, tax rebates and some guarantees of stability, but not enough raw materials to operate efficiently, while socialized firms will still be wasting a part of their allotments until the bonus system is reformed. Where the people have been granted freedom to make changes, as in the socialized sector of agriculture, their onslaughts have shattered socialist institutions: recent reports claim that 80 percent of the collective farms have been broken up and their lands redistributed, while most of the rest have been transformed into producers' coöperatives of the Western type. Equipment in the Communal Machine Centers has been bought by the peasants.

These anti-collectivist trends do not portend easy success for the current political and economic experiments of Poland's new leaders. In attempting to crossbreed authoritarian with liberal institutions, as if to foster a strain that would merge the finest characteristics of both, they are also challenging the forces of nature, for the offspring of such dissimilar parents seldom breed true.

For the time being there are two basic conditions for mending the Polish economy: first, that the Poles be allowed to administer their affairs with a minimum of foreign interference and doctrinal prejudice; second, that they may have the political stability necessary to carry out far-reaching institutional reforms. By strengthening the power of the more liberal and nationalist-minded Communists headed by Gomulka, the recent elections have gone some way toward fulfilling both these conditions.

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IRELAND . . . AND WHERE DOES SHE STAND?

By John V. Kelleher

A PHENOMENON overlooked by most of those who comment upon the international scene is the extraordinary shrinkage of Ireland. Forty years ago, as the biggest and most persistent headache of the biggest empire the world had seen, Ireland outranked most of Asia, all Africa and South America, and the dominions beyond the seas, at least in the Sunday papers. The Irish Question, having long baffled British ingenuity, was defying British force as well, and with even more interesting results. It was constantly in the news. When nothing else stirred, every unelected statesman could keep his clientele awake by discussing how the Question should be solved or why it never would be.

Today, though the I.R.A. is once more on the warpath, Ireland is certainly the least of Britain's many worries. If one tries to follow Irish events in the American press, one finds that the news from there is about on a par with weather reports from Kerguelen —scarce, and indicating fog. The Irish Question has vanished, mined out like the Mesabi range. Where once the mountain reared its impregnable head, two small states and the Partition problem are vaguely discernible amid the surrounding emptiness.

This relative invisibility may not last much longer. Though its leaders have had much success in making the country appear the small, remote and damp but sinless nirvana of their elderly dreams, Ireland is presently in serious trouble, with many indications of worse trouble to come. I do not refer to the breakup of the coalition government in late January, or to the general election scheduled for March 5, from which De Valera will no doubt emerge with a small majority and a headache of more than Victorian severity. Nor do I refer to the new eruption of I.R.A. activity, though the popular response it has evoked in southern Ireland is unquestionably full of portent—for southern Ireland. For the moment, anyway, other matters are much more alarming.

In 1955, the Republic of Ireland, the 26-county area, earned itself a deficit of £35,500,000, some £30,000,000 greater than for the preceding year. Despite austerity measures taken since,

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reports suggest that the deficit for 1956 may be as large. Emigration seems to be running at about 40,000 a year, the highest since the 1880s. In November 1956, unemployment was stated to be 70,000 and in January 1957, 100,000. In 1955, it had averaged 40,000, or 6.8 percent of the insured population, the lowest since 1934 when records were first kept; but the total labor force was low too, down by about 65,000 since 1946. The amount and value of imports had increased; exports had declined; agricultural productivity, the basis of the whole economy, had gone down 2 percent, quite probably to its lowest level in this century, since its peak in 1938 was not far above the position in 1901. As for the present population, it is anybody's guess. The 1951 census produced a total of about 2,960,000—260,000 fewer than in 1901—and there were 54,000 more males than females. If emigration has averaged nearly 40,000 annually these last six years, as some domestic critics claim, the present total may be close to 2,750,000. (Since there is also considerable emigration from Northern Ireland—10,000 a year has been mentioned in the Dublin papers—the population of the island as a whole may now be about 4,000,000. It was once 8,600,000, just before the Famine of 1845–47.) These are some current estimates as I can gather or guess them from the Irish newspapers. I do not swear to any of them. The true figures may be more adverse; they are certainly not a great deal better.

On October 5, last year, Premier Costello addressed a meeting of the Inter-Party (coalition) ministers and deputies. He made what seems a very frank and sensible speech on the general situation, and then outlined a plan for the economic regeneration of the country. In his speech he made no bones about the deficit or about the way it was incurred or about the necessity of avoiding its repetition. At the same time he refused to take a pessimistic view of the future. The economy, he insisted, was fundamentally sound; industrial progress was continuing; new markets and new products were being studied; the bases for a good life were now thoroughly established in Ireland; and if the people would but put their backs to the job, there was nothing to prevent Irish courage, vigor and imagination gaining what they all desired. Success, he said, was imperative. Failure would mean such widespread and permanent unemployment as the country had not seen since independence was won. It would mean the loss of economic independence. Naturally, he did not envision failure. He

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was certain that the Irish people could be counted on to accept some temporary deprivations and to arm themselves for the long-term efforts that would bring enduring prosperity.

The plan he then presented was a good one. It touched on every aspect of the national economy and was conceived throughout in terms of bold self-reliance. That it seemed to resemble rather closely other plans and programs put forward there since the war was no objection, for there can be no secret about what needs to be done in Ireland and little disagreement about how it should be done. Mr. Costello's plan differed in being more detailed, more thoroughgoing, more fully stocked with inducements to the native investment of native capital, and in being presented with new urgency. Still, though one may not quarrel with the plan in detail, there are a few questions of context. The first is that if the vigor, courage and imagination Mr. Costello so confidently relied on were characteristic of the Irish these last ten years, there would be no need for the plan. There is, after all, no *good* reason why Ireland should be in such a fix. There are several bad reasons, all thoroughly characteristic, but these were not mentioned except inferentially. The worst reason of all, emigration, was referred to only as an unfortunate condition to be cured in time by improved employment and better material rewards. The truth is by no means so simple, but we will get to that later.

Some of the other possible objections were naturally left undiscussed: the meeting was not a Communist self-criticism *klatsch*. We may, however, discuss them here. There is, for instance, little reason to suppose that either the Inter-Party Government or its only present alternative, a Fianna Fáil administration headed by DeValera and Seán Lemass, could manage now to infuse the people with the enthusiasm, or despair, needed to put the plan over. This is not only because Mr. Costello's address was so devoid of the blood-sweat-and-tears approach and contained so many firm assurances that all is still fundamentally sound. It is not because, in statements issued since, he and his fellow politicians have blown alternately so warm and cool about the gravity of the situation. Rather, I believe, it is because the people in general do not regard the Government as having final power or final authority, no matter what its party name or who heads it. In social, educational and cultural matters the Catholic hierarchy is felt to have greater and more effective authority. In eco-

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nomic matters power is thought to be the monopoly of those owners, bankers, large shareholders, directors and managers who control the new industries and are linked fraternally in that anti-Masonic secret society, the Knights of Columbanus. Since so many ministers and parliamentary secretaries and their opposition shadow-cabinet replacements are also directors, shareholders, managers and Knights, the people somewhat distrust the government's willingness or ability to force the business community in any daring, vigorous or self-sacrificing direction the businessmen do not feel inclined to take.

This attitude is unfair as well as unfortunate. In such a small country it would be silly to expect a clear division between business leaders and political leaders; and certainly the politicians are better for knowing which end of a company report goes up. Still suspicion persists. It has been thickened by the fact that a case or two of presumed corruption in upper political circles, with indications of greasier tenacular development downward through successively lower circles to somebody's cousin's wife's uncle's bacon-curing plant, have been rather sketchily investigated and have resulted in rather light penalties. The real cause, however, is that the people know the structure of Irish society; and if many a political-financial transaction is felt to be surrounded by an aura of mutual aid among well-placed and long-tailed families, this is not because the suspicion is correct but because it very well might be. Add to this the entirely natural fact that the same families that produce Dáil deputies and company managers also produce influential clergymen, and the circle of suspicion is complete. The most suspicious country that ever yet was seen.

One might indeed argue that popular suspicion denies that the Government is a government at all, at least in the sense of an institution meant to determine the people's wishes democratically and to translate them democratically into acts and statutes. It is designed as such an institution. Usually it functions that way—or as nearly so as can be expected where the people's wishes are so faintly expressed. There is, however, clear evidence, furnished by Premier Costello himself, that if the Catholic hierarchy privately registers an objection to a proposed measure the democratic process will not be followed and the measure, no matter how popular, will be dropped without open discussion. (I refer to the Browne case of 1951, the key incident in postwar Irish politics.) Since the Dáil is the only political forum in the

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country that has any semblance of real power—local government is administered by county and borough managers appointed from Dublin—when the democratic process is reneged there, the end of the line is reached. The people have no other recourse than to vote for Tweedledee in the next election: which they do, but with the full expectation that Tweedledee will operate in the same way, only a little more discreetly. And what sort of government is that, to rally a nation to bold efforts and stern sacrifices?

And what sort of a nation is it that the Government is supposed to rally? If the people will not speak up and will not kick effectively when the democratic process is short-circuited, why should the Government be expected to challenge the bishops all alone? Every democratic politician has the right to be pushed. The sad truth is that there has been no push at all in the Irish political situation since before the war. Instead of vocal discontent there is silent emigration; and in what emigration leaves behind there is apathy below and smugness above.

A word on the latter. Most references to the fundamental soundness of the Irish economy relate to the 150 percent increase in industrial productivity over the last 25 years, from, of course, an abysmally low base. This productivity could probably increase a thousand percent and still make little difference in Ireland's earning capacity. It is mostly for home consumption, and too much is non-competitive, being protected by tariffs, import-quotas, monopolies and trade associations. Then, too, the habitual outlook must be considered—unless, by some miracle, it has changed greatly from what it was four years ago when a team of American experts, engaged to examine the possibilities of increased exports to the dollar areas, made their report.

The criterion for their study was "most profitable and immediate exportability." The report was almost entirely negative. Some of the products examined were judged simply unprofitable for marketing in America; others would be unacceptable because of price, quality, style or undependability of supply; a few might be restudied for later possibilities; woolen textiles and Waterford glass had some promise and might be pushed moderately. The most interesting part of the report was the section headed "Smugness." Three excerpts will indicate its tone.

> There is a persistent illusion concerning the superior quality of the Irish product. This, of course, is not shared by people of experience, but it permeates the general atmosphere nonetheless.

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More to the point:

> There is a very real shortage of capital; but what there is remains buried. We have discovered no inclination among Irish producers to take any sort of risk. On the contrary, they wish to know the price their product will bring in the American market for years to come; the quantity which can be sold indefinitely; the designs which will be fashionable next year; what the tariffs are going to be; what their taxes will be; what every person concerned in a transaction will earn from it; and, on top of all this, in some cases, just what their competitors' costs are.

In conclusion:

> All this is fantastic, and we suspect that it is a method of rationalising a negative attitude. It is a very poor spirit with which to approach the highly-volatile and risk-conscious American market.

And how is that for vigor, daring and imagination?

The real basis of the Irish economy is, of course, agricultural production. As we have seen, it is not even valiantly standing still. In Mr. Costello's speech he called for more government co-operation with the farmers and in his plan he proposed new or stronger ways of trying to induce them to raise more, to use more fertilizer, to plant better grass for grazing, to accept technical advice, to consider mechanization and rural electrification a little more warmly, and to avail themselves of the already very generous state loans for the improvement of their terribly under-capitalized farms. Considering what efforts toward coöperation with the farmers the various governments have made these last 20 years, and what lackadaisical response these overtures have evoked, it is hard to see what *more coöperation* could mean, unless the politicians intend to do the herding and tilling and fertilizing and ditching themselves while the farmers sit by the hedge and gripe.

Here, by the way, we may reintroduce the topic of suspicion. The urban population is firmly convinced that the farmers get all the gravy and do too little towards earning it. Any visitor will be told, with absolute conviction, that the present income-tax system makes it impossible for the people in the towns and cities to save money and just as impossible for the farmers to lose money. Though there are never more than a handful of farmers in the Dáil, most of the deputies, it is pointed out, are elected from rural districts. For parties as a whole the urban vote is not decisive; the farm vote is. As a result, the city dwellers say, the whole tax burden is carried by themselves, regardless of earnings, cost of living or common equity. Belief in the farmer's sock of

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gold is universal; and the strong-farmers, those with enough and good-enough land for grazing, are thought of as flint-fisted Crœsuses.

Again this is, if understandable, unfair. Outside the wonderful grazing lands of Meath, farming in Ireland is generally a melancholy business; and the small-farmers seldom have the capital, the labor, the land or even the incentive for more intensive use of the soil. They have not the education, either. Few farm children go beyond the sixth grade in the National Schools. Moreover, in these schools, no agricultural science is taught. It used to be, but after the Revolution compulsory Irish (Gaelic) was foisted on the schools—for the first three years everything is taught in and through Irish; thereafter, it is a required subject —and since the curriculum was already overloaded, something had to go. Agricultural instruction went. Of course, the loss was not uncompensated. Nowadays any youngish small-farmer, looking out over his meagre, rainswept, rush-embroidered, unfertilized fields and at the increasingly lonely countryside beyond, can comfort himself by thinking his thoughts in Irish, if he happens to remember any of it. His life may be easy—all too easy. He may not be able to lose money at his job. But if, as he does in his thousands every year, he presently packs up and leaves for Dublin or Liverpool, it is not because he has found his existence unbearably satisfactory. The evidence is plain in the census figures for nearly every county outside Leinster (the eastern province containing Dublin) and for a few counties in Leinster. Six years ago Leitrim had a twelfth the population it had before the Famine. West Kerry, the heart of the Munster Gaeltacht, is now emptying out like a shaken sack. Constantly one comes on empty houses and the fields in rushes. The conclusion seems inescapable that everywhere, but especially in the rural districts, Irish life is no longer able to hold its own. That can be interpreted two ways, both right.

Ireland has no right to be sick. If we compare its resources with those of other small Western European countries, and its population with what those have to support, one can hardly avoid deciding that Irish ills are largely psychosomatic. True, they can all be explained from history; but to explain is not always to excuse, the less so indeed since Irish history records so little energetic common sense and so much casual acceptance of accidental developments. Any conversation about Ireland in Ireland is al-

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most bound to produce some defensive mention of the terrible troubles the Irish have survived and the hard time of it the nation has had generally. Alas, the truth is that Ireland has had an almost fatally easy time of it, at least in this century. The revolutionary victory of 1916–21 was assisted powerfully by outside circumstances and by the fact that it was a thoroughly respectable 1848-type revolt, a little delayed. For a national struggle of such romantic fame, the actual fighting was mostly confined to two rather short periods and to two smallish areas. The Civil War that followed in 1922–23 was much wider and much worse, but that was strictly an internal affair and was the result chiefly of the inability, common to the whole Republican tradition, to distinguish a principle from an aspiration or to deal consecutively, much less realistically, with the cold, hard, lumpy facts. Then as now the chief fact was emigration which went on before the Troubles, during the Troubles, and after the Troubles—continually lowering the pressure of Irish life.

Emigration is a comment, silent but explicit, on every Irish condition. It is a contributing cause of every Irish condition. Some observers argue that, in the 110 years since the Famine, emigration has become a self-operating social mechanism, governed by its own laws and not amenable to any usual remedies. To this may be replied that the theory does not explain the sudden fall-off, almost 50 years ago, of the movement to the United States. (For years only a small fraction of the much-envied Irish quota of 17,853 has been used.) And one can object, too, that if by the usual remedies is meant making life in Ireland sufficiently attractive, they have not been applied enough. The thin and drab quality of Irish life, however, is largely due to emigration—so that it is, in a certain way, a self-perpetuating phenomenon.

First of all, emigration drains off youth, energy and discontent. Next, it lowers the pressure on resources. That lowering of pressure is felt through the whole social organism. To it may be attributed the apathy that repeatedly deprives every new program of its motive power. To it again may be attributed the despair, felt by energetic men, of forcing upon the powers that be in Church and State the changes of policy or attitude needed to institute and carry out pertinent reforms, or even to consider them. Ultimately the despair refers not to the bishops and politicians, unexhilarating as most of them are, but to the people themselves, for the people have had the power in their hands all

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along to stir up their leaders or to change them or, in the case of the Church, induce them to consider the benefits of a little more sympathetic humanity and some Christian prudence. The people's failure to do this can be ascribed only to indifference or suspicion or naïveté, or all three at once. The indifference is either from inanition or from the intention to emigrate. The suspicion, whether justified or not, is an ugly and cancerous condition, as deadly to action as any apathy. The naïveté is in some ways a sheltered innocence, in other ways mere crudeness, in all ways another product of low pressure and, hence, of emigration.

One thing is certain, that the prime causes of emigration are not economic. If the economy is in a pickle now, it was not so a few years ago, or was not obviously so. Ireland emerged from the war period a creditor nation; and in a burst of good sense the Government embarked on a very large-scale housing program and, a little later, on a hospital-building program. A lot of money was spent, too, on land drainage—a big problem in so low and wet a country—and on improving social services. Quite a few new schools were built. However indifferently or unimaginatively, a welfare state was created, possibly even beyond the means of the country to support. All these improvements were being developed at a great rate by 1950—and that was the year emigration reached 40,000.

The people emigrate because they do not like what they are offered and because they do not expect to be offered anything else. They go out, too, in a pretty sour frame of mind, as is evidenced by persistent reports from England that between 60 and 80 percent of the new Irish immigrants cease to communicate as Catholics within a year of their arrival. That also is a comment on what they leave behind. Among the young people who stay in Ireland and who quarrel with the present conditions, the comments range from I.R.A. activity which, though more romantic than intelligent, has at least some hope in it, to—at the other extreme—the Dublin version of teddy-boyism which is as hopeless as it looks. The dearth of young people in the established parties is all but complete.

What the people are offered and what the emigrants reject is paternalism. Long years ago Mr. DeValera was credited with the statement that he had only to look into his own heart to know what the Irish people wanted. Whether he said it or not, it sounds like him. The statement, however, is incomplete. What is meant

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is what the *good* people of Ireland want, or ought to want; and in this sense it is not illogical, for who in Ireland was ever gooder or more Irish than Mr. DeValera himself, the most lugubriously virtuous statesman of the age? (It must be understood that the opposition leaders are quite as virtuous and as nearly lugubrious as their means permit.) What Mr. DeValera found in his heart was a burning desire for compulsory Irish in the schools and civil service; a thoroughgoing, or at least hardworking, censorship; efficiency and honesty in local government (achieved by taking all real powers away from the elected county and borough councils and killing such community initiative as there was); and in general a society based upon Catholic and "Gaelic" principles of "frugal sufficiency" and geared to the supposed tastes and interests of the small-farmer, the truly representative Irish citizen.

He found other things there too. Among many real accomplishments, both political and economic, he must be credited with the success of Irish industrialization, with the first attempts to grapple with current social problems like unemployment, and with the creation of the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. What counts today, however, is that he and his successors have left Ireland a duller and, in spirit, a deader place than they found it. One has only to look at the literature, the theatre, the newspapers, the few magazines, the censored libraries for the proof—or listen to Radio Eireann—or spend a rainy weekend in a small town. To a great extent this has been achieved by a round-robin process of politicians, clergymen, professional Gaels, pietists and other comfortable bourgeoisie looking into each other's hearts and finding there, or pretending to find, the same tepid desires. The process requires that they ignore the silent comment of emigration and such other evidences of discontent as the annual flood of letters to the press from parents protesting against compulsory Irish and against the whole inadequate, outmoded, chaotic school system. This paternalism requires, too, that the general public never be asked to register its opinion on any of the desired blessings which so many obviously do not desire. Yet these things, taken together, account for far more of the situation from which the emigrants flee than does any of the topics mentioned in Mr. Costello's speech and plan. Another incentive to flight may be stronger still: the desire to escape from those of their neighbors, probably a majority, who have no great com-

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plaint against things as they are and who neither desire nor will assist substantial change.

Every cantankerous critic has the duty to hazard at least one positive suggestion. Since I have given so one-sided a picture, omitting all that makes Ireland pleasant and attractive—which it is—my duty is the stronger. I would, then, suggest that the leaders of Church and State in Ireland accept emigration as a major and, for the moment, insoluble native problem. They should cease to regard it as a historical accident. Accepting it, they should at the same time accept the responsibility for seeing that those who do emigrate go out into the world well enough trained and educated to make an advantageous start in their new countries. In the nineteenth century an Irishman with a sixth grade education was at no special disadvantage in England or America. Today, three out of four Irish children still do not go beyond the sixth grade; and the education they receive is half-ruined by concentration on a language they will never speak again, anywhere. As emigrants they simply cannot compete on equal terms with Englishmen or Americans of the same class, who have had a better and longer education.

I am inclined to believe that if an educational system adequate for this task were created in Ireland—and its creation would necessarily involve real vigor, daring and imagination, as well as searching reappraisal of old "principles" and actual conditions —the effects of the effort would soon manifest themselves in every aspect of life. Everything would be changed; and not impossibly, so much for the better that the young might decide to stay at home and make a go of the country after all. There is, to be sure, the danger that they might make a go of it in ways the present fatherly rulers could only regard with horror; but it is the ultimate function of fathers to be horrified, and the function of the young to insure it happens to them. Anyway, that prospect, for all its uncertainty, is a better one to face up to than the likelihood of things going on as they are. I cannot imagine the sudden sweeping outbreak of anti-clerical rage which some of my Irish friends so gloomily but confidently predict. I can, however, imagine that Ireland may do what no other nation has ever tried, and perish by sudden implosion upon a central vacuity.

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MASTERS OR PARTNERS?

Race Relations in the African Federation

By Philip Mason

THERE are various grounds on which it may be argued that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is the key to Africa. In the Union of South Africa, racial attitudes have hardened and the express political ideal of the dominant party is to increase separation between the races—social, political and economic. This is to run counter to the main trend of opinion in the world and in the long run would seem to most people in the United States and Britain a policy likely to lose Africa—that is, lose any hope of keeping the good will of African States when they eventually become independent. But to the north of the Union lies the Federation, which covers more than 485,000 square miles, larger than the states of Texas, California and New York put together, and has an economic potential to be reckoned with. Here the declared political ideal is not separation of the races but "partnership." Many eyes look from the south towards the Federation, some with cynicism, some with hope. If by any chance the Federation can find a solution to racial problems which can truly be described as "partnership" the Union would surely be affected, and still more so Kenya and Tanganyika. There are divided minds and uneasy consciences in the Union and the success of the Federation's policy would reinforce the consciences.

On one point it is possible to be tolerably certain. If in the course of the next ten years no solution based on a true form of partnership has emerged, then the small white minority who live in Central and East Africa must either cling to power by the naked use of force—and that can hardly be for long—or make the uncomfortable choice between leaving the country of their birth and reconciling themselves to a government in which African interests and attitudes are supreme.

To a visitor who has recently come from the Union, the Federation will seem at least superficially an extension of the country he has left. The basic factors in the situation are similar. Economically, the two races are necessary to each other. Management is white, and there are few Africans who have reached the level even of foreman or clerk. Exports—copper, tobacco, gold, tea, chrome—are all produced by European management. Without these ex-

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ports the territory could not pay for its imports of motor cars, machinery, manufactured goods; the present structure would collapse. Equally, white management needs black labor, without which farms and mines would grind to a standstill.

So far the Federation is not very different from the Union in these respects, and the social pattern too is much the same. In the Rhodesias, as in the Union, there was until 1953, the date of Federation, virtually no social contact between the races. For instance, there are no restaurants or hotels in Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia, to which it is possible to take an African. Economically, the distinction between the races runs right through the earnings of daily paid workers. On the Copperbelt, for example, the average earnings of a European miner at one mine in 1954–5 were £2,042, to which must be added a house worth about £240 a year supplied for about £3 a month. The average for Africans at the same mine, including benefits in kind, was £168.58 per annum. In politics there were, as of April 30, 1956, 50,118 Europeans on the voters' roll in Southern Rhodesia and 526 Africans.

Against this broad similarity—in both cases, a society dominated by whites—must be set the extremely important difference of the proportion between the races. In the Union there is one white man to rather less than four Africans. (I omit the figures for Colored and Indian, which although significant in the Union may be ignored in a summary of the Federation's problems.) In Southern Rhodesia the proportion is approximately one white to 12 black; in Northern Rhodesia it is about one to 35; in Nyasaland it is one to 450.

This is the picture that is likely at first glance to strike the inquiring visitor from Britain or the United States. How this situation has arisen in the process of history must be understood before one can usefully consider how it is to develop in future. When Rhodes organized the pioneer column which marched from Kimberley and hoisted the flag at Fort Salisbury in September 1890, the greater part of what is now Southern Rhodesia was occupied by scattered tribes, loosely organized, who were continually threatened by raids from the one powerful group who might be called a nation, the Matabele, under their king, Lobengula. Every year a Matabele raid went out and returned with cattle and young people who were assimilated into the tribe. Old people who were no use for work and adult men were ruthlessly killed.

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Such a people as the Matebele could no more live at peace with settlers and farmers than the Iroquois with the settlers of America. The Matabele were defeated in a brief war in 1893. In 1896 they rebelled; they had a number of grievances and—it was claimed by the settlers—had not been beaten properly in 1893. The rebellion spread to the Mashona in the east of the colony and throughout the whole country took the form of sudden risings and the slaughter of white people living on isolated farms or mines. It was repressed; the justice meted out was often rough and summary. The phase of frontier warfare was now over and the period of settling down began; it was inevitable that the European of the period should usually regard the Bantu as a people who had shown they were not to be trusted.

From the start one of the greatest problems of the settler was to get labor. The Matabele had lived by raids; the tribes loosely called Mashona had been economically self-sufficient—at a very low level of sufficiency—but had not used the plow or the wheel. They saw at first no reason to leave their homes and work for white men. But one by one they acquired the economic wants which white men thought proper for them and found it necessary to come to the farms and mines for a short time to earn money. The earner went back to his home as soon as he had got what he needed and one may suppose that usually he did as little work as possible. A tax was imposed, more to create the need to earn than for any return it would bring in; Africans began to want blankets and tools, later clothes, and today furniture, cooking pots, bicycles, gramophones, beauty cream, soap and motorcars. It remains, however, an article of faith with many white Rhodesians that to pay the African more will result in his going back sooner to his home.

Political rights were demanded by the white settlers from the start and—with memories still in mind of Burke and George III and the Declaration of Independence—Parliament in the United Kingdom was quick to grant them. In 1922, Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing colony with a prime minister, a cabinet and a parliament. A right of veto was reserved to the Crown in respect of any legislation which might be thought to be prejudicial to the interests of Africans; but this has proved a dead letter and has in fact never been exercised.

It is against this background—of bitterness resulting from the rebellions, of the primitive nature of the original inhabitants and

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their unwillingness to work, and of a white settler community virtually self-governing—that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia has come into being. And these same historical factors apply to the western part of Northern Rhodesia.

But while South African traditions spread up through Southern Rhodesia and northwards to what is now the Copperbelt and the borders of the Belgian Congo, a different influence and a different kind of administration came through Nyasaland and into northeastern Rhodesia. It was the travels of Livingstone and his reports of the horrors of the slave trade which roused among his fellow countrymen the keen philanthropic interest which sent the first missionaries to Nyasaland. It was Livingstone's belief that this trade could best be killed by an increase of wealth that would give the inhabitants something other than human beings to offer for the guns and cloth which they wanted. Missionaries were therefore followed by traders, and the flag followed the Bible and the ledger. Missionaries, traders and administrators alike found that their stockades became cities of refuge with no means of defense; humanity forbade the return of escaped slaves who fled to them for help and protection, yet without force it was hard to keep them. The African Lakes Company fought an abortive war around the north and east end of Lake Nyasa; in the end the work had to be continued under government control. It was carried out by a few hundred Sikh soldiers and some African auxiliaries under British officers. The slavers were defeated and administration extended over the country. But it was from the first a loose administration operating largely through native chiefs, a system which has continued until the present.

This system of indirect rule for the benefit of the African population forms the other half of the background to the argument which ended in Federation. Here were three territories lying side by side. One, Nyasaland, had a deficit trade balance every year. It was overcrowded and its people were forced to live by working in Southern Rhodesia or in the Union. In Southern Rhodesia there was an economy with great possibilities of development if labor and capital could be made available, but at present unhealthily dependent on tobacco exports of about £20,000,000 a year. Northern Rhodesia was comparatively a rich country but in her case 95 percent of the exports were copper. The economic arguments for bringing the three territories into some kind of union were unanswerable; but there was political objection from

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the Africans of the two northern territories, because they felt that Southern Rhodesia would dominate the Federation and that Southern Rhodesia's political philosophy, and in particular Southern Rhodesia's view of the natural lines of development for Africans, were not the same as those of the Colonial Office.

Although the Africans of these territories were not directly represented by voting power in the Assemblies, they were represented indirectly, and the people were consulted through the administrative machine. The Nyasalanders' feeling was that they were technically part of a Protectorate; they were "British Protected Persons;" they were not a conquered people, as the Africans of Southern Rhodesia had been. They had been brought up under the paternal care of the Colonial Office, and though they might disagree with the Colonial Office as to what was their best interest, they did not doubt that on the whole the Government considered their interests. Further, they had always been led to suppose that the aim of the Colonial Office here, as in British colonies throughout the world, was eventual "self-government." They might not be very clear as to what exactly this might mean and they certainly did not envisage it as meaning complete separation from the Commonwealth. But whatever "self-government" might mean, it was bound to be postponed by any form of association with Southern Rhodesia, where white colonists already enjoyed virtual independence. Every Nyasalander has some knowledge of Southern Rhodesia because many—indeed most—of them earn their living there; wages, it is true, are higher there, but—they say—the African there is a second-class citizen and the interests of the white settler, who is a voter, always come first.

Sentiments of this kind were almost universal in Nyasaland at the time of Federation and were only less strong in Northern Rhodesia where political consciousness was less widespread. They have today been modified only slightly; there are a few who feel that since Federation has occurred it is sensible to make the best of the situation, but in general the African population is not reconciled to what has taken place.

In the United Kingdom, however, the views of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia Africans, though expressed by the Liberal and Labor Parties, were never understood by the electorate and were discounted by most of the Conservative Party. Those Conservatives who had studied the question most deeply felt that the

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economic advantages to Africans were overwhelming and that, as these came to be appreciated, political opposition would die down; that, if trusteeship has any meaning, it is the duty of the trustees to take the action they believe right in the interests of their wards; that relations between Europeans and Africans could be settled only in Africa and that the sooner Europeans in Africa realized that these relations were their responsibility the better. Finally, there were present in Conservative minds the desirability of a strong state in Central Africa and the tradition of the devolution of power which has run through colonial history since the loss of the American colonies.

While Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were opposed to Federation, there were many in Southern Rhodesia who in private welcomed an accession of African strength, even though in their public utterances they felt they must support "their brothers from the north." Among the Europeans throughout the three territories there was a division of opinion. A right-wing element in Southern Rhodesia disliked Federation for the same reason that some Southern Rhodesian Africans welcomed it; it altered the numerical balance to their disfavor. There were Europeans in Northern Rhodesia who felt that they were paying Southern Rhodesia's debts, and others in Nyasaland who would have preferred unification to Federation. All these views were defeated in a referendum and an election, which were as much as anything else a vote of personal confidence in Sir Godfrey Huggins, now Lord Malvern, the former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia who became the first Prime Minister of the Federation.

Federation became a fact, and in the preamble to the Constitution was embodied the statement that partnership was the aim of the new Federation. The Federal constitution is made complex by safeguards intended to protect the interests of Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. More power is therefore vested in the territories than most constitutional lawyers or students of political science would think ideally desirable. Most notably, the subject of "Native Affairs" (which concerns the vast majority of the population of the three territories) is excluded from the Federal purview. These complications have undoubtedly hampered the development of the idea of partnership at the Federal level.

It is paradoxical that in Southern Rhodesia—which the Africans of the north feared as illiberal—there has been more ap-

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parent progress than at the Federal level. It is true that many Africans in Southern Rhodesia are bitterly disillusioned at what has been done since Federation, or rather at what has not been done; there are outside observers who express similar views. But the history of Southern Rhodesia has to be considered, as well as the fact that the Parliament has to answer to an electorate brought up in a rigidly separatist world. There is no democratic body anywhere whose acts correspond entirely with the ideas professed in the constitution or in the philosophy of the state. It is only three years since the Federation came into being and since Rhodesia consciously set about the task of giving partnership a meaning. Against this background, four measures stand out as distinguishing Southern Rhodesian policy sharply from that of the Union.

It has been a convention throughout southern Africa that the African worker came to the town as a visitor only. At first he was usually housed in barracks, often with several bunks to a room. Later it became more and more common for a wife and children to accompany the male worker, but he was still a visitor and his house must be given up within a fortnight of losing a job. Now Southern Rhodesia is giving African workers plots in the municipal areas on a 99-year lease. A four-room house with a kitchen, shower and lavatory and electric light will be built on each lot to become the property of the tenant by successive payments covering 20 years. The scheme is not perfect; industry is growing so fast that when these homes are built the waiting list is likely to be as long as it is now; there are other criticisms. All the same, the step is revolutionary because it does for the first time give the African worker a home he can call his own in the cities.

With this step goes a second, more ambitious in that it aims at being completed within five years and probably will really be finished in seven. The lands reserved for Africans, which in Southern Rhodesia constitute 45 percent of the total territory, were previously held in a common tribal system by which sale was impossible and improvement unrewarding. Under the new scheme, the land will be divided into small holdings, three of which can be combined into one, and which can be transferred by sale or inheritance. The result will be to build up a class of professional peasant farmers with a stake in the country. This is unpopular among urban dwellers because they see that their precarious and inefficient stake in the reserve will be extinguished. They will be-

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come town dwellers and will need a great extension of the home ownership scheme already outlined. But this must surely be a necessary step in the hard journey from a tribal society to a modern competitive industrial state.

Everywhere in Africa the visitor is impressed with the urgent need for education. In Southern Rhodesia, education for Africans has on the whole been undertaken by missionaries whose funds have been subsidized by the Government. There can hardly be two opinions that the educational system is today unfair. Europeans throughout the territory receive free education while in practically every mission, although it is state-aided, the African pupil has to pay a fee. Many African children never go to school at all; many disappear from the schools at a very early stage; there are not enough teachers and the standard of teaching is low. The Southern Rhodesia Government has just voted £12,000,000 for an educational scheme which will open new secondary schools and teachers' training colleges for Africans and eventually make primary education compulsory for every child in the urban areas. That this third big step is inadequate would hardly be denied by its warmest adherents, but it is a step forward and probably as much as could be implemented for the moment.

The fourth measure, when it becomes law, will make possible a single trade union system in which Africans and Europeans alike will be members. This is in marked contrast both with the Union of South Africa, where the Government is doing all it can to keep unions to one race only, and with Northern Rhodesia, where there are separate unions, where the European union has stood in the way of the advancement of individual Africans, and where the African unions are now, in the name of egalitarianism and labor's solid front, resisting management's attempts to build up in a separate union an African middle class of foremen and supervisory artisans. Here, in Northern Rhodesia's trade unions, lies the Federation's most obvious single immediate problem—yet it is only one facet of the total situation.

In the Federal sphere there are so far two landmarks, the setting up of an inter-racial university and the adoption of a scheme of grades for the Federal Civil Service based not on race but primarily on educational qualifications. These are both steps towards a free and integrated society, although in both cases there are concessions to the present state of European opinion to which it is possible to raise doctrinaire objections.

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While these advances have been made in Southern Rhodesia—which the African of the north fears as a settlers' country—the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have made slower progress and in a similar direction though at a slightly different angle. Their slower progress is partly because they have been more considerate of African public opinion. For example, in Southern Rhodesia the land reforms here briefly sketched are the result of years of experiment (in which an American missionary, Mr. E. D. Alvord, was a pioneer) and are being carried out by direction, with little consultation of African opinion. In Nyasaland, experiments of the same kind are beginning, but so great is African suspicion of any change in land tenure that progress at a comparable rate seems remote. The difference in angle is one that it would be easy to exaggerate. But while Southern Rhodesians have pictured "their" Africans developing as a prosperous peasantry who are not particularly interested in politics, the territories in the north, under Colonial Office pressure, have given politics and education a higher priority and have not insisted that economic development must come first.

What does partnership mean? Is it a partnership between two races, each considered as a unit? If that is so, and the two races are one day to be equal, it will mean that a member of one race has 35 times the power and wealth of a member of the other. Or is it an equal partnership between members of the two races? At first no definition was attempted. Lately there has been a tendency among European leaders towards the former definition, which can never satisfy the Africans. But it is not at present fashionable among the Europeans of these territories to suggest that the African should be in any way kept back. Discussion goes on constantly as to what is the ideal arrangement which will give Africans a say in political affairs and still not result in the Europeans being "swamped." Yet the hope that changes may not come in one's own lifetime is bound to be widespread in a privileged and dominant minority; the underprivileged majority are equally reluctant to postpone advantages to the afterlife or a later generation. The general situation on the white side is as though the former Confederate States had been required to lift themselves by their own boot straps, carrying out as a matter of conscience those advances which have actually been to a large extent due to northern pressure. Change is unlikely to proceed at the pace that African opinion would regard as satisfac-

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tory. On the African side, the atmosphere in the towns and among the educated is one of intense impatience of all limitations and restrictions. But, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, there is a force of African inertia just as on the white side.

There are Europeans in Southern Rhodesia who are aware of trends in world opinion which will not condone the permanent domination of a majority by a minority; there are others with some awareness of the strength of the upsurging desire of Africans throughout the continent for equality of status and opportunity —not 30 years hence but tomorrow. Yet to the European in Central Africa it seems axiomatic that a man cannot proceed in one generation from something close to savagery to equality in a modern industrial state. He says "slowly;" the African says "quickly." The result, to an observer, is something like a slipping clutch in which one set of wheels is trying to go faster than the other and both heat and smoke are generated.

In this heat and smoke, sight is often lost of certain economic problems which must here be expressed in a highly condensed form. First, the level of African unskilled wages is insufficient to provide bare necessities for a man with a wife and two children who live with him in a town and have no other means of support. And more and more often this is how the African unskilled worker does live. An increase in real wages would eventually lead to an increase in productivity and internal purchasing power—unless Central Africa is quite different from the rest of the world. Wages are going up, though slowly; productivity is not likely to increase more quickly than wages. Second, the standard of living which the town African desires—and indeed begins to consider a right—is higher than the income of the territories and his own productivity at present warrant. In 1951, the average money product of the African in Southern Rhodesia was £12 per annum. It is more now, but not enough to warrant a house costing £500 as the minimum standard provided for an unskilled worker. So there is going to be a big gap between the town worker and the peasant. Third, the territories as they become more industrialized are becoming every year more vulnerable to a world slump. They need capital badly and they need the good relations between management and labor without which capital will not come. As the Royal Commission on East Africa has said, Africa needs capital more than capital needs Africa. Capital will flow to Central Africa if the United States and the United Kingdom

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believe in her future. This they are likely to do just so far as those at present in power recognize the realities of the situation, turn the vicious circle outlined above into a benevolent spiral and take steps to establish a stable partnership.

The events of October 1956 in Poland and Hungary have surely underlined the dangers of disregarding the wishes of most of the people all of the time. The Federation has taken its decision against such a course and has set its face clearly away from separation as an ideal. The question is whether the conscious ideal set out in the constitution can overcome, before it is too late, the unconscious opposition set up by short-term self-interests. These are pushing all the time. It is easy to see that in the public interest Africans ought to be employed wherever they can be; it is much harder to take the trouble to train an African to do a job in your own office—risking possible failure and certain criticism. In the next few months we may have some clear pointers. We shall know whether the proposals for non-racial unions which have been approved so far by the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia actually become law or are smothered by opposition from the white trade unions; we shall see what proposals are put forward for self-government in African townships; we shall see, above all, whether the proposals put forward for the franchise can truly be described as implementing partnership.

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THE LAST MONTHS OF PEACE, 1939

By Raymond J. Sontag

ONLY one who has had the oppressive feeling of being buried under the sheer mass of the captured German Foreign Ministry archives can appreciate the achievement of the editors of the papers relating to the last months of peace in 1939.[1] Despite their bulk, the captured archives are not complete. Much was lost by destruction, deliberate or accidental. Parts of the archives remained in Berlin or Eastern Germany, and the fate of these parts is still uncertain. Above all, few in the German Government knew with certainty what was in Hitler's mind, and Hitler's own words were often designed to obscure, not clarify, his intentions. In these circumstances, the pencilled notes for a private conference within the Foreign Ministry may tell more than a score of formal diplomatic papers, and a private letter in the files of an ambassador may be needed to correct the impression left by the instructions he received through official channels. The editors of the "Documents on German Foreign Policy" have not only tracked down every shred of evidence in the captured archives; they have also related this evidence to the enormous body of published evidence from other archives, to the testimony offered at the war crimes trials, and to the memoirs and biographies of participants in the events of these months.

From the tangle of evidence, one theme emerges, a theme which has relevance to our own day. It is the way in which a succession of diplomatic moves, intended only as preparatory to a still distant trial of strength, developed into a diplomatic crisis involving all of Europe, and eventually precipitated a world war which at the outset Hitler had no thought of starting and which to the end he hoped to avoid.

To see that story in proper perspective, and to appreciate its present relevance, it is necessary to push aside the legend that Hitler was either a fool or a reckless gambler. Leaving moral values to one side, Hitler's achievements during his first six years as chancellor compel reluctant acknowledgment. He had come to power in a distracted, impoverished, disarmed country. He had enforced unity at home. He had revived and increased German

[1] "Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945." Series D (1937–1945). v. 6, "The Last Months of Peace, March–August 1939;" v. 7, "The Last Days of Peace, August 9–September 3, 1939." (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1956.)

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industrial power. He had built armed forces before which all Europe trembled. He had reoccupied the Rhineland and constructed formidable defenses in the west. He had annexed Austria and the strategically decisive Sudeten districts. What was left of Czechoslovakia lay helpless under the shadow of German power. As German industrial and military strength expanded, and as he moved from success to success, his favor was courted by those who had treated the Weimar Republic with scant respect. With Japan and Italy his relations were intimate. Poland, while retaining the alliance with France, was in practice closer to Germany. The Baltic States and the states of southeastern Europe were tacitly acknowledged to be within the German sphere of influence. The Governments of Britain and France were desperately eager to appease their formidable neighbor. Even the U.S.S.R. was showing a desire not to provoke the sworn enemy of Communism. In the light of his amazing successes, the warning voices of those of his advisers who feared he was carrying Germany headlong to destruction were silenced by dismissal, by fear or by conversion to the belief that his judgment was, in fact, infallible.

Hitler freely admitted that his successes in the foreign field had been won by bluff. The conviction was general in Europe that the First World War had dangerously undermined European society and that another war would bring the structure to ruin, with Communism as the only gainer. The Soviet Union, sharing this conviction, was eager to stand clear so that it would not be involved in the general ruin. By exploiting fear of war Hitler had won much. He was confident that still more must be won by diplomacy before he could safely embark on war with the West.

Some day, Hitler recognized, Britain and France would be tempted to set limits to German power, even by war. In preparation for that day, he argued, Germany must not only strain her resources in military preparations; she must also win territory sufficient to feed her people during a long war—for war with the Western democracies would be both long and hard. Colonies would be of no value; their resources would be lost by blockade just when they were needed. The territory must be won in Eastern Europe. There, German skill could increase agricultural production, and the non-German population would provide a labor pool for farm and factory. The moment was, he believed, auspicious. Russia could not interfere: the purges had shaken the

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country and deprived the Red Army of its leaders; Stalin must fear a victorious army no less than military defeat. Fear of Russia would hold Poland on the side of Germany so long as exactions from Poland were counterbalanced by concessions to Polish territorial greed. Italy and Japan were so completely estranged from the Western democracies that they must follow the German lead. British and especially French rearmament was only beginning, and was encountering opposition unavoidable where the press was unmuzzled. Above all, Britain and France were ruled by men who had already retreated before the threat of war. Hitler was convinced that they lacked the resolution to precipitate a war or conduct it to the death.

The moves of March 1939 were, like the annexation of Austria and the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia, merely preliminary to the task of winning "living space." They would provide better frontiers and advanced military bases in the east, jumping-off places for future action. They would not bring the enlarged agricultural base needed for the future long war of annihilation with the Western democracies. Hitler made no diplomatic or military preparations which would suggest that even local opposition of any importance was anticipated. In one sense he envisioned the moves of March 1939 as the logical completion of the campaign against Czechoslovakia; in another sense, they were moves preparatory to the winning of the desired agricultural base.

II

In the early morning hours of March 15, 1939, after a stormy interview with Hitler, President Hácha wearily signed away the independence of what was left of Czechoslovakia. German troops had already crossed the frontier, and by afternoon Hitler was in Prague. The following Monday, March 20, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister was received by Ribbentrop and told that Memel must be surrendered to Germany. Even before this demand was accepted on Thursday, the next move was made.

On Tuesday, March 21, Ribbentrop asked the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, to call on him. The Ambassador said that the German protectorate over Slovakia had hit Poland hard. Ribbentrop hinted that the status of Slovakia was not necessarily final and might be subject to discussion if German-Polish relations developed satisfactorily. It was Hitler's hope, Ribbentrop continued, that such would be the case; but the Führer was troubled

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by anti-German feeling in Poland. The Poles must surely recognize that unless they coöperated with Germany they would be absorbed by Communist Russia. It was necessary to put German-Polish relations on a sound and lasting basis. To this end, Danzig must return to Germany, and Germany must be granted extra-territorial rail and road connections between the Reich and East Prussia. Then Hitler would be prepared to guarantee the Polish Corridor, and then it would be possible to deal with the Slovak question to the satisfaction of all. Ribbentrop suggested that Lipski take these proposals to Warsaw. Possibly the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, would come to Berlin to discuss them; Hitler would warmly welcome such a discussion.

Lipski did go to Warsaw, and while he was away Hitler informed his army commander that a military solution of the probblem of Danzig was not desired, because this would drive Poland into the arms of Britain; the use of Slovakia as a bargaining counter to win Polish agreement was contemplated. While he did not wish to solve the Polish question militarily unless especially favorable political conditions arose, Hitler continued, plans should be made, with the objective of beating the Poles so thoroughly that they would not be a political factor for some decades. He would absent himself from Berlin, leaving the conduct of negotiations with Lipski to Ribbentrop.

The Polish reply was presented by Lipski on Sunday, March 26. In form it was most conciliatory, but it did not meet the German demands. Ribbentrop, from his discussion with Lipski, drew the conclusion that this was not the Polish Government's last word and that Poland merely wished to escape as cheaply as possible. The next day, he applied pressure. The Polish reply, he said, could not be regarded as a basis for a settlement; German-Polish relations were, therefore, deteriorating rapidly. Lipski promised to do what he could to overcome the difficulties. Two days later, the German representative in Danzig was told that Poland was not to be provoked. Polish reluctance would be worn down by attrition tactics, and Danzig should adopt a sphinx-like attitude. Ribbentrop was of the opinion that the climax of the crisis had been reached.

Already signs were multiplying that the crisis was not, in fact, at its climax, and that Prague, Memel and Danzig had violently shaken world diplomatic alignments. In Britain and France the annihilation of Czechoslovakia produced a strong popular reac-

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tion against the policy of appeasement. Chamberlain and Daladier had wavered and then fallen in with the popular mood. Recognition of the German action in Czechoslovakia was refused, and the British and French Ambassadors in Berlin were ordered home for consultation. When there were rumors of new German moves in Central Europe, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity from which emerged, on March 31, a declaration by Chamberlain in the House of Commons that Britain and France would aid Poland in resisting any action clearly threatening Polish independence. Hard on this declaration, the Polish Foreign Minister arrived in London, and at the conclusion of his visit Chamberlain stated on April 6 that a permanent alliance would be negotiated between Britain and Poland. Moreover, Chamberlain offered similar guarantees to states of southeastern Europe, and these offers met with a sympathetic reception despite German reminders that "the shelter of the umbrella" had been no protection for Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia or the Spanish Republicans.

More ominous, negotiations began in mid-April for drawing the Soviet Union into what the Germans called the British encirclement program; someone kept the German Embassy in London fully and promptly informed of these negotiations. Finally, even the United States Government assumed a more active rôle. At the onset of the March crisis, the German chargé in Washington warned that the Roosevelt Administration was determined to support Britain and France in any war with Germany and that, while American opinion was opposed to war, this opposition would collapse on the first news of air attacks on British or French cities. On April 15, President Roosevelt appealed directly to Hitler and Mussolini, asking for assurance against armed attack on a long list of states.

Even within the Axis, the occupation of Prague produced a violent reaction. As usual, the Italian Government had received no advance notice of the German action, and repetition intensified Italian resentment against such cavalier treatment. Now, however, the Italians were not only humiliated; they were frightened. Austria and Czechoslovakia were completely under German control, and Hungary was a dependent of the Reich. As a reliable informant told the Germans, "people are saying that in the end the old Hapsburg Empire, this time under the swastika flag, will reappear on the Adriatic." German assurances that the Mediterranean, including the Adriatic, was an Italian sphere of

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influence, did not disarm Italian fears. On Good Friday, Mussolini moved to solidify the Italian position by seizing Albania, and he did not forewarn Germany. Meanwhile, more and more clearly the Italian suggestion that Germans in the South Tyrol be resettled in Germany was changing to a firm demand. Italian policy was assuming an unaccustomed and potentially dangerous independence of German leadership.

III

There is no evidence that all this activity caused Hitler any alarm, and much evidence that he continued confident of success. As the weeks passed, German policy towards Poland changed, and by May 23 Hitler was resolved to attack her at the first suitable opportunity; but this was to be an isolated operation, from which other Powers would remain aloof.

By April 3, when Beck arrived in London, it was already obvious that the German plan to hold Poland away from Britain had failed. On the same day, the high command of the Wehrmacht was instructed to prepare plans for an attack on Poland in such a way that the operation could begin at any time from September 1. In the amplification of these instructions issued on April 11, the war with Poland was still described as a possibility to be avoided if possible; in any case, every precaution must be taken to limit the war to Poland only. The proposal made by Ribbentrop to Lipski was withdrawn on April 6; German missions abroad were instructed not to discuss the proposal or the Polish counter-offer.

The war of nerves was begun, with full confidence of victory. Ribbentrop was convinced that "not one British soldier would be mobilized in the event of a German-Polish conflict." Göring and Hitler expressed the same conviction. Public excitement, the Nazis argued, had pushed Beck, Chamberlain and Daladier into foolish threats and promises, but, as Hitler said, "one could only yell for a certain time." When passions cooled, and reason reasserted itself, it would become obvious that the German position was overwhelmingly strong. In the German view, British and French rearmament had only begun, and the German West Wall was impregnable; therefore no effective help could come to Poland from the west. Russia would not fight, and in any case the Poles knew that the Russians, if they ever entered their country, would never leave. There were even signs that reason, as the Nazis un-

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derstood reason, was returning. The French and British Ambassadors returned to their posts in Berlin; and the latter, Nevile Henderson, promised that he would not cease to work for a favorable solution. The German chargé in Warsaw reported that responsible Poles wished to keep the way open for a rapprochement, although they could do nothing because of the excited state of public opinion. The German chargé in Moscow stressed Soviet "mistrust and reserve" in relations with the West, and on April 17 the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin suggested that so far as the U.S.S.R. was concerned, Nazi-Soviet relations could easily be improved. And so Hitler was probably quite honest when he said that he "had a great deal of time for theatres and concerts" and that he "regarded the whole course of events calmly."

Through four weeks after Chamberlain's promise of assistance to the Poles, the Germans kept their own counsel. Then, on Friday, April 28, Hitler spoke. The British encirclement policy and the Polish military agreement had, he said, destroyed the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the German-Polish political understanding of 1934. With irony verging on ridicule, he dismissed Roosevelt's peace appeal as meaningless. About Russia he said nothing. The reaction abroad to the speech, as reported by German representatives, was heartening. The comment of the chargé in Paris (the German Ambassadors to Britain and France had not yet returned to their posts) was typical: "It is fairly generally recognized that the tone of the speech was moderate, serious and dignified, and that the German demands are by no means incapable of being met."

A week after Hitler's speech the strength of the German position was dramatized by a meeting in Milan between Ribbentrop and the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano. In the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting, on May 7, emphasis was placed on the "perfect identity of views" between Germany and Italy, and on the intention of the two Governments to conclude a political and military pact—the pact which was grandiloquently to be called "The Pact of Steel."

Actually, the pact which was announced on May 7 and concluded on May 22 was thought a poor and temporary substitute for the alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan for which the Germans had been pressing. The Japanese were willing to conclude an alliance against Russia; they were as yet unwilling to promise military assistance against Britain and the United States. Since

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the alliance was wanted by Hitler as a means of bringing the British to a more "reasonable" attitude, the proposal of an alliance against Russia was rejected. As an alternative, Ribbentrop touched lightly in his discussion with Ciano on the possibility of improving relations with the Soviet Union. Ciano thought such a move desirable; but felt that for domestic political reasons Mussolini would not wish too great an improvement.

At this stage in the developing crisis, the Germans also showed no great eagerness to strengthen their position by bidding for the support of the Soviet Union, despite clear indications of the importance which the British and French attached to a political agreement with the U.S.S.R. When Dirksen returned to his post in London he reported that failure to achieve agreement with Russia would shake the position of the British. Similarly, on his return to Paris, Welczeck reported that "even right-wing circles are convinced that without Russia there would be no possibility of effectively stemming the German advance in the East."

The Russians did their best to elicit a German offer. On May 3 Molotov replaced Litvinov as Foreign Secretary and the Soviet chargé in Berlin intimated that the change could facilitate improvement in Nazi-Soviet relations. Two weeks later he again suggested that an improvement in relations would not be difficult to achieve. The German Government did bring Schulenburg, the Ambassador in Moscow, home for consultation; but he returned to Russia with instructions only to suggest the reopening of economic negotiations which had been interrupted earlier in the year. Schulenburg talked with Molotov for over an hour on May 20, but found him unwilling to reopen the economic discussions until a "political basis" had been found. After some wavering, the German Government decided to make no definite political proposals.

On May 23, Hitler reviewed the international situation with his military advisers. Now, two months after his first demands on Poland, he had enlarged his objective. Poland was to be attacked at the first suitable opportunity, and destroyed. "It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the East and making food supplies secure and also solving the problem of the Baltic States." The campaign against Poland could be a success only if Britain and France stood aside. There were indications that "Russia might disinterest herself in the destruction of Poland," but to restrain Russia it might be

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necessary to have closer ties with Japan. In any case, the task was to isolate Poland, and there must not be a simultaneous showdown with France and Britain. That showdown would come, but later. It would be a hard, and probably a long fight, involving the very existence of Germany; it was time to begin preparations for that fight. He was, therefore, setting up a small planning staff, which would work in complete secrecy, and which would study all aspects of the problem of preparing for the life and death battle with Britain. He gave no date for the war with the West, but in response to a question from Göring he stated that the armaments program would be completed by 1943 or 1944.

IV

For two months the Polish, British and French Governments had been trying to convince Hitler that further advances to the east by the threat or use of force would precipitate a general war which Germany was bound to lose. The only effect of these warnings had been to convince Hitler that Poland would not give up without a fight, as Austria and Czechoslovakia had done, and that Poland must therefore be destroyed. He refused to believe that the rulers of Britain and France would, after preaching the blessings of peace for so long, accept the terrors of general war, which they themselves described in such despairing language. Yet, while the British and French continued to proclaim their dread of war and their eagerness for a reconciliation with Germany, they also continued to affirm their determination to preserve Polish independence. In the German view, these contradictory positions could be reconciled only by the assumption that the Soviet Union would shoulder the burden of defending Poland.

The Germans were convinced that Russia neither could nor would defend Poland. At the same time it was thought probable in Berlin during the last days of May that some sort of agreement would be made between Russia, Britain and France. If agreement was achieved, the illusory conviction of the British and French that they could support Poland without peril to themselves would be strengthened. Therefore, as the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker, wrote privately, "in the days before Whitsun [May 28] and during the holidays, deliberations on whether and by what means one could still try to put a spoke into the Anglo-Russian conversations have been going to and fro."

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One suggestion was that Russia be confronted bluntly with the choice between German enmity, which an Anglo-Russian agreement would insure, and the assurance that, in settling the Polish question, "we would take Russian interests into account as far as possible." This suggestion was discarded, but the contrast between the meager compensation then proposed for Russia and the concessions made in the Nazi-Soviet pact a few months later is a measure of Nazi confidence at the end of May.

The course of action finally adopted on May 30 was a "private" conversation between the State Secretary and the Russian chargé in which Weizsäcker made clear the German desire for improved political as well as economic relations with the U.S.S.R., and hinted that an Anglo-Russian agreement would prevent this improvement. On the following day, Molotov publicly denied that an Anglo-Russian agreement impended and intimated that trade negotiations between Russia and Germany would soon begin. From London, Dirksen reported a few days later that even in Labor circles alarm was spreading over the price Russia was now asking for an agreement with Britain.

A spoke had indeed been put in the Anglo-Russian negotiations, and again the German Government settled back, waiting for the long, unremitting strain to have its effect. From a conversation with Henderson on June 13, Weizsäcker drew the conclusion that the Ambassador "is not happy about British relations with the Poles, that he thinks nothing of the Russian pact, and that, for the rest, he is deeply concerned about a possible conflict this summer." On June 24, Dirksen reported the growth of a "disillusioned, critical, and perturbed attitude" in Britain towards both Poland and Russia: "It has been possible to observe for some weeks now in conversations with leading British personalities that they are tending towards a discussion with Germany on burning problems, and that this is spreading to the press." On June 27, when he handed over to Weizsäcker a British memorandum suggesting an exchange of views on a new naval agreement, Henderson stated his belief that "a constructive exchange of views" would not be difficult to bring about. He offered to do anything he could to bring about a resumption of talks between London and Berlin, and "he said it was absolutely wrong to believe that Chamberlain had left the path of peace." As he had before, Weizsäcker merely commented that British foreign policy was incomprehensible to the German Government.

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Meanwhile, through June the Anglo-Russian negotiations limped along. In the middle of the month a special British envoy, William Strang, arrived in Moscow, but the Russian press reported that the results of the first discussions with him were "not entirely favorable." At the end of the month, Weizsäcker was unable to guess what the outcome of the talks would be, although the British seemed disposed to make every concession to the Russians. He was equally uncertain whether anything would come of German offers to resume trade discussions with Russia. With an irony which was certainly deliberate, the German suggestions were also characterized by the Russians as "not entirely favorable." The Russians continued to drop hints that they would welcome political discussions. Schulenburg, during a two weeks' stay in Berlin, attempted to move the discussions in this direction, but he found Ribbentrop not greatly concerned about the problem of Russia. On his return to Moscow, Schulenburg ventured to raise the possibility of discussing political issues in a conversation with Molotov on June 28, but while Molotov was friendly and obviously "greatly interested in learning our political views and in maintaining contact with us," he was also noncommittal. Even before Schulenburg's report was before him, Hitler had impatiently ordered even the trade discussions with Russia stopped.

V

From this point it is necessary to grope one's way through the maze of Nazi diplomacy, without certain documentary guidance. So far, through 15 tense weeks, if German diplomatists at home or abroad did not believe Britain and France would stand aside while Poland was crushed, they kept their heretical views to themselves. By July, however, it was becoming difficult to believe German pressure on Poland would not, in the end, lead to a general war. During the last days of June the attitude of the Germans in Danzig had become increasingly provocative, and the German press had ever more stridently called for "justice," that is, the right of Danzig to become a part of Germany. As the clamor grew, the attitude of Britain and France perceptibly stiffened. On July 1 the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, formally declared that "any action, whatever its form, which would tend to modify the status quo in Danzig, and so provoke armed resistance by Poland, would bring the Franco-Polish

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Agreement into play and oblige France to give immediate assistance to Poland." The British position, Dirksen reported on July 3, was equally firm. If war with the West did come, it was problematical how much support Germany would receive from Italy: with suspicious frequency, the Italians pointed out that they would not be ready for a general war for at least three years. As for Japan, the German Ambassador in Tokyo warned that continued pressure for alliance against Britain was likely to weaken Japanese willingness to make an alliance even against Russia.

While Hitler and Ribbentrop continued to assert that the courage of Britain and France would, in the end, collapse and while there is no evidence of open dissent from this view among the officials of the German Foreign Ministry, there is evidence that in Berlin, and in the Moscow embassy, there was recognition that Russia was becoming of central importance in the war of nerves. No sooner had Hitler ordered negotiations with Russia ended than arguments were presented not only for the continuance of the negotiations but also for greater concessions to Russian views. By July 7, Weizsäcker was able to sanction a renewed effort to begin the economic negotiations, although he cautioned that "we should on no account place ourselves in the position of suppliants." Suppliants the Germans might not wish to be, but the negotiations began, not only on Russian economic terms, but in Berlin. The Germans would have preferred Moscow, because the sending of a German economic envoy there would have attracted the attention of the British and Poles, with important political effects; but the Russians said they preferred Berlin, so Berlin it was.

The Germans need not have worried about the danger that negotiations in Berlin would be unobserved. No sooner were they begun than the entire Soviet press announced, on July 22, that they were taking place. The announcement was made at the very time the British press was discussing rumors that during the visit of a German official, Wohlthat, the British Government had offered a huge loan as compensation for the relaxation of German pressure on Poland. So great was the outcry against a return to the policy of appeasement that Chamberlain was forced to deny on July 24 that a loan was contemplated. As Dirksen sadly reported, in the atmosphere prevailing in Britain any plans for negotiations with Germany "would immediately be torpedoed

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by Churchill and other agitators with cries of 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to the policy of appeasement!' " Dirksen was convinced that "the few really decisive statesmen in Britain" had a clear view of the situation. They knew the extreme tension of the past three months could not go on. They were worried by the advance of Japan in the Far East; they were doubtful of the value of Poland as an ally; they knew the negotiations with Russia were stagnating. They would like to end the ominous drift by a "constructive" policy towards Germany. But they were, for the moment, prisoners of a bellicose public opinion.

The Italians took a similar view of the situation. Mussolini believed the tension had become so intolerable that the world would prefer war to continued uncertainty. He was convinced that this was the moment for an international conference; such a conference would, he believed, disrupt the unity of the front opposing Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop rebuffed this suggestion with vigor: any peace initiative by the Axis would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. The Axis was bound to win the war of nerves, he argued, because the Axis had steadier nerves than its opponents. Britain was not militarily prepared for war, and Britain had not been able to conclude the alliances necessary for war. Therefore the Axis must hold firm. "Time was on our side."

The difficulty was that time was running out. When Hitler had ordered the Wehrmacht to be ready for war with Poland by September 1, that date had been five months away. When, on May 23, he had announced his determination to crush Poland, there had seemed ample time to insure the isolation of Poland which he said was essential for the success of that operation. Now, however, less than six weeks remained before September 1, and by now the German Government had decided that September 1 was not the earliest, but almost the last day upon which operations could begin. By late September heavy rains were likely to make mechanized warfare in Poland impossible. To be on the safe side, the timetable had been advanced so that operations could begin by August 20, less than a month away. If the British and French Governments were not to be forced into war by the pressure of public opinion when the German armies struck, then the futility of war must be brought home to the peoples of Britain and France.

One cannot say with certainty that Hitler was forced to revise his policy towards Russia by recognition that time was running

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out. What is certain is that while Hitler had ordered efforts to secure even a trade agreement stopped on June 29, and while opinion within the German Government was still fluctuating two weeks later, the pace was rapidly accelerated in the days following the uproar in Britain over the supposed offer of a huge loan to Germany by the Chamberlain government. The official in charge of the economic negotiations, Schnurre, wrote privately on August 2 that, from about July 23, he had at least one conversation daily about Russia with Ribbentrop who was also constantly exchanging views with Hitler. "The Foreign Minister is concerned to obtain some result in the Russian question as soon as possible, not only on the negative side (disturbing the British negotiations) but also on the positive side (an understanding with us)."

VI

During the weeks which followed, the Nazis were driven, step by step, to meet every Soviet demand. The first step, on July 26, was a long dinner conversation, extending past midnight, between Schnurre, the Soviet chargé and the Soviet trade representative. Emphasizing that he was speaking on Ribbentrop's instructions, Schnurre declared that there was no real conflict of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R. at any point from the Baltic to the Black Sea and on to the Far East, and said he "could imagine a far-reaching arrangement of mutual interests" in all these areas. However, he warned, the opportunity to effect such an arrangement would be lost if the U.S.S.R. allied itself with Britain. The Russians expressed surprise and pleasure at these remarks; they reciprocated Schnurre's desire for improved relations, but emphasized that improvement could come only slowly.

A week later, on August 2, Ribbentrop intervened directly. In conversation with the Soviet chargé, he reiterated the German conviction that a far-reaching political agreement was possible and "dropped a gentle hint at our coming to an understanding with Russia on the fate of Poland." The chargé tried to elicit information on the concrete terms Ribbentrop had in mind; the latter said he was quite ready to be explicit when the Soviet Government stated that it also wished to put relations on a new basis.

During the days which followed, the German representatives repeatedly sought to draw from the Russians a definite statement

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of willingness to enter negotiations on political problems, but without success. At last, on August 10, Schnurre came to the point. He stressed the impossibility of any agreement if the U.S.S.R. concluded a military pact with Britain. Beyond that, however, he made it plain that war against Poland impended, and that a demarcation of spheres of interest in Poland was desirable before war came. This produced results. Two days later, the chargé reported that his government was interested in a discussion of political problems, including Poland, and wished the negotiations to take place in Moscow.

To Hitler it seemed that the road ahead was now clear. In a conference at Obersalzberg on August 14 he stated categorically that Russia would keep out of the war. Britain would, in the end, draw back: "the men I got to know in Munich are not the kind that start a new World War." Without Britain, France would not move.

That evening, Ribbentrop telegraphed new proposals to Schulenburg, proposals which he wished Stalin to receive in as exact a form as was possible without putting an incriminating document into Soviet hands. He proposed a linking of the Soviet and German economies, "which are complementary in every sphere." He proposed political coöperation. He affirmed "that there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries." To secure speedy agreement, he was prepared to come to Moscow himself "to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Russian relations."

By then, the September 1 deadline was less than three weeks away and the propaganda campaign preparatory to war with Poland was already approaching its strident climax. Foreign observers in Berlin were freely predicting that the question of Danzig if not the fate of Poland would be settled before the month was over. Hitler encouraged these prophets. In the past he had carefully concealed his plan of action from the indiscreet Italians. This time, he was very explicit. War against Poland might come any day, he told Ciano, and would come by the end of August unless Poland not only surrendered Danzig but altered "her general attitude."

German need was Russian opportunity. Even while they had suggested ever more plainly their desire for a political agreement with Germany, the Russians had continued their negotiations

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with the British and French. At the time that he had announced the opening of trade negotiations with Germany, Molotov had also suggested the sending of an Anglo-French military mission to Moscow as a means of speeding agreement with the Western democracies. The discussions of this mission with the Soviet military leaders were begun on the very day, August 12, that the Germans were told of Soviet willingness to begin political discussions. Now, on August 15, when Schulenburg presented Ribbentrop's proposal that he come to Moscow, Molotov stressed the need for "adequate preparation" before the arrival of so distinguished a visitor and asked whether Germany was prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact and to influence Japanese policy in the direction of better relations with the Soviet Union.

Two days later—and even this short interval seemed long to Ribbentrop—Schulenburg was back with fresh instructions. Germany would conclude a nonaggression pact. Germany was willing to influence Japanese policy in the desired direction. But speed was essential because "of the possibility of the occurrence, any day, of serious events." Ribbentrop was prepared to come to Moscow by airplane at any time after August 18. Molotov refused to be hurried, and laid out a timetable: first the economic agreement must be concluded; then "after a short interval" a political agreement could be made; however, there might now be an exchange of drafts of the proposed political agreement, and the Soviet Government would await with interest the German draft.

Promptly, Schulenburg received new instructions, which he executed in two interviews with Molotov on August 19. With only the thinnest covering of diplomatic verbiage, the Russians were told that war was imminent and that a delineation of spheres of influence was essential before the fighting started. In the first interview Molotov refused to set a date for Ribbentrop's visit. In the second, Molotov (apparently on new instructions from Stalin) agreed that Ribbentrop might come on August 26 or 27. Meanwhile, in Berlin, the trade agreement was finally signed.

Hitler now intervened with a letter to Stalin. Polish presumption, said Hitler, had produced intolerable tension which might lead to war any day. There was no time to lose. He asked that Ribbentrop be received on August 22, or at the latest on August 23; Ribbentrop would have full powers to draw up and sign the

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nonaggression pact and the political agreement. The letter was delivered on August 21. On the same day Stalin replied, agreeing to the arrival of Ribbentrop on August 23. That night, the German Government issued a communiqué telling of the impending conference for the purpose of concluding a nonaggression pact.

The final card had been played. It was a costly move. At the end of May, consideration for Soviet interests in Poland had been the highest price mentioned for a pact with the U.S.S.R. As late as August 16 Ribbentrop offered, so far as the Baltic States were concerned, only a joint guarantee of their independence. Now, in the pact of August 23, Finland, Estonia and Latvia were to be an exclusively Soviet sphere of influence. Russia was also to receive a large share of Poland. As for southeastern Europe, the Soviet claim to Bessarabia was acknowledged, while "the German side declares complete political *désintéressement* in these territories." In the search for "living space," a search which had seemed so easy in the spring, Hitler had been forced to surrender his claim to hegemony in the Baltic and in southeastern Europe.

The cost was high, but again Hitler was confident that he could now crush Poland without provoking general war. On August 22, before Ribbentrop reached Moscow, Hitler called his military leaders together once more. Most of what he said was an elaborate demonstration of the necessity for war with Poland, together with instructions for the ruthless conduct of the war. So far as Britain and France were concerned, his arguments were those he had used so often before: neither had really rearmed, both were obsessed by the frightful risks entailed by war, neither had strong leaders. He said the German attack would probably be launched on Saturday, August 26.

Momentarily, Hitler's optimism seemed justified by reports of the confusion caused in Britain and France by the Nazi-Soviet pact. On Wednesday, August 23, the attack on Poland was definitely set for Saturday, and on August 24 the first of the moves by which war was to be provoked was made by the Germans in Danzig. On August 25, however, there came two heavy blows: the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement was signed, and Mussolini made it plain that he would not intervene if Germany became involved in war with France and Britain. In the evening, the order to attack was cancelled.

There followed a week of desperate manœuvring. Much has been written of the "offers" made by Hitler in those last days of

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peace, but it is now clear that the offers were intended only to shake the determination of the British Government. Hitler had gone too far to retreat, and time had run out. On September 1, the German invasion began, with Hitler still vainly hoping that the political leaders of Britain and France would, at the last moment, lose their nerve.

VII

Over and over, through the spring and summer of 1939 the British and French Governments had said they would fight if Germany attacked Poland. These warnings went unheeded. In justification for his refusal to heed the warnings from London and Paris, Hitler invariably came back to the same arguments: Britain and France were militarily unprepared for war, and certainly for a war to protect Poland; they had threatened before, and had drawn back at the end; the men in power in 1939 were the same men whose will had collapsed in face of firm resistance. As he repeatedly boasted, he had bluffed and won before; what he had done when Germany was weak he could do again with confidence now that Germany was strong.

These boasts had an increasingly hollow sound from the last week of July. But by then the whole world had come to regard the question of Danzig as a decisive test of strength. Through the years since 1933 he had advanced from one victory to another by convincing his opponents that if they did not surrender he would annihilate them and, if necessary, bring what Bonnet called the house of Europe crashing in ruins. Now Hitler was confronted by the despised Poles; they not only remained steady through the war of nerves, but, despite all provocation, they avoided rash action which would place the onus of aggression on them. If they were able to defy him with impunity, the tide which had carried him from success to success would turn. In a last desperate effort to break the will of his opponents, he promised the hated Communists more for neutrality than he could win from war against Poland. Even under this pressure the courage of the Poles did not collapse. Retreat was now more impossible than ever. And so the diplomatic moves of March, intended at the outset only to advance Germany another stage along the road to supremacy in Europe, led inexorably, step by step, to war against the West in which the very existence of Germany was at stake.

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THE RENAISSANCE OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

By James H. Billington

IT IS ironic that in the recent events in Poland and Hungary a leading rôle was played by one of the most favored and privileged groups in Communist society, the intellectuals. It was the students who led the Hungarians into combat and provided the most active element wherever else in the Soviet bloc echoes of the Hungarian and Polish experience were heard. It is also ironic that this agitation occurred at a time when many social theorists in the West had all but concluded that Soviet intimidation and indoctrination made uprisings of the 1848 variety impossible in Communist lands. Clearly, some reappraisal is in order of the rôle of the intellectual class in Eastern Europe. For the student of international affairs such an examination should perhaps focus on two questions: What is the nature of the ferment among intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. itself? What is its political significance?

Since at least mid-1953, Soviet writers have been actively seeking greater liberty, attempting through both their writings and their public meetings to limit the authority of their Party supervisors. The Party's difficulties in sustaining controls in the post-Stalin era became evident when it proved unable to define a firm line at the Writers' Congress in December 1954. The situation worsened in the summer of 1956 when a number of heterodox works by formerly purged writers began to appear in literary journals and when *Questions of History*, the leading historical journal, pressed its campaign to reëxamine the Soviet past and "reëvaluate the bourgeois historical legacy" in the face of direct Party criticism. By early 1957, the régime was confronted with direct attacks on the long-sacred doctrine of "socialist realism" both in the review *Questions of Philosophy* and at the Ukrainian Writers' Congress.

Even more alarming than these manifestations of discontent was the fact that the older generation of disaffected intellectuals had apparently been joined by a large segment of the student population, which was both more important to the régime and more outspoken in criticizing it. Students appear to have played a leading rôle in the Georgian riots of March 1956; and young

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students and technologists figured large in *Pravda's* denunciation in April 1956 of "degenerate" excesses in the campaign of de-Stalinization.

After the Hungarian and Polish uprisings late in 1956, student insubordination and discontent reached a new level of intensity. Both the central and the provincial press were full of reports of "demagogic" and "anti-Party" demands at student and *komsomol* meetings; of expulsions from universities; of the dissemination of illegal handbill-type newspapers; and of increased interest in Hungarian, Polish and Jugoslav attitudes. Numerous students from Hungary and Poland were reportedly sent home; and beginning in December 1956 a determined and energetic campaign was launched to bring to an end the "rotten moods" which were said to have infected Russian students.

Although the pattern of unrest among Russian intellectuals resembled in broad outline that of the Poles and Hungarians, there was one important difference. The Russian movement lacked a political focus or a nationalistic rallying point. Whereas the intellectuals in the satellites could unite in opposition to foreign occupation and alien ways of life, the Soviet intellectuals could hardly help but feel a deeper sense of personal involvement in the Communist experiment. As a result, their discontent has tended to be more despairing and apolitical. Indeed, for the most part they are accused not of political agitation but of "anarchism," "nihilism," "subjectivism" and "individualism."

Their activity is, nonetheless, a source of deep and understandable concern to the régime. Even more than most states, the Soviet Union is dependent on its intellectual élite because of its determination to overtake the United States technologically and the fact that its very *raison d'être* as a state and a system is ideological. The Soviet régime cannot afford to revert to Stalinist oppression of the intellectuals, but neither can it tolerate their growing sense of estrangement from the Soviet system. Thus, its drive to restore discipline has alternated between warnings and exhortations to the Party *activs* among the intellectuals.

While a combination of piecemeal concessions and appeals for Party unity may satisfy some older intellectuals who have a twilight nostalgia for Lenin and the atmosphere of the twenties, the problem of the young students is deeper. These are children of the Stalin era only. They had been taught unceasingly to believe that, no matter what, there was in their system a "magic

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citadel" of infallibility in which their own lives acquired meaning and purpose. With the revelations of Khrushchev's secret speech, a deep shock set in—not so much at the revelation of Stalin's use of cruel means as at the gnawing thought that the end, in the name of which all this suffering was tolerated, had itself become hopelessly corrupted. When a myth as vast and pretentious as Stalin's becomes at last dispelled, those who have lived exclusively under its spell are left numbed, disarmed and resentful. It is not surprising that the most sensitive leaders of Soviet student life should feel unable to do anything but finish the job of negation which Khrushchev had begun and begin to look within themselves and their small circle of trusted friends for something new to live by and for.

It is in the light of a profound search for some new basis for personal integrity that the unrest of the young intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. must be understood. They are, as the régime has accused them of being, individualists. Although they do not know what they want, they are united in knowing what they do not want: the impersonal, petty and pointless world of bureaucratic state Communism. Their hero is Lopatkin, the lonely and persecuted inventor who is the main character in the new and much-discussed novel by Vladimir Dudintsev, "Not by Bread Alone." Lopatkin succeeds in spite of the system and the Communist Party rather than because of them, as is the standard pattern. He retains his individuality to the end, deriving his satisfaction from his work, from a small group of friends and from listening to great music.

When the régime accuses Dudintsev and his admirers of infection with ideological "survivals of the past" it may be pointing to a deeper truth than it realizes. A reëxamination of much of the Russian past has been going on during the last year, including a marked revival of interest in the long-proscribed figure of Dostoevsky; and there can be little doubt that current ferment in the U.S.S.R. does represent in many ways a reassertion along classical lines of the unrest and searching of the old pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia. "Intelligentsia" is after all a Russian word, and the inclusion of it as a class alongside the proletariat and the peasantry in the "progressive vanguard" is a purely Russian emendation to Marxism.

In its classical sense, intelligentsia meant, of course, much more than mere intellectuals in the somewhat pedantic Western sense

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—more even than the sum total of those who live by or engage in conceptual thought. The Russian intelligentsia derived their sense of identity from a common participation in the search for truth, for *pravda,* in the primitive, absolute sense in which the term was understood in nineteenth century Russia. The intelligentsia never agreed among themselves or even understood as individuals precisely what they meant by *pravda*; but they did clearly agree and understand what it was not. And this common opposition to its denial—to the *nepravda* (falsehood), *krivda* (crookedness) and, above all, *meshchanstvo* (petty bourgeois philistinism) of the autocratic state—gave them a sense of anguished seeking which perhaps knows no modern Western parallel.

One of the deepest students of the nineteenth century Russian intelligentsia, R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik, gave the subtitle "individualism and *meshchanstvo*" to his "History of Russian Social Thought;" and the story is indeed well told as a conflict between what Russian thinkers opposed, petty bourgeois mediocrity, and what they sought, a new basis for individual integrity. Thus, when Dudintsev entitles a novel "Not by Bread Alone" and when he lets his individualistic hero upbraid the established bureaucracy with the term "*meshchanskii* Communist," he is in a sense reasserting the renewed validity of the intelligentsia's classical search for individual integrity in the midst of the ideological desert of contemporary Soviet Communism.

It may not be too much to say that one of the first prerequisites for a revolutionary situation is coming into being in the U.S.S.R.: the alienation of the intellectual élite. The new leadership appears to have assumed—as Stalin never did—that the Soviet system was inherently stable, and that—unlike the régimes of Alexander I, Alexander II and Nicholas II—it would not be fundamentally disturbed by liberalizing measures. Seeking to reintroduce vitality and productivity to Soviet life, the Soviet leaders have given new status and opportunities to the intellectuals, and the intellectuals have apparently chosen to become once more an "intelligentsia."

Few of the other prerequisites for a revolutionary situation appear to exist in the U.S.S.R. at present; and there is, of course, no way of knowing that an intelligentsia in the old sense can or will reëmerge as a determining political factor under the very different conditions of the Soviet system and modern technocratic

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civilization in general. Nevertheless, some hints of the political significance of this rebirth of the intelligentsia may be found in the past history of this curious social grouping.

Just 100 years ago this June, the first issue appeared in London of Alexander Herzen's *Bell,* Russia's first émigré radical journal and one which set Russia off on a turbulent period of unrest. Then as now, Russia had just come out of a period of extreme social and intellectual repression, and its rulers were ready to grant cautious and limited reforms. Then as now, reforms tended to stimulate rather than satisfy the youth, whose hopes and expectations soon outdistanced not only the plans of the régime but the intentions of the older, moderate reformers as well. Then as now, the most vigorous elements of the young generation were united in outrage that the régime laid claim to "truth" in the exalted, Eastern sense of the word, yet was hopelessly mired in pettiness and bureaucracy.

Terms of abuse like "nihilist" and "anarchist" which are currently used by the Soviet leaders were originated by their Tsarist predecessors during this period. The vehicles of protest, the monthly "thick journals" and university gatherings, are the same as they were in the 1860s. Then as now, radicalism lacked any clear political focus and was often accompanied by social nonconformism and rowdyism—now known as "hooliganism." In 1863 as now, a cruel Russian repression of an uprising in Eastern Europe created a deep sense of mortification among Russian students and a sense of identity with the common victims of the oppressive Russian state. One even senses that the current student generation shares the implausible confidence felt by the radicals of the 1860s that the only real contending forces were themselves and virtually everyone in authority, "we" and "they."

To carry the parallel through to the end, one would have to conclude that the current unrest was destined to be no more than a new series of unorganized and undirected gestures and acts which might at best prove to be a harbinger of revolutionary developments many years hence. The argument against crediting any real political significance to the current unrest is further strengthened by considering the capabilities of the Soviet state to atomize and intimidate opposition.

Nevertheless, there is one important reason why the current ferment in the U.S.S.R. might produce greater and more immediate political results than did that of a century ago. Today,

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in contrast to then, most Russians have been taught to read, write and—in some sense—think. When the Russian populists of the 1870s "went to the people" they could not be understood, much less supported by the ignorant and inarticulate masses. Today, more people have at least the basic literacy required to understand the issues. Accordingly, the possibility has increased of infecting broader segments of the population with the intellectuals' strivings. Dudintsev's Lopatkin may prove no less of a prophet than some of the great heroes of nineteenth century Russian literature with his statement that "once a man has started to think you cannot deprive him completely of freedom."

Of course, even if the intelligentsia were to assume the vanguard rôle that has been suggested here, there would still be many problems in freeing Russian thought from its penchant for utopianism and its unfamiliarity with democratic political programs. But the outside world would do well not to underestimate or view condescendingly the Russians' potential ability to solve these problems for themselves if ever given the chance by history. A nation which can produce Dostoevsky and Tolstoy and survive the travails that Russia has known in more recent years must have deep inner resources. Their people may well prove able to create new forms of life and society which neither they nor the outside world will have foreseen, but which will answer their restive desire for freedom.

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By Henry L. Roberts

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THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By GRAYSON KIRK AND OTHERS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956, 158 p. $2.50.

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A British physicist succinctly reviews the state of the atomic arms race (through 1955) and offers his judgment and criticisms of various British and American political and strategic doctrines which have sprung up along the way.

ATOMIC QUEST. By ARTHUR HOLLY COMPTON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 370 p. $5.00.

A leading physicist's personal account of the wartime developments in atomic energy, culminating in the production of the atomic bomb.

MEN IN ARMS. By RICHARD A. PRESTON AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1956, 376 p. $6.50.

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A general survey of the history of warfare, with particular emphasis on the interrelation of military techniques and social organization.

DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER NATIONEN. By Günter Decker. Göttingen: Schwartz, 1955, 435 p. DM. 14.80.

An extensive theoretical and historical analysis of the principles and application of national self-determination. The author's examples are drawn from all regions of the globe.

REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. By A. Loveday. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 334 p. $6.75.

Though modestly presented as "reflections," this book by the former Director of the Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League of Nations presents many well-considered and sober conclusions on the problems of organizing and operating an international agency: the type of personnel required, the maintenance of staff morale and discipline, the functioning of committees, the conduct of research and the handling of finances.

THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Charles De Visscher. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 381 p. $5.00.

A good critical study by an eminent Belgian scholar and jurist of the relation between politics and law in the field of international relations. The original French edition was published in Paris in 1953.

GÉOGRAPHIE DE LA CIRCULATION AÉRIENNE. By Eugène Pépin. Paris: Gallimard, 1956, 341 p. Fr. 1200.

A survey of the development, exploration and regulation of the world's air lanes.

LE TRAVAIL PARLEMENTAIRE EN FRANCE ET À L'ÉTRANGER. By François Goguel and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 200 p. Fr. 500.

A symposium of studies on legislative procedure and methods in France, Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain and Italy.

CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS. By Amos J. Peaslee. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956, 3 v. Guilders 85.50. (New York: Justice House, $22.50.)

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS. By Amos J. Peaslee. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956, 2 v. Guilders 57. (New York: Justice House, $15.00.)

Two useful reference volumes. The second edition of the compilation of the world's constitutions (the first appeared in 1950) includes five new nations which have become sovereign, plus changes in the text or status of some 35 constitutions. The new work on international governmental organizations—a rapidly growing field—ranges from the African Postal Union to the World Meteorological Organization.

AN HISTORIAN'S APPROACH TO RELIGION. By Arnold Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 318 p. $5.00.

In 1952 and 1953 Mr. Toynbee delivered two courses of Gifford Lectures, on the historian's attitude and approach toward religion. The present book is based on these lectures.

SCIENCE, DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM. By Humayun Kabir. London: Allen and Unwin, 1955, 126 p. 12/6. (New York: Macmillan, 1956, $3.00.)

Essays, rather removed from practical politics, on a variety of philosophical and ideological themes.

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THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL 1889–1914. By James Joll. New York: Praeger, 1956, 213 p. $3.50.

An able history of the Second International from its founding to its mortal crisis in 1914. As the author contends, "The Socialist world was never to be the same again after 1914."

THE RAPE OF THE MIND. By Joost A. M. Meerloo. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1956, 320 p. $5.00.

A study, with some appalling terminology, of the "strange transformation of the free human mind into an automatically responding machine."

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 227 p. $3.95.

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1957, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of the governments of all countries; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; and lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors.

HISTORICAL ATLAS. By William R. Shepherd. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1956, 341 p. $12.50.

A welcome new edition printed by offset lithography—the original plates were destroyed in Germany—of a valuable reference. The additional maps prepared for the period since 1929 are not very satisfactory.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS. By Douglas H. K. Lee. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 182 p. $3.50.

Much of the underdeveloped area of the world is in the tropics. Most tropical countries are underdeveloped. Does the connection between these two facts lie in the obstacles to economic activity created by hot, wet climates? An investigation of this question launched by the Council on Foreign Relations led to this book. Dr. Lee, a physiologist and climatologist, examines the effect of tropical climates on humans, animals, soils and crops, materials, and industrial processes. The result is a clear statement of the present state of knowledge and an indication of the kinds of research still needed, both to appraise the obstacles created by tropical climates and to assess the means of overcoming them.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DES KLIMAS FÜR DEN INDUSTRIELLEN STANDORT. By Günter Grundke. Gotha: Geographisch-Kartographische Anstalt, 1955, 127 p. DM-Ost. 20.

A study of the rôle of climate as a factor in industrial location.

A PROPOSAL: KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY. By Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow. New York: Harper, 1957, 170 p. $2.75.

The "proposal" is to recognize an American interest in economic development that is distinct from the immediate political orientation of underdeveloped countries and to offer a substantial increase in development aid provided the would-be recipients can demonstrate their ability to use this aid effectively to supplement sound development programs.

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ECONOMIC COMMENTARIES. By Sir Dennis H. Robertson. London: Staples, 1956, 174 p. 18/. (New York: De Graff, $3.75.)

Essays and comments, a number of them concerning contemporary economic problems—the trade cycle, the sterling problem and inflation.

NATO: THE ECONOMICS OF AN ALLIANCE. By Ronald S. Ritchie. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 147 p. $3.00.

A solid and stimulating examination of the economic aspects of the NATO alliance: the economic base, burden sharing, the prospects for the future.

THE STERLING AREA IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Philip W. Bell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 478 p. $10.10.

A detailed study, by an American economist, of the internal working of the Sterling Area, its cohesiveness, its disturbances and adjustments.

FREE PORTS AND FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES. By Richard S. Thoman. Cambridge (Md.): Cornell Maritime Press, 1956, 203 p. $7.00.

A review of the movement to establish free ports and foreign-trade zones, most of the examples being drawn from the German and Scandinavian experience.

DIE WELTWIRTSCHAFT UND IHRE ROHSTOFFE. By Henry Guttmann. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1956, 531 p. DM. 19.80.

A broad survey, with numerous statistics, charts and maps, of the world economy and production of raw materials.

THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS. New York: New York University Press, 1956, 132 p. $4.00.

The proceedings of a conference, held in November 1955, dealing with the manpower and educational situation in American engineering and science.

MY FATHER, IRVING FISHER. By Irving Norton Fisher. New York: Comet Press, 1956, 352 p. $4.50.

A familiar, interesting and somewhat uneven biography of an eminent American economist best known for his long advocacy of stable money.

THE REFUGEE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. By John George Stoessinger. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 239 p. $4.50.

The author, who has himself been a refugee, here discusses this major contemporary problem and the international efforts—through the League of Nations and the I.R.O.—to meet it.

INDIAN STUDENTS ON AN AMERICAN CAMPUS. By Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 122 p. $3.00.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF SWEDISH STUDENTS. By Franklin D. Scott. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 129 p. $3.00.

FOREIGN STUDENTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Cora Du Bois. Washington: American Council on Education, 1956, 221 p. $3.50.

The first two books, dealing respectively with the experiences of Indian and Swedish students in American universities, are volumes in a series of monographs sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council. Miss Du Bois' study is a more general analysis of the problems and potentialities of international educational exchange.

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PROSPERO AND CALIBAN: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLONIZATION. By O. Mannoni. New York: Praeger, 1956, 218 p. $4.25.

An extremely interesting and stimulating psychological analysis of some of the more baffling features of human and social relations in colonial areas, drawn from the author's experiences in Madagascar. The original French edition, "Psychologie de la Colonisation," was published in 1950.

POPULATION. By Dennis H. Wrong. New York: Random House, 1956, 128 p. 95 cents.

A brief but useful introduction to demography and the world's major demographic problems.

The Second World War

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939–1946: THE WAR AND THE NEUTRALS. Edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 378 p. $8.00.

This volume of the Survey for the war years deals with such related topics as economic warfare, Latin America, the neutrals and the non-belligerent allies.

STUDIES OF OVERSEAS SUPPLY. By H. Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1956, 537 p. 37/6. (New York: British Information Services, $6.98.)

FOOD. VOLUME II: STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL. By R. J. Hammond. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1956, 835 p. 50/. (New York: British Information Services, $9.29.)

FINANCIAL POLICY, 1939–45. By R. S. Sayers. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1956, 608 p. 37/6. (New York: British Information Services, $6.98.)

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. VOLUME II: "THE GERMANS COME TO THE HELP OF THEIR ALLY" (1941). By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1956, 392 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $6.53.)

GRAND STRATEGY. VOLUME V: AUGUST 1943–SEPTEMBER 1944. By John Ehrman. London: H.M.S.O., 1956, 634 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, $7.82.)

The first three of these five volumes are in the Civil Series of the official British History of the Second World War, the last two are in the Military Series. Messrs. Hall and Wrigley deal with the problem of procurement and supplies from North America and the Eastern Hemisphere. Mr. Hammond, continuing an earlier volume, provides a number of monographs on specific commodities and on rationing. Professor Sayers deals with the policies evolved to meet the demands of war: budget policy, interest rate, capital issues control and financial relations with the Dominions and the United States. General Playfair's volume, one of a projected six on the Mediterranean and Middle East, covers Germany's assistance to Italy in the Balkans and North Africa in 1941. Of perhaps greatest general interest is Mr. Ehrman's volume on Grand Strategy, the fifth of a series of six, and covering the critical year August 1943 to September 1944, the year of the Quebec, Cairo and Teheran Conferences.

1940: LA GUERRE DES OCCASIONS PERDUES. By A. Goutard. Paris: Hachette, 1956, 406 p. Fr. 990.

An extensive analysis of the background and conduct of the war in the west in

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the spring of 1940, to demonstrate, as the title indicates, that a French victory was possible. The fault lay not with armaments or troop morale, but with a fallacious doctrine of war and military organization.

DIE LUFTSCHLACHT UM ENGLAND. By Theo Weber. Frauenfeld (Switzerland): Huber, 1956, 205 p. Swiss Fr. 7.40.

A detailed summary of the Luftwaffe's attack on Britain in 1940–1941.

AT WHATEVER COST. By R. W. Thompson. New York: Coward-McCann, 1957, 215 p. $3.50.

A reconstruction and appraisal of the costly and controversial raid on Dieppe in August 1942.

EIN MANN VERLIERT EINEN WELTKRIEG. By Karlheinrich Rieker. Frankfurt/Main: Fridericus Verlag, 1955, 307 p. DM. 15.90.

A quite comprehensive survey of the Eastern Front up to 1943. Illuminating in many details, though very brief on the major decisions. As the title indicates, the chief question is why Hitler lost the war, not why he started it.

FINLAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By C. Leonard Lundin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957, 303 p. $5.00.

A primarily diplomatic history of Finland's vicissitudes between 1939 and 1945, of particular interest for its comments and evaluations of other writers and books on this subject. Critical of a number of aspects of Finnish policy in those years.

SUOMEN KOHTALON RATKAISU KANNAKSELLA V. 1944. By K. L. Oesch. Helsinki: Otava, 1956, 216 p. M. 750.

An important contribution to the military history of the decisive events of 1944 by the Finnish general in command of the Karelian Isthmus sector.

THE O.S.S. AND I. By William J. Morgan. New York: Norton, 1957, 281 p. $3.75.

For half the book the author describes some of the tests administered in England to prospective spies and saboteurs from a number of Allied countries. He completes the volume with tales of his experiences in the Maquis which he joined at a late stage of the war.

The United States

DIPLOMACY IN A DEMOCRACY. By Henry M. Wriston. New York: Harper, 1956, 115 p. $2.50.

In these lectures given at the Associated Colleges at Claremont, California, the President Emeritus of Brown University develops the theme that "a sound professional diplomatic corps is neither impeded, on the one hand, nor guaranteed, on the other, by the fact of democracy." In his concise development of this thesis Dr. Wriston challenges a number of prevalent views on the workings of diplomacy in a democratic society. On the whole his findings are optimistic though certainly not complacent.

THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1957, 557 p. $6.00.

The author of "The Age of Jackson" turns now to the Age of Roosevelt, a four-volume study, of which the present book represents the substantial first installment. Actually it serves as a prologue and concludes with F.D.R.'s inauguration in March 1933; the principal theme is the abrupt reversal from prosperity to depres-

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sion and the ensuing temper of fear, bewilderment and disaffection. Mr. Schlesinger's narrative is tied very closely to the activities, statements and asides of leading political figures, a method which will doubtless evoke some lively objections, but which produces an extremely vivid portrait of the times.

WOODROW WILSON. By John A. Garraty. New York: Knopf, 1956, 206 p. $2.50.

One of the series "Great Lives in Brief;" has a helpful review of Wilson biographies.

WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM. By Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 504 p. $7.50.

The principal theme of this second volume of Mr. Link's important biography (the first volume, "Wilson: The Road to the White House," was published in 1947) is the President's effort to put his program into effect in the first years of his Administration. Although concentrating primarily on domestic themes, the present volume does deal with relations with the Central American republics.

A CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM: THE 1912 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by John Wells Davidson. New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation), 1956, 570 p. $6.00.

This contribution to the centennial brings together the full texts of nearly all of Wilson's major speeches, as well as sections of many minor ones, that he delivered in the 1912 campaign. Based largely on the shorthand notes of his campaign reporter, Charles L. Swem.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE RISE OF AMERICA TO WORLD POWER. By Howard K. Beale. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956, 600 p. $6.00.

A scholarly examination of Theodore Roosevelt's rôle in American foreign policy and international relations in the years when the United States was rapidly emerging as a world Power. While admiring Roosevelt's energy and ability, the author regrets his support of imperialism and his "urge for power."

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES. By Robert E. Cushman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, 248 p. $2.85.

Designed to be a "bird's-eye view of the entire field of civil liberties since the close of World War II:" problems, issues and selected readings.

THE HOOVER REPORT 1953–1955. By Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 344 p. $6.00.

A useful exposition of the Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By F. Jay Taylor. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, 288 p. $5.00.

A study of American policy and attitudes with regard to the Spanish Civil War. Not a major contribution to this thorny and much debated topic.

THE WORLD AT HOME. Selections from the Writings of Anne O'Hare McCormick. New York: Knopf, 1956, 343 p. $4.50.

A selection of articles on the United States between 1925 and 1945, by the late editorial writer and correspondent of *The New York Times.*

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PATRICK J. HURLEY. By Don Lohbeck. Chicago: Regnery, 1956, 513 p. $6.50.

A substantial but embattled biography of General Hurley's substantial but embattled career. Over half the book deals, as is to be expected, with the Second World War.

AS I SAW THE U.S.A. By James Morris. New York: Pantheon, 1956, 245 p. $3.95.

An interesting and perceptive travel book. The author, a British journalist, went many places and saw much. While disconcerted or dismayed by certain features of American life, he is no unfriendly critic.

IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, 1850–1950. By E. P. Hutchinson. New York: Wiley (for the Social Science Research Council in coöperation with the U.S. Bureau of the Census), 1956, 391 p. $6.50.

A detailed monograph on the foreign-born population of the United States in the last century, with particular emphasis on changes since 1920, and making extensive use of the tabulations of the 1950 census.

Western Europe

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. By A. H. Robertson. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1956, 252 p. $7.75.

A comprehensive study of the structure and operation of the Council of Europe since its founding in 1949. The author served as Counsellor in the office of the Clerk of the Consultative Assembly.

LES TAXIS DE LA MARNE. By Jean Dutourd. Paris: Gallimard, 1956, 275 p. Fr. 590.

A bitter and provocative condemnation of France's leadership in 1940. Invoking, in contrast, the episode of the Marne taxicabs of World War I, the young author traces the development of his own patriotism from the period of his two weeks' army career at the time of the fall of France.

EAST NORWAY AND ITS FRONTIER. By Frank Noel Stagg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 285 p. 25/. (New York: Macmillan, $5.75.)

This fourth of an able series of regional histories of Norway deals with the Oslo region and its Swedish frontier.

SWEDEN AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1956, 315 p. $3.00.

One of a current series of studies on international organization initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The report was prepared by a study group of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and is concerned primarily with defining and describing Sweden's attitude toward, and policy in, the U.N.

GERMANY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Edmond Vermeil. New York: Praeger, 1956, 288 p. $5.50.

An unsatisfactory translation of the second volume of the author's "L'Allemagne Contemporaine," originally published in Paris in 1952–53.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939–1946: FOUR-POWER CONTROL IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, 1945–1946. By Michael Balfour and John Mair. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 390 p. $7.70.

This volume in the very valuable series of the Survey dealing with the war

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years, 1939–1946, describes the work of the Allied Control Commissions in Germany and Austria in the first years of the Occupation. Both authors served in the British element of the Commissions.

DIE VERBÄNDE IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK. By Rupert Breitling. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1955, 303 p. DM. 23.60.

A study of economic, religious and political groups and organizations in West Germany and their influence in the Bundestag.

DAS DRITTE REICH UND DIE JUDEN. By Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf. Berlin: Arani, 1955, 457 p. DM. 39.50.

Documents, extensive and horrible, of the Third Reich's treatment of the Jews in German-occupied Europe.

DER FUNKTIONÄR IN DER EINHEITSPARTEI. By Joachim Schultz. Stuttgart: Ring, 1956, 285 p. DM. 22.50.

An analysis of the creation of the ruling cadres and bureaucracy in the S.E.D. of the Soviet Zone of Germany. A contribution to the study of the élites in totalitarian régimes.

NATIONALISM AND LIBERTY. By Hans Kohn. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 133 p. $3.25.

An essay, by a leading student of nationalism, on the development and character of Switzerland as a nation.

DIECI ANNI TRA ROMA E WASHINGTON. By Alberto Tarchiani. Milan: Mondadori, 1955, 356 p. L. 2200.

Valuable diplomatic memoirs covering the decade after 1945. Ambassador Tarchiani was intimately concerned with many major issues of Italian foreign policy —the lost colonies, Trieste, the peace treaty, and the Marshall Plan and NATO.

LO SCRITTOIO DEL PRESIDENTE (1948–1955). By Luigi Einaudi. Turin: Einaudi, 1956, 677 p. L. 3000.

In these occasional writings and speeches prepared during his term of office, former President Einaudi expresses his attachment to the classical liberal tradition in both economic and political questions.

VATICAN ASSIGNMENT. By Sir Alec Randall. London: Heinemann, 1956, 210 p. 21/.

Primarily memoirs of the Vatican in the late 1920s, when the author was a secretary at the British Legation to the Holy See, but including many general observations on Vatican diplomacy.

THE ADRIATIC SEA. By Harry Hodgkinson. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 256 p. $5.00.

A pleasant sketch of the eastern and western coasts of the Adriatic, but not a great deal on recent events.

Eastern Europe

A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By Georg von Rauch. New York: Praeger, 1957, 493 p. $6.75.

RUSSLAND: STAATLICHE EINHEIT UND NATIONALE VIELFALT. By Georg von Rauch. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953, 235 p. DM. 15.60.

The first of these is a substantial, though not particularly inspired, one-volume

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history of the Soviet Union, a translation of "Geschichte des Bolschewistischen Russland" (Wiesbaden: Rheinische Verlags-Anstalt, 1955, 607 p. DM. 21.80). The earlier work by Dr. Rauch, Professor of Russian History at the University of Marburg, deals with federalistic forces and concepts in Russian history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By R. D. Charques. New York: Dutton, 1956, 284 p. $3.95.

A concise, competent and readable general survey.

THE RUSSIAN STRUGGLE FOR POWER, 1914–1917. By C. Jay Smith, Jr. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, 553 p. $4.75.

This survey of Russian foreign policy during the First World War up to 1917 is not wholly successful in substantiating its argument that "there is more than a passing resemblance between the Tsarist policies of 1914–17 and those of Stalin between 1941 and 1948."

KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN'S GHOST. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Praeger, 1956, 322 p. $3.95.

A very useful commentary on Khrushchev's now famous report delivered in February 1956 at a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress.

THE RED ARMY. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Harcourt, 1956, 480 p. $6.00.

A valuable symposium of 39 essays, by many specialists, on various facets of the Soviet Army—its organization, tactics, history, performance and capabilities. Although there is some unevenness in the contributions, the study is on the whole very well organized.

THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM AND SOVIET ADMINISTRATION. Edited by Rudolf Schlesinger. London: Routledge, 1956, 299 p. 30/. (New York: Humanities Press, $6.00.)

Selected Soviet documents and readings on the development of nationalities policies in the U.S.S.R.

PAASIKIVEN LINJA. By Juho K. Paasikivi. Helsinki: Söderström, 1956, 2 v. M. 2000.

A collection of the political and economic speeches of the late President of Finland, covering the years 1923–1956.

SIRPIN JA VASARAN TIE. By Arvo (Poika Tuominen). Helsinki: Tammi, 1956, 333 p. M. 980.

Readable and revealing memoirs of Finland's most influential (or most articulate) ex-Communist.

EESTI RIIK JA RAHVAS TEISES MAAILMASÕJAS. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1954–56, 3 v.

The first three volumes of an extensive collection of articles providing detailed information on events in Estonia shortly before and during World War II. Seven more volumes are to follow.

FIGHTING WARSAW. By Stefan Korbonski. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 495 p. $6.75.

A personal account of the wartime Polish Underground by the then Chief of the Directorate of Civil Resistance. An interesting close-up, which, however, throws relatively little light on military affairs.

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NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND POPULAR REVOLT IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Paul E. Zinner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, 563 p. $2.95.

A collection of Communist documents—speeches, Party resolutions, editorials, etc.—on the events in Poland and Hungary from February to November 1956.

MEMOIRS OF MICHAEL KAROLYI. New York: Dutton, 1957, 392 p. $6.50.

In this autobiography of the late Count Karolyi, who had two brief and disastrous periods of political activity in Hungary separated by years of exile, one gains a most revealing and touching picture of a significant if rather exceptional strand of twentieth-century political attitudes: the humane aristocrat who turns from his class and takes up the ideals of Socialism only to find his ideals betrayed by the Communists.

LA SLOVAQUIE DANS LE DRAME DE L'EUROPE. By Joseph A. Mikus. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1955, 475 p. Fr. 1350.

A Catholic discussion of Slovak efforts at independence, throwing some new light on the vicissitudes surrounding the secession of Slovakia from the Czechoslovak Republic (1939) and on the Slovak uprising (1944).

WITHIN CLOSED FRONTIERS. By Lena A. Yovitchitch. Edinburgh: Chambers, 1956, 253 p. 10/6.

A modest but effective personal picture of the Serbian civilian population during the wartime German occupation.

ALBANIA. Edited by Stavro Skendi. New York: Praeger (for the Mid-European Studies Center), 1956, 389 p. $7.50.

This volume, the first of a series of seven handbooks on East Central Europe under the Communists, is a most useful reference work on a country for which there is very little literature. Following a brief historical and geographic introduction are surveys of the political and economic systems, and cultural and social developments. Sketches of leading Communists, chronology and bibliography.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. By Frank H. Underhill. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1956, 127 p. $2.00.

A brief introduction, by a Canadian scholar, to the rise and continuing evolution of the Commonwealth.

AMERICA AND THE BRITISH LEFT. By Henry Pelling. New York: New York University Press, 1957, 174 p. $3.50.

This historical review of attitudes toward the United States on the part of members of the British "left" from Bright to Bevan provides a useful background to Leon D. Epstein's recent work "Britain—Uneasy Ally" (noted here January 1956).

BRITISH BROADCASTING. By Burton Paulu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 457 p. $6.00.

An extensive description and appraisal of radio and television.

UNREPENTANT TORY. By Robert Blake. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 556 p. $9.00.

An exceptionally able and readable authorized biography of Andrew Bonar Law.

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THE FLAG IN THE WIND. By J. M. MacCormick. London: Gollancz, 1955, 222 p. 13/6.

A personal account, by the Chairman of the Scottish Covenant Association, of the national movement for a "free Scotland in a Federal United Kingdom" in the years from 1928 to 1954.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIAL POLICY. By J. D. Legge. Sydney: Angus and Robertson (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1956, 245 p. 25/. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $3.50.)

A historical survey of Australian administration on Papua.

The Middle East

MID-EAST: WORLD-CENTER. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen in collaboration with Ernest Jackh. New York: Harper, 1956, 386 p. $6.50.

This seventh volume in the Science of Culture Series is a symposium of studies by a number of experts on the history, politics, economy and culture of the "navel of the world."

THE IDEAS OF ARAB NATIONALISM. By Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, 227 p. $4.00.

A survey, analysis and defense of Arab nationalism, by an American-trained official of the Jordanian Government. In the author's view the goal of political unity for the Arab world is indispensable for the future of the Middle East—unity fortified by economic and social reform.

THE ARAB BLOC IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By G. Moussa Dib. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1956, 128 p.

A serious but somewhat confusing discussion of the positions taken by the Arab bloc with respect to leading problems before the U.N. in the last decade.

VIOLENT TRUCE. By Commander E. H. Hutchison. New York: Devin-Adair, 1956, 199 p. $3.50.

Personal experiences of a U. S. military observer in the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Very critical of Israeli actions.

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the area stretching from Pakistan to Japan, Canada and the ANZUS countries. Mr. Ganguli is Professor of International Trade at the Delhi School of Economics, joint editor of the *Indian Economic Review,* and has served on Indian delegations to several international meetings.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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